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SUMMARY
An investigation was made to determine the effects of (I)a safe-life design
approach and (2) a fail-safe design approach on the space shuttle booster
vehicle structure, and to recommend any changes to the structural design
criteria document, NASA SP-8057, that might appear advisable as a re-
sult of this study. Two conflgurat/ons of the booster vehicle were consid-
ered, one incorporating a delta wing (B-9U configuration) and the other a
swept wing (B-16B configuration). Advaniage was taken of Phase B studies
already made by Convair Aerospace on the space shuttle booster. These
studies provided extensive data on structural arrangements, member sizing,
weight, cost, and other aspects of design, construction, and operation of
the space shuttle booster.
Several major structural components of the booster were studied in depth,
each being examined to determine the fatigue life, safe-life, and fall-safe
capabilities of the baseline design. Each component was further investi-
gated to determine the practicability of applying a safe-life or fail-safe
design philosophy, the changes such design approaches might require, and
the impact of these changes on weight, cost, development plans, and
performance.
It was found that:
a. Conventional fatigue is not a critioal design cond/tion for the booster
structure because of its short design service life.
b. Most components invest/gated showed safe-lives in excess of the 100
mission design level. The wing box, however, showed a short safe-
life of three missions in both the B-9U delta and the B-16B swept con-
figurations with an initial flaw of the maximum size permitted by
NDE methods. The short life is ascribed to the severity of the load-
ing spectrum and the criticality of the assumed flaw configuration.
c. The baseline propellant tanks are not fall-safe. Moreover, attempts
to provide fracture arrest capability by means of crack stoppers
showed prohibitive weight increase.
d. The B-9U delta wing and the thrust structure are shown to require
some increase in section to attain full fall-safe capability, while a
change in basic configuration appeared advisable in thd case of the
aft orbiter support frame if fail-safe design is required. The other
components investigated were shown to have a high degree of fail-safe
capability in their baseline configuration.
xiu
eo
f.
The weight impact of the safe-Life or fall-safe design approaches for
the components investigated was small, being 0.5 to 1. 0 percent of
their baseline weight.
The choice of a safe-life or fall-safe design approach did not exert a
strong influence on booster cost or performance.
Finally, a number of modifications to NASA SP-8057, "Structural Design
Criteria AppLicable to a Space Shuttle," are proposed, based primarily
on the study results.
X1V
SE C TION 1
IN TRODU C TION
1.1 SPACE SIIUTTLE REQt_I_MENTS AND CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT
The space shuttle system represents a major advance in structural technology. It
embodies the characteristics of aircraft, spacecraft, and launch vehicles and their
associated severe environments and loads, long mission life, high-reliability require-
meat, _nd considerations for low cost and weight.
New requirements (Reference 1) for "fracture control" to prevent catastrophic service
iailures of pressure vessels, pressurized structures, and other primary structural
components necessitate that the stlmcture be assumed to contain initial flaws prone to
brittle fracture. For space shuttle vehicles it is imperative that the need for damage
tolerance be recognized and provided for in the initial design. Prediction of residual
strength and residual life assuming damaged structural elements must supplement
conventional static strength and fatigue analysis. Materials and structural arrange-
ment selected nmst provide sufficient residual strength and life to allow the vehicle to
remain flightworthy to the next major structural inspection after initiation of an unan-
ticipated fatigue crack. In addition, the critical fatigue crack size must be large
enough to be reliability detected by conventional ihspection methods.
Preliminary structural design criteria (Reference 2) have been developed for the space
shuttle system. These criteria were prepared by a committee formed from representa-
tives of major aerospace companies with an interest in the space shuttle, and reviewed
by NASA personnel experienced in structures technology. They are the required cri-
teria to develop a successful space shuttle system as determined by the committee.
A number of important structural criteria problems were identified by this activity,
:rod the present study was directed toward providing greater insight into one of these
problem areas: safe-life and fail-safe criteria.
Since the preliminary criteria developed in Reference 2 were based on past experience
with either very short life aerospace systems (e. g., one-mission expendable spacecraft
or launch vehicles) or very long life aircraft systems, it appeared prudent to re-
examine the preliminary safe-life and fail-safe criteria and their weight, cost, and
performance impact in the light of the anticipated space shuttle mission requirements.
Such examination is the prinmry purpose of this study.
The emerging role of fracture mechanics as an engineering tool may have significant
effects on the choice of safe-life or fail-safe criteria and design approaches on the
spaceshuttle. Similarily, non_testructive testing (NDT) cai_tbility can also introduce
constraints. These disciplines are used in this study to determine these effects and
to illustrate their potential usage.
1.2 SAFE-LIFE AND FAIL-SAFE DESIGN PHILOSOPttY
All vehicles are designed for fatigue life in excess of the expected service life; however,
the approach to providing residual strength or residual life in structures in the event of
induced or inherent damage can be provided by designing for fail-safe or safe-life. For
example, in commercial transport aircraft where safety is of utmost concern, fail-safe
capability is provided to the greatest possible extent. For military aircraft where per-
lbrmance is of primary concern, fail-safe capability is not provided where it would cost
weight to do so, reliance being placed on the fatigue analysis and tests to screen out
potential structural damage, and safe-life analysis of assumed defects is used to estab-
lish safe inspection intervals. For single mission launch vehicles and spacecraft,
reliance is placed on safe-life analysis of assumed defects and proof tests of each arti-
cle to provide safe-life in excess of the short service life.
Fail-safe design requires that the failure of any single structural cunq_onent will not
degrade the strength or stiffness of the remainder of the structure to the extent that
the vehicle cannot complete the mission at a specified percentage of limit loads. Fail-
safe design is normally achieved by providing structural redundancy and the means for
arresting unstable crack growth. On the other hand safe-life design requires suffici-
ently low design stresses that catastrophic failm_es of critical structural components
will not occur during a specified service life due to initiation and growth of fatigue
cracks, or due to the growth of flaws and defects that already exist in the structure.
The safe-life of a structure is usually taken as an arbitrary multiple or increment of
the specified service life depending on whether the concern is for the initiation of fatigue
cracks or the growth of existing defects. For fatigue the arbitrary multiple is usually
taken as four service lives and for the growth of flaws or defects the increment is
usually taken as the interval between major scheduled inspections.
Some confusion exists in Reference 2, the aerospace industry, and NASA regarding a
precise definition of safe-life. Some engineers, particularly aircraft designers con-
cerned with long life structures, define safe-life as the life of a component to the initia-
tion of fatigue cracks. Other engineers, particularly those with fracture mechanics
training, define safe-life as the component life for initial defects in the component to
grow to critical size and failure. A third group, including the authors, feel that sale-
life encompasses both of the above failure modes. For purposes of this report and to
be consistent with the definitions of Reference 2, the following definitions are adopted:
a. Fatigue life is the life of an unflawed structural component to the initiation of
visible fatigue cracks.
b. Safe life is the life for initial defects in a componentto grow to a critical size
for catastrophic failure.
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY
The present study was undertaken with the following objectives:
a. To determine the extent to which application of the present space shuttle booster
structural desig_ criteria, as contained in Reference 2, results in safe-life (safe
flaw growth) and fail-safe capabilities, as well as adequate fatigue life, in the
space shuttle booster structure.
b. To determine the effects of the safe-life or fail-safe design approaches, or com-
binations of these, on weight and cost of the space shuttle booster, including the
sensitivities of quality control, operational, and maintenance plans to such
appl_ ache s.
c. To identify the optimum criteria for safe-life or fail-safe design, based on the
impact of the criteria on weight, cost, and service life, giving consideration to
vehicle performance and inspection intervals.
d. To formulate specific revisions to Reference 2 as required to impose the optimum
design criteria requirements identified in the study.
e. To propose modification to the space shuttle operations plan, if the criteria revi-
sions recommended arc incompatible with the existing plan.
1.4 STUDY APPROACH
The study approach consisted of selecting two baseline heat-shield-protected space
shuttlebooster vehicles, performing safe-lifeand fail-safeanalyses on them, and
determining the impact of alternativelyemphasizing safe-lifeor fail-safedesign ap-
proaches on booster weights, performances, costs, and service lives. From these
investigations the fatigue, safe-life,and fail-safecapabilityof the booster structural
elements which 1_sulted from following the preliminary structural design criteria
of Reference 2 were determined. Also evaluated were the structural weight increases
required to meet selected safe-lifeand fail-saferequirements and the adequacy of
preliminary test and maintenance plans developed for the baseline boosters. With this
background, recommended safe-life/fail-safecriteria and design approaches were
developed.
Two booster configurations were studied because it was anticipated that the study re-
suits would be sensitive to configuration. For example, a delta wing configuration
3
wo_ld be less sensitive than a sweptwing configuration to alternatively applied safe-
life amt fail-safe designapproaches, becauseof the inherent fail-safe capability of the
multispar delta wing. The two booster configurations selected are presented in Section
2: they are essentially the samebooster with alternative delta and sweptwing planforms.
The stud.vdid not include the orbiter becauseof lack of detail knowledgeanddata on the
orbiter (i.e., Convair Aerospacers Phase B studies have been limited to the space
shuttle booster) and the low funded effort. It is believed by the authors that the study
results are generally applicable to the orbiter; however, caution should be exercised
and orbiter studies accomplished before this conclusion can be fully satisfied.
The scope of the program also did not permit study of the entire booster structural
system; however, the major structural components were studied. These included the
main LO 2 and LH 2 propellant tanks, thrust structure, vertical tail box, aft orbiter
support frame, and wing boxes, which represent approximately 45 percent of the
booster primary structural weight, 25 percent of the booster dry weight, and 60 per-
cent of the total booster structural system cost. Not included in the study were the
thermal protection system, canards, crew cabin, intertank adapter and other miscel-
laneous sub-components.
The choice of safe-life or fail-safe design criteria and approaches have significant
impact on development plans such as structural test and maintenance plans; these
plans are examined in some detail in Sections 4 and 5. Other development plans such
as operational plans, quality control plans, and engineering are not examined in detail
because the effects of design criteria and approaches on these factors are not consid-
ered significant, or the impact is measured indirectly through the maintenance and
test plans discussed above.
Cost effects are presented as increments to the preliminary cost estimates for the
development, acquisition, and operation of the baseline booster systems. Total costs
are also presented. Cost increments are calculated for any changes identified in the
booster structure and weight, and for test hardware and manhours to accomplish addi-
tional tasks.
In Figure 1-1, the procedural path followed in accomplishing the study is diagrammed.
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Figure 1-1. Safe-Life/Fail-Safe Criteria Identification Logic for Spaoe Shuttle Booster

SECTION 2
BASE LINE BOOSTE R DE FINITION
2.1 BOOSTER MISSION
The Space Shuttle Program is designed to provide a space transportation system capable
of placing and/or retrieving payloads in earth orbit. The specific mission considered
in this study consists of launching an orbiter vehicle into a 100 n.mi. south polar orbit
from WTR with a 40,000-pound payload. These objectives are achieved using a two-
st_agc (booster and orbiter) vehicle capable of boost and earth entry with cruise-back
to a designated landing site. This cycle is accomplished with reasonable acceleration
levels and shirt-sleeve cabin environment. The significant elements of this mission
are ground operations, mating of booster and orbiter, launch followed by staging of
the two vehicles, with the booster returning to the launch area and the orbiter contim_-
ing on to its prescribed orbit. A complete mission cycle is shox_m in Figure 2-1.
A typical mission flight profile for the booster is shown in Figure 2-2.
2.1.1 ASCENT. The ascent phase is defined as beginning with engine ignition and
ending with the initiation of separation. In the ignition/lift-off sequence, the thrust
rises to 50 percent of full thrust and holds at that level until main-stage in all engines
can be verified t:nd holddown release is verified. Upon vc:'i _cation, the thrust is in-
creased at a controlled rate to 100 percent. The vehicle lift-off occurs when the
thrust-to-weight ratio (T/W) is greater than 1.
After the vehicle has cleared the service towers, the vehicle is oriented to the correct
azimuth and pitch to provide the proper trajectory such that the vehicle assumes a
wing-level, pilot-side-up attitude and correct azimuth. As propellant is depleted,
along with increased thrust at altitude, the vehicle acceleration increases to 3 g. At
this point, the main engines are throttled to maintain 3 g for crew comfort and vehicle
design loads. Ascent ph: _e is terminated by initiation of separation based on attain-
ment of desired velocity or by indication of fuel depletion. Figure 2-3 gives a variety
of ascent trajectory parameters. The booster weight decreases from 4,188,000 pounds
at launch to about 808,000 pounds at separation, while achieving a velocity of 10,824
fps at an altitude of 244,784 feet. After separation the orbiter continues on its mission
and the booster positions itself for entry.
2.1.2 ENTRY. The entry mode for the booster is a supersonic gradual transition.
High-lights of the entry are shown in Figure 2-4. During the first 40 _econds after
staging the booster pitches to 60 degrees angle of attack and banks to 48 degrees. That
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attitude is maintained until the resultant load factor reaches 4.0 g, occurring at Mach
$.4 and 144,000 feet altitude. Pitch modulation starts at this time to keep from ex-
ceeding4.0 g. The lower stability limit constrains the angle of attack from goingbe-
low 30 degreesduring this maneuver. Uponreaching 30degrees, the bank angle is
raised to 75degrees, which is held until the vehicle has completed its turn. A maxi-
mum q of 409psf is reachedat Mach 6.3 and 110,800 feet altitude. By Mach 3.25,
fl_eangleof attack has returned to 56 degl_ees. Beginningthere, the angle of attack
is cow,strained by the upper stability limit, reducing to 5 degrees at Mach = 1.1.
"_Vhen the booster reaches 20,000 feet, the flyback range is 404 n.mi. At the comple-
tion of the entry phase the gross weight of the booster has decreased slightly to about
787,000 pounds.
2.1.3 ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT. At approximately 20,000 feet, the air-breathing en-
gines are deployed and the return cruise is initiated.
The vehicle descends to approximately 13,000 feet and is flown at the altitude that is
for best cruise specific range (maximum n.mi. per pound of fuel) for the required
flyback range of 404 n.mi. Landing is based on a touchdown speed at the trimmed
power-off C L for an angle of attack of 14 degrees. The landing distance varies with
the vehicle gross weight, but with a touch down weight of 628,000 pounds, about 5625
feet are required for landing over a 50-foot obstacle. This distance is for a standard
day condition at sea level using braking on a dry concrete runway.
2.2 BOOSTER CONFIGURATIONS
As discussed in Section 1.4, t_vo booster configurations are studied to determine the
effect of configuration oa safe-life/fail-safe design criteria and related weight, per-
formance, and cost impact.
2.2.1 B-9U DELTA WING BOOSTER. The B-9U booster is a low, delta wing vehicle
with a single vertical tail and a small canard surface mounted forward above the body
centerline. The body is basically a cylinder with fairings added to streamline the in-
tersections with the aerodynamic surfaces. Figure 2-5 shows a general view of the
delta wing booster.
The baseline booster configuration consists of cylindrical tanks to contain the launch
propellants and to serve as the structural backbone. Surrounding the basic body struc-
ture is an outer heat shield assembly that provides the protective layer against aero-
dynamic heating and an aerodynamic surface for the body. This aerodynamic surface
varies from a round body section at the nose to a flat-bottomed section at the delta
wing, which is attached to the underside of the body structure. The delta wing, with
its elevons, canards, and the vertical tail, provides the aerodynamic surfaces re-
quired for stability and control for both supersonic and subsonic flight.
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Figure 2-5. B-9U Delta Wing Booster Vehicle Configuration
For the vertical launch, mated with the orbiter, the booster thrust is provided by 12
main propulsion engines, with a nominal thrust of 550,000 pounds per engine, that
burn liquid hydrogen and oxygen and are arranged in the aft end of the vehicle.
Control of the vehicle during powered ascent is provided by gimballing the main en-
gines for thrust vector control and by using elevons for additional roll control. Sub-
sonic cruise thrust for flyback after a space mission or for ferry flight is provided
by 12 air-breathing engines mounted in nacelles. These engines are normally stowed
within the wing and body structure envelope during the vertical flight and entry.
Attitude control outside the earth's atmosphere is provided by the attitude control
propulsion system (ACPS) engines installed on the fuselage and wings. The ACPS
engines use LO2/LH 2 propellants and provide 2100 pounds thrust each.
Landing is accomplished using a conventional tricycle landing gear, including two 4-
wheel-bogie main landing gear assemblies and a dual-wheel steerable nose gear
assembly.
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The booster incorporates a mating and separation system on its top surface to support
the orbiter during vertical flight and to perform the separation of the two vehicles.
Figure 2-6 shows a three-view drawing of the booster basic configuration.
Internally the booster is arranged with the LO 2 tank forward and the LH 2 tank aft.
The selection of cylindrical tanks with separate, state-of-the-art bulkheads, and of
cylindrical intertank section and thrust barrel all combined into a primary load-
carrying structure, was made to -maintain simplicity of the design and manufacture,
to increase confidence, and to reduce development risk.
The tanks have ellipsoidal bulkheads with radius-to-height ratios equal to ¢_- to
minimize hoop compression effects. The tanks are of aluminum alloy, with longitu-
dinal integral T-stringcrs. They provide the primary load-carrying structure of the
booster as well as functioning as pressure vesscls. The tank diameters are 33 feet.
All structural frames are external to the main tanks. The LO 2 tank is 667 inches loag,
as shown in Figure 2-7. The LO 2 tank is not insulated.
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Figure 2-6. B-9U Delta Wing Booster Three View
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]"our main LO2 lines are routed through the lower body main structure/heat shield
interslrace, past the main landing gear and aft to the vehicle base.
The LIt 2 tank is similar in geometry to the LO2 tank, except for the length of 1779
inches, as shownin Figure 2-7. Figure 2-8 shows the body structure.
For the mixture ratio of 6:1, with added volume of 7.1 percent (for ullage, potential
tanking at minimum specific impulse, and for internal insulation) a total LH 2 tank
volume of 120,160 cubic feet results; for the LO 2 tank, which does not have any in-
sulation, a factor of 4.5 percent is added to cover ullage and minimum specific im-
pulse, for a tank volume of 40,900 cubic feet. The LH 2 tank construction is similar
to the LO 2 tank_ except that there are no anti-slosh baffles in the LH 2 tank because
the low density fuel does not require them. Internal insulation is used to reduce
thermal shock at tanking and to reduce heat leaks and cryopumping potentials associ-
ated with external insulation. The basic structural external frames are increased in
section modulus at the aft attach points to the orbiter and in the main landing gear and
wing box attach link pickup points.
The tanks are joined by a cylindrical intertank section that supports the canard pivot
and the forward attach links to the orbiter. The intertank section Is shown in Figure
2-9.
The intertank section is a conventional skin-stringer-frame assembly with built-up
frames to support the orbiter attach links and the canard pivot points. The LO 2
lines run aft and occupy the lower intertank space. The canard pivot actuators are
shown, four per side below _e pivot point 50 inches above the body centerline. The
intertank section contains the LH 2 and LO 2 tanks for the ACPS and auxiliary power
unit (APU) supply. A single LH 2 tank for both systems is provided. The orbiter for-
ward attach points are at the aft LO 2 dome/intertank joint and take the axial loads as
well as pitch and side loads, while the aft attach points, which take pitch and sideloads
only, are at Station 2666 in the LH 2 tank region (Section G-G of Figure 2-7.)
The top of the booster is flat in the stage interface region to fair out the attach frames
of the booster and to accommodate the booster linkage after separation. The booster/
orbiter separation system is a linkage type using booster thrust and orbiter inertia to
produce positive separation. It is selected as the only system with the present con-
figuration that will operate feasibly in the case of high dynamic pressure separation,
as is required by abort criteria. The orbiter is arranged piggyback on the booster.
This mating was initially done to allow rollout of the mated configuration to the
launch pad on the booster main gear.
The aft end of the LH 2 tank picks up the cylindrical thrust skirt, which is also 33 feet
in diameter and includes truss-type thrust beams that intersect to form the main
14
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Figure 2-9. B-9U Intertank Section
engine thrust pad/gimbal support points. The thrust structure is a structurally con-
nected titanium truss beam assembly with intersecting parallel vertical and horizon-
tal beams, as shown in Figure 2-10. The beam intersections support the gimbal pad
points. The beams are constrained by peripheral frames that transfer the loads into
the cylindrical thrust skirt. The LH 2 tank exits via a vortex baffle into a sump that
branches into 12 fuel ducts to each engine. The engines have a fixed, low-pressure
pump attached to the booster structure and a high-pressure pump on the engine. This
arrangement allows the feed lines traversing the gimbal point to be of reduced dia-
meter, eliminating the need for heavy pressure volume compensating ducts, and facili-
tating gimballing to the required ±10 degrees. The four LO 2 lines branch at the aft
end of the booster into three lines each to serve the 12 engines. The engine propellant
inlets and thrust structure are arranged for acceptable clearance in the selected pattern.
The LO 2 lines are designed to have equal lengths from tank exit to pump inlet to mini-
mize residuals. Each individual propellant feed line has a prevalve for a total of 12
for LO 2 and 12 for LH 2,
The aft skirt that flares out for the rocket pump packages is an extension of the thermal
protection system (TPS). The fairing is pocketed to accommodate the four support and
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Figure 2-10. B-9U Thrust Structure
hold-down longerons that transmit their axial load directly into the thrust barrel. The
external skirt that protects the thrust structure and engine pump packages from ther-
mal and aerodynamic loads is shaped to minimize booster base area as is seen in
view M-M of Figure 2-7. The base heat shield consists of corrugated sheet with in-
ternal insulation. The heat shield is located in a plane through the nozzle throats of
the main engines. Each engine has a spherical radius collar at the throat that wipes
a matching hole in the heat shield to allow gimbal motion while maintaining a seal.
The base heat shield is penetrated by fill-and-drain lines and pressurization-and-
purge lines. Electrical and other service disconnects are located as shown. The JP
tank will be pressure fueled via a single point in the upper surface of the wing root.
The forward end of the LO 2 tank supports a tapered skirt that terminates in a bulkhead
that supports the nose landing gear. See Figure 2-11. The main landing gear is sup-
ported from trunnion points on external frames attached to the LH 2 tank. As shown
in Figure 2-7, the main gear retracts forward into the wing root fillet region. The
main gear bogies incorporate 60 × 20 inch 40 PR tires, The nose gear has dual 47 x
18 inch tires.
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Figure 2-11. B-9U Forward Skirt Structure
The outer heat shield provides an aerodynamic surface for the body which varies from
a circular cross-section at the nose gear station to a gradually flattening lower sur-
face transitioning into the wing fillet. The heat shield is primarily of shallow corru-
gated frame stiffened panels utilizing Rene t 41 alloy principally, and titanium alloy in
the regions of lower aerodynamic heating. The heat shield is supported via links from
the primary structure to allow for expansion. The forebody ahead of Station 1479 is
supported as an extension of the heat shield itself and moves with it, except for the
nose gear that, as previously explained, is supported from an extension skirt on the
primary load-carrying LO 2 tank. The body heat shield frames are on 20-inch centers
below the body maximum breadth and on 40-inch centers above it.
The delta wing is mounted below the LH 2 tank. The wing carrythrough spars are
tapered in the center section to allow the wing to overlap the tank in the side view and
thus minimize base area. The wing attaches to the hydrogen tank frames and to the
thrust structure via a series of links designed to take out relative expansion differen-
tials between the wing and the body. See Figure 2-7. A low wing is selected princi-
pally to reduce the entry reradiation wing/body intersection temperature increase
2O
effects in a high wing arrangement. The low wing/fillet arrangement also provides
main landing gear stowage space.
23m wing is located aft for balance purposes. Because of the large weight of boost
engines it is necessary to move the aerodynamic center aft to accommodate the aft
cg in a balanced configuration. A low aspect ratio delta wing of 53-degree sweep is
selected to provide minimum flyback system weight, within the constraints of satis-
factory stability characteristics and landing speed. The delta wing also allows suffi-
cient thickness to stow the flyback engines internally, which is particularly desirable
since the shock impingement of lower surface nacelles creates excessively high tem-
peratures. The high-sweep delta wing tends to minimize both heating and boosting drag
(also reduced with retracted flyback engines) and promises better transonic charac-
teristics.
Figure 2-12 shows the general arrangement of the delta wing. The wing is spliced at
span Station 507.5 to allow disassembly for shipping. Five ACPS engines are located
next to the rear spar.
The delta wing has a theoretical area of 8451 square feet and an exposed area of 5047
square feet installed at +2-degree angle of incidence to the body centerline to facilitate
cruise and to reduce landing angle within the constraints of the boost loads on the wing.
The leading edge sweep is 53 degrees. The installation of tim JTF22A-4 air-breathing
engines in the wing requires a maximum thickness chord ratio of 10.3 percent at wing
Station 507.5 just outboard of the outboard engine. Installation of these engines below
the body in the center section requires a 7.1-percent theor tical root thickness at the
vehicle centerline. The airfoils are NASA four digit serms with modifications to the
leading edge radii and with conical camber at the tips to improve L/D. The trailing
edge of the wing is perpendicular to the body centerline with elevens segmented into
three spanwise parts ior rallying degrees of control. The wing structure is primarily
titanium alloy with two main structural boxes. The forward box accommodates the
air-breathing engines. The lower surface of the wing is thermally protected by a
System of dynaflex insulation with metallic radiation cover panels.
Flyback engines are selected from among off-the-shelf candidates. The JTF22A--4
is the lowest bypass ratio candidate and presents the smallest package for installation.
This condition permits low wing thickness-to-chord ratio (t/c) thus minimizing poten-
tial control problems during transonic passage at the end of entry. Overall system
weight differences between the JTF22A-4 and the F101 {higher bypass ratio engine)
are small, the savings in fuel being offset by the increase in engine and installation
weight and increased cruise drag effects. The air-breathing engines are installed in
podded configurations, pivoted at the aft support point. Each engine assembly has its
own deployment rotary actuators. Longitudinal doors in the lower m_rface open to
allow deployment of the air-breathing engines to the subsonic cruise position. The
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Figure 2-12. B-9U Wing General Arrangement
engines rotate through 180 degrees to the locked-extended position. Upon engine de-
ployment the engine bay doors close to present a clean surface for cruise and landing.
See Figure 2-13.
The JP flyback fuel is currently stewed in a single tank on the booster centerline,
near the center of gravity. While no fuel transfer is currently anticipated in the B-9U
configuration for balance purposes, JP fuel presents an advantage in this respect for
configurations having a closely coupled hypersonic/subsonic relationship requiring
fuel transfer for cg control. The fuel is fed to the four engines under the body at
Station 3560 and to the four engines in each wing.
The fully pivoting canard is selected as a trim and control device and as an adjunct to
rotation for takeoff on ferry flights. The canard is located as far forward of the wing
as feasible to increase control effectiveness. Use of the canard allows reduction
in wing area and elevon size and permits the use of wing high-lift devices at landing
and for cruise improvements in the typical high drag booster configuration. A general
view of the canard is shown in Figure 2-14. The canard provides a total exposed area
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of 5,i0 square feet. The leading edge sweep is 60 degrees and the thickness is 14 wr-
cunt. The entire surface is pivoted at 56 percent of the mot chord and moves 65 de-
_,_rccs nose clown to decouple the effect of fl_e surface during hypersonic entry. "rhe
surface wilkes a body fairing to maintaib a seal at all points along the down travel.
"II_is seal is to minimize entry heating. Upward travel of the leading edge of the
canard is 30 degrees.
The vertical tail is on the centerline of the body to minimize weight relative to tip
fins that weigh more in themselves and impose an added weight to the outboard wing
sections due to maximum boost 8q loads and the att_ch complexity. Directional sta-
bility is maintained in the booster during reentry in the high-angle-of-attack mode by
using the ACPS yaw engines. Even after the heat sink leading edge and the extra
ACPS weights were incorporated, a centerline vertical still showed the least overall
system weight. The general configuration of the vertical tail structure is shown in
Figure 2-15.
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Figure 2-15.
The vertical stabilizer has an area of
1500 square feet with a leading edge
sweep of 35 degrees to provide orbiter
separation clearance consistent with
weight and aerodynamic considerations.
The tail thickness varies from 13 percent
at the root to 11 percent at the tip. A
35-percent chord rudder is provided with
+25 degrees of travel. The base of the
rudder is cut off at 15 degrees to provide
plume clearance for the upper rocket en-
gines. Vent and exhaust lines are term-
inated at the fin tip trailing edge. The
leading edge of the vertical tail has in-
creased material thickness to act as a
heat sink during the brief period of plume
impingement during orbiter separation.
The crew compartment is conventionally
located in the nose structure (see Figure
2-5). Swivel seats adjustable for the
vertical flight, entry, and cruise flight
B-9U Vertical Tail are provided in conventional locations for
Structure captain and co-pilot. The crew compart-
ment is pressurized for shirtsleeve en-
Ileal shields are plwvided over the windshields, which are sized for ad-
Access with the
vironment.
quate landing visibility at the maximum 15-degree touchdown angle.
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booster in the vertical position is via a door to the left of the pilot scat. Access with
the booster in the horizontal position is via a door in the compartment floor reached
through the nose-gear wheel well. Immediately behind the crew is space for an addi-
tional jump seat available for horizontal flight test or checkout purposes. Aft of the
crew compartment arc the booster avionics systems installed in a controlled environ-
mcnt but separate from the crew compal_tm ent. Below the crew and avionics compart-
ments is the nose-gear wheel well.
2.2.2 B-16B SWEPT WING BOOSTER. The original plans were to generate a straight-
wing/horizontal-tail booster which would bc directly comparable to the Model B-9U
delta-wing/canard booster, and its mission profile. However, no straight-wing/hori-
zontal-tail configuration with high-cross-range capability had been investigated at
Convair Aerospace. It was decided to adapt a swept-wing/canard configuration to the
B-9U body, canard and vertical tail. This configuration meets the intent of the study
by providing a wing structure that can be designed using safe-life and fail-safe design
principle s.
Previous Convair Aerospace studies had generated a low-cross-range booster using
swept wings and canards (Model B-16A), that offered a desirable wing structure. A
combination of the B-9U body, canards, and vertical tail with a scaled-up version of
the B-16A wing was determined to be aerodynamically feasible. This configuration
was designated as Model B-16B booster. The Model B-16B booster, similar to the
B-9U booster, is a low, swept wing vehicle with a single vertical tail and two canard
surfaces mounted forward above the body centerline. Figure 2-16 shows a three-
view drawing of the basic B-16B booster configuration. Table 2-1 lists compara-
tive data for the B-9U delta-wing/canard and B-16B sw._pt-wing/canard baseline
boosters •
The uninterrupted wing box is attached to the booster body with a system of statically
determinate links, as in the B-9U delta wing vehicle. The LH 2 tank wing support
frames require relocation, but the tank structural design philosophy remains unchanged.
Details of the structural arrangement of the two swept wing concepts are shown in Fig-
ures 2-17 and 2-18. Figure 2-17 shows a three-spar box Ci.e., safe-life concept),
with bending reacted by heavy integrally stiffened skins, and Figure 2-18 shows a five-
spar box (i.e., fail-safe concept) with bending reacted by the heavy spar caps.
The temperatures of the non-corrugated upper and lower structural skins shown in
Figure 2-17 are assumed to remain at a relatively low uniform temperature due to
the skin mass and the thermal protection for the lower structural skin. The relatively
thin upper and lower skins in Figure 2-18 are corrugated to allow for differential
thermal expansion. The lower skin is insulated to prevent temperatures exceeding
about 650°F.
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The wing spars for both designs are located at constant percent chord lines outboard
of the main landing gear (MLG) support bulkhead. The center spar is located midway
between the front and rear spars, and the auxiliary spars are located at the quarter
points. A conventional aileron is provided outboard of wing station 585, and an up-
only aileron and spoiler is provided over the air-breathing engines. The air-breath-
ing engine system (ABES) is a problem on the relatively thin (10 percent) short chord
wing. For comparability witJ_ the delta-wing booster, it was desirable to retract the
engines when not in use. However, it is not practical to cut out such a large portion
of the swept wing box.
The selected approach, shown in Figure 2-16, clusters the engines on the lower aft
wing surface, six to a side, in a common pod. They are located below the basic wing
structure. The engine inlets are protected by a retractable ramp during the high
temperature portion of flight.
The wing structural materials, noted on Figures 2-17 and 2-18, are identical to the
delta wing. Annealed titanium (6AI-4V), is used throughout the structural box, except
for the lower surface thermal skin of either HS188 or coated columbium. The spar
and rib webs are composed of corrugated annealed titanium, and the method of fabri-
cation and attachment is similar to the delta wing. A more detailed discussion of
structural materials is given in Section 2.3.
2.3 BOOSTER STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
Materials for the space shuttle booster structure fallinto several categories. (i)
aluminum alloys, (2)beryllium alloys, (3)titanium alloys, (4)nickel base alloys,
(5)cobalt base alloys, (6)columbium alloys, and (7)composite materials. Primary
candidate materials have been selected on existing properties data or data generated
under space shuttle studies. To provide an efficientfinaldesign, the properties of
some of these materials must be investigated to determime their allowable properties
after exposure to the expected environments. Table 2-2 liststhe primary structural
materials for both the B-9U delt._twing and B-16B swept wing booster systems under
detailed study.
The wing box is primarily fabricated from titanium with a thermal limit of 800"F.
Titanium was selected due to its high specific modulus and strength and low thermal
stress index at 650°F. Titanium has well defined mechanical and physical properties
and the fabrication, machining, and welding techniques are well known.
The basic structural concept of the wing is based on the use of a metallic standoff
heat shield combined with insulation between the shield and the wing lower surface
structure to provide thermal protection for the whole wing structure except for the
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Table 2-1. Data Comparison of Models B-9U and B-16B
Item
Booster
Launch weight, M lb
Empty weight, M lb
Cruise weight, M lb
Landing weight, M lb
Orbiter weight, M lb
Landing c.g. station, in.
Flyback range, n.mi.
Staging velocity (relative), fps
Configuration
B-9U
Staging altitude, ft
Body
Planfomn area, ft 2
Volume, ft 3
Tank diameters, in.
Length, in.
LH 2 tank volume, ft 3
LO 2 tank volume, ft 3
Wing (Theoretical)
Area, ft 2
Slain, in.
Aspect ratio
MAC (_), in.
Wing station, in.
i/4 5, in.
i/4 _ station, in.
Wing (Exposed)
Area, ft2
Span (semi), in.
Aspect ratio
MAC (c),in.
Wing station, in.
1/4 _, in.
1/4 c station, in.
Load landing, lb/ft2
Max cruise, Ib/ft2
Location, c.g. to 1/4 _, in.
Canard pivot to 1/4 _, in.
Wing 1/4 _ to tail1/4 _, in.
4.188
0.627
0.787
0.639
0.859
3,166
404
10,824
245,000
8,728
274,650
396
3,067
120,161
40,901
8,451
1,722
2.436
860.6
314.3
215.2
3,421
5,047
645
2.289
671.8
456
167.9
3,563
126.6
155.9
397
1,539
285
B-16B
4.188
0.627
0.787
0.639
0.859
3,166
404
i0,824
245,000
8,728
274,650
396
3,067
120,161
40,901
6,834
1,983.8
4.0
558.8
393.2
139.7
3,387
4,613
775.9
3. 625
473.2
531.2
118.3
3,482
138.6
170.6
316
1,458
386
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Table 2-1. Data Comparisonof Models B-9U and B-16B, Contd
Item
Wing (Exposed), Continued
Thickness ratio t/c
Taper ratio
Miscellaneous
Canard area (exposed), ft 2
Canard pivot to c.g., in.
Canard span, in.
Vertical tail area (exposed), ft 2
Tail 1/4 _ to c.g., in.
Tail span (exposed), in.
Gear axis to c.g., in.
B-9U
O. I01
5O4
1,142
800.4
1,500
682
533.8
129.0
Configuration
B-16B
0.i00
0.28
504
1,142
800.4
1,500
682
533.8
118.0
hot leading edge. This allows efficient use of titanium for all of the primary and
secondary structure above the TPS while the TPS shield itself can be made of HS188
and coated columbium. The Haynes 188 material is thermally limited to about 1900°F
and the coated columbium to 2500°F. Both these materials were selected for their
thermal strength properties.
The vertical stabilizer structural arrangement is a three-spar, multi-rib configura-
tion with integrally stiffened skin/stringer panels. Spar and rib webs are of corru-
gated or trussed construction to allow for differential thermal expansion. The rudder
is of similar construction. The entire structure is titanium except for the leading
edge which is Inconel 718. The segment of leading edge that is subjected to the orbi-
ter engine exhaust impingement is "heat sink" designed to withstand the increased
temperature. Again titanium is selected due to its strength at temperatures that pre-
clude aluminum, and its adaptability to a variety of proven fabrication techniques.
The main LO 2 and LH 2 fuel tanks are fabricated almost entirely of 2219 aluminum.
Both 2219 and 2014 aluminum alloys were considered for the main tanks and other
body structures. Both alloys possess excellent strength-toughness properties in the
base metal at all temperatures down to -423°F, with the 2014 alloy being somewhat
stronger than 2219. However, welded joints in the 2014 alloy exhibit a tendency to-
wards brittle fracture and greater sensitivity to minor weld flaws at liquid oxygen
to liquid hydrogen teml_ratures. The significantly greater resistance to stress
corrosion possessed by Z_he 2119 alloy has been thoroughly demonstrated, as has its
superior weldability and weld repairability. The combination of better fracture
toughness in welded joints at reduced temperatures and superior resistance to stress
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Table 2-2. Booster Materials
Booster
Components Sub-Components Materials
Wing Box
Vertical
Tail Box
LO 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
Orblter
Support
Bulkhead
Thrust
Structure
Spar Caps
Spar Webs
Rib Caps
Rib Webs
Intercostals
Lower Surface Thermal Skins
Upper & Lower Structural Skins
Trusses
Fasteners
Spar Caps
Spar Webs
Ribs and Bulkhead Caps
Ribs and Bulkhead Webs
Integrally Stiffened Skins
Stiffeners
Fasteners
Integrally Stiffened Skins
Frame Caps
Frame Webs
Bulkheads (Dome)
Fasteners
Note LO 2 Tank
Beam Caps
Beam Web
Bulkhead Caps
Bulkhead Webs
Fasteners
Skins
Thrust Beams
Thrust Posts
Bulkheads
Vertical Stabilizer Attach
Fittings
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Haynes HS-188/Coated Columbium
Annealed Titanium
Annealed Titanium
Conventional Except for Lower
Thermal Skin
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6AI-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Conventional
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Conventional
Same as LO 2 Tank Except for Poly-
phenylene Oxide Insulation
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T81/T851
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T81/T851
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T81/T851
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T81/T851
Conventional
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6AI-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
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Table 2-2. Booster Materials, Contd
Booster
Components Sub-Components Materials
Intermediate Frames
Attachment Flange
Fasteners
Base Heat Shield
Annealed Titanium (6AI--4V)
Annealed Titanium {AII-4V)
Conventional
IRene _41 & coated Colnmhium
corrosion result in a significantlyhigher reliabilityfor the 2219 alloy as compared
to 2014.
Both 2219 and 2014 exhibit a decrease in strength properties as the plate thickness
increases. Both the ultimate and the yield tensile strengths of 2014 decrease with
increasing thickness at a greater rate than does the yield strength of 2219. Conse-
quently, ifthe tank walls must be machined from 3 to 4 inch plate in order to accom-
modate integral stiffenersor weld lands, the strength advantage of 2014 is minimized.
Although 2014 shows an advantage in strength of the base metal, Convair Aerospace_s
choice of the 2219 aluminum alloy for the space shuttle propellant tankage is based
upon its superior weldability, much better resistance to stress corrosion cracking,
better overall toughness, and better reliability for the reusable manned space launch
vehicle.
2.4 BOOSTER WEIGHT SUMMARY
Table 2-3 |s a summary weight statement for the B-9U delta wing booster and the
B-16B swept wing boosters in the launch condition. This launch condition is for the
mission described in Section 2.1, and assumes that the orbiter launch weight will be
about 859,000 pounds. In Table 2-3, weights are broken down to show individual
major system weights.
Table 2-4 shows the wing group weight breakdown. Weights are detailed to show both
exposed wing and carry-through structure. The wing structural weights are separated
intomajor components such as spars, ribs, and skins.
The B-9U weights were taken from Reference 13. The B-16B five-spar wing weights
were derived from preliminary stress analysis and unit weights for the B-9U. The
B-16B three-spar wing weights were derived as follows: the skin weight was obtained
by using the theoretical weights from a finite element analysis and the non-optimum
factor for T-stringer integral skin panels; the rib weights were obtained from
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Table 2-3. Weight Summary
B-16B B-16B
B-9U Five Spar Three Spar
Description (lb) (lb) (lb)
Wing 59,063 56,221 65,491
Tail 17,908 17,908 17,908
Body 174,052 174,052 174,052
Induced environment, protection 86,024 97,024 97,024
Landing, recovery, dock 28,457 28,457 28,457
Propulsion-ascent 124,786 124,786 124,787
Propulsion-cruise 49,513 44,747 44,747
Propulsion-auxiliary 12,126 12,126 12,126
Prime power 1,930 1,930 1,930
Electrical 1,682 1,682 1,682
Hydraulics 2,201 2,201 2,201
Surface controls 9,620 9,620 9,62 0
Avionics 5,582 5,582 5,582
Environmental control 1,648 1,648 1,648
Pe rsonnel provisions 1,636 1,636 1,636
Co ntingency 50,705 47,313 38,042
Dry we ight 626,933 626,933 626,933
Personnel 476 476 476
Residual fluids 11,503 11,503 11,503
Inert weight 638,912 638,912 638,912
Inflight losses 21,718 21,718 21,718
Propellant-ascent 3,382,307 3,382,307 3,382,307
Propellant-cruise 143,786 143,786 143,786
l>ropellant-A CS 1,500 1,500 1,500
Gross weight 4,188,223 4,188,223 4,188,223
preliminary stress analysis using rib data from the five-spar wing analysis and the
B-9U unit weights. Although the B-16B wing carry-through structure is smaller in
area than the B-9U carry-through structure, it was assumed to be the same weight
because of the initial assumption of similar wing loads. Reduction in carry-through
weight because of smaller size is compensated for, in part at least, by increase in
body weight. The induced environment protection on the B-16B wing was assumed to
be the same as on the B-9U. Based on past analysis of similar configurations, 11, 000
pounds was added for the temperature effects on engine pods being below the wing.
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Table 2-4. B-16B Wing Weight Summary
Description Three Spar (Ib) Five Spar (Ib)
Wing
Box
Spar caps
Upper spar
Lower spar
Spar webs
Web spar
Ribs
No. 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Upper skin panels
Skin
Standoffs
Fasteners
(65,491) (56,221)
(39,399)
(1,440) (11,816)
260 1,240
0 1,246
238 1,164
0 1,030
222 818
260 1,418
0 1,406
238 1,332
0 1,178
222 984
(4,248) { 4,998)
1,580 1,086
0 1,120
1 , 551 1,066
0 958
1,117 768
(2,824) (1,504)
350 350
330 0
304 304
280 0
256 256
236 0
216 216
190 0
164 164
140 0
120 120
96 0
70 70
48 0
24 24
(15,190) (2,598)
15,161 2,281
0 288
29 29
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Table 2-4. B-16B Wing Weight Summary, Contd
Description Three Spar (lb) Five Spar (lb)
Lower skin panels (8,771) (2,287)
Splices (1,449) (1,449)
Carry-through (14,747) (14,747)
Leading edge (5,776) (5,776)
Trailing edge (598) (598)
Tip (348) (348)
Engine penalty (2,000) (2,000)
Elevon (7,500) (7,500)
Links wing attach (600) (600)
The dry weight was held constant for all three vehicles.
Figure 2-19 shows the change in cg during the mission. Both the combined vehicle
(booster and orbiter) and separate booster cg changes are shown. Vehicle weight is
shown for various points in the mission.
Table 2-5 gives the booster mass properties sequence during the mission detailed in
Section 2.1. Changes in weight, center of gravity, moment of inertia, and product
of inertiaare given.
2.5 DESIGN CRITERIA
The booster vehicle is designed to provide adequate structura' strength for a safe life
of 100 missions, or for a ten year life, without the need for major repairs. This de-
sign is capable of withstanding the service life of flight ai,d pressure loads combined
with the thermal and acoustic environment. Booster structure is designed for mini-
mum weight commensurate with overall costs and the vehicle is designed to minimize
post-flight inspection requirements for rapid turnaround. Design technology wlH re-
present that prevalent in 1972.
For purposes of this study, design loads on the selected components are assumed to
be identical for both the B-9U and B-16B booster configurations. Structural compo-
nents are designed to provide the yield and ultimate factors of safety, proof, and
other factors used in the booster design, as shown in Table 2-6. Static and fatigue
factors are both summarized in Table 2-6.
The LO2 tank is designed to be proof-tested in segments because of weight savings,
using a three-phase proof test. The entire LH 2 tank is designed to be pneumatically
proof-tested at room temperature. The thermal protection system (TPS) structure
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Figure 2-19. Mission Center of Gravity Travel Check
is also designed for the load factors in Table 2-6, as applicable. In addition, an
allowable creep strain of 0.2 percent per 10 hours exposure at maximum temperature
will be used, and for corrugated panels in the transverse direction, 1.0 percent creep
strain per 10 hours exposure at maximum temperature. A minimum clearance of 1.0
inch between the inner tank structure and the outer TPS structure will be maintained
at limit load.
The booster is designed to withstand the repeated loads incurred in 400 flights without
failure, including a scatter factor of four. Consideration will be given to the effects
of acoustic fatigue loads. The booster will withstand the mission thermal environ-
ments with a minimum of post-flight inspection and subsequent structural refurbish-
ment and/or replacement.
The primary structural components willbe designed fail-safe insofar as practical,
considering weight, cost, and manufacturing. When primary structure fail-safe design
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Table 2-6. Design Criteria
Component Yield Ultimate Proof Applied On
Main Propellant Tanks
Pe rso nne I Co mpart-
ments, Windows,
Doors, llatches
Airframe Structure
Pressure Vessels
Pressurized Lines
Fittings
Fatigue
Flow Growth to Leak
or Failure
Thermal Stresses
I.i0
] .10
i.00
!.]0
1.5O
1.00
I 1.i0I.I0
4.00
1.50
1.40
1.40
1.50
2.00
1.40
1.50
2.00
2.50
1.50
I .50
1.50
Maximum relief valve
pressure only
Loads (+ limit pressure
Proof pressures
Loads (+ limit pressure
Maximum operating
pressure only
Proof pressure
Boost + entry loads
Aircraft mode loads
Maximum operating
pre s sure
Maximum operating
pressure
Design Service Life
Design Service Life
1.00 -- -- Temperature gradients
*Based on Fracture Mechanics Analysis Assumed service life = 100 missions
is not practical, a safe-life design concept will be applied. The primary structure in-
cludes the wing box, tanks, fin box, thrust structure, major bulkheads, intertank
adapter, and similar major load-carrying structural components or elements such as
spar caps and wing/body attach links.
Safe-life designs will be compatible with latest NDI (nondestructive inspection) tech-
niques and limitations and residtml strength and crack prot_tgation analyses will be
used to ensure that adequate safe-life has been provided.
Conventional strength, fail-safe, and fatigue analyses will be supplemented by fracture
mechanics analysis to determine critical flaw sizes and residual life assuming pre-
existing flaws.
4O
2.6 DESIGN CONDITIONS
Booster design conditions were generated from ground handling procedures and from
mission flight characteristics. The flight conditions investigated include: launch,
ascent, entry, subsonic cruise, and horizontal takeoff and landing. Effects of Mach
number, angle of attack, and control surface deflections on longitudinal and lateral
directional characteristics were also included. The ground conditions investigated
were taxi, towing, mating, and launch preparation and erection.
In most instances, the aerodynamic data was based on available experimental data
adjusted for differences between tested and current configuration.
Table 2-7 summarizes limit flight loads and design load factors for a number of the
critical mission conditions. Maximum loads on the body, wing, and canard occur
during maximum g recovery (i.e., entry), while maximum Bq during ascent yields the
greatest load on the vertical stabilizer. Critical design conditions and considerations
for aerodynamic surfaces are summarized in Table 2-8.
Internal loads consisting of axial and shear loads and bending and torsion moments
were determined at 48 stations along the body length for 25 load conditions. The con-
ditions investigated are:
1. One-hour ground head winds, fueled, unpressurized
2. One-hour ground tail winds, fueled, unpressurized
3. One-hour ground side winds, fueled, unpressurized
4. LiRoff + 1-hour ground head winds
5. Liftoff + 1-hour ground tail winds
6. Liftoff + 1-hour ground side winds
7. Maximum a q head winds
8. Maximum a q tall winds
9. Maximum _ q
1O. Three-g maximum thrust
11. Booster burn-out
12. Maximum g entry
13. Subsonic gust
14. Two-point landing
15. Three-point landing
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Table 2-7. Summaryof Booster DesignConditionsand Loads
CondlUon
l'wo week standby
One day hold
One hour to launch
Lift-off
Max, dynamic pressure
Max _q
[leadwind
Taiiwind
Max B(I
Max. thrust
Boostcr burnout
Max, g recovery
2.Sgmaneuver
Rudder kick
Subsonicg_st
Landing
Con] portent
(or .Mass Item
(I.O,_ mass)
(Lit; mas_) /
(Orbiter & other)i
i
I
{
Body {
Wing
Cans rd i
Body
"_Ving
C:I nll i'd
Body
Wing
Canard
Vertical Lail
Body
Wing
Carlard
Body
Wing
Ca Klltl-d
Body
Wing
Canard
Witlg
Ca rt.3rd
Vertical tail
Body
Wing
Carmrd
Vertical tail
Body
Wing
Canard
lAir toad
1.0
1.0
l.(J
1.31 ± 0.15
1.31 ± 0.25
1.31 _: 0.21
1.61
1.61
1 .(Jl
1.67
1.67
1 .(;7
1.60
1 .(10
1.60
1.60
3.3
3.3
3. :i
3.3
3.3
3.3
± 0.213
i 0.213
± 0.213
: 0.213
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.51 ;337,000
0.51 66b,_00/
0.51 45,t30{
-0.10 -J_O OOO"
-0. It) - i'_,,;GOi
0.016 i 13{}, 000
0,016 { t'_5, (100
0.016 Iu,520
0.016 _ 1_57,100
t ,)J._t_
0.242 i
0.242
0.'143
0.343
0.343
4.0 _1'507'000
4.0 I _0_ 60
' 04.0
'2.5 617,600
2.5 71,370
_.20d, 000
2.1 488,000
2.1 591,500
2.1 -4.957
1.0 z272,000
2.35 20_,000
2,35 { 376,000
2.:i5 _ ,t7,000
Remarks
Provides, with booster
burnout condition, criti-
cal loads for orbiter-
booster attachment.
Provides critical intcrtla
loads for wing-to-body
drag links, and together
with max. _q condition,
critical loads for orbiter-
booster attachment.
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Table 2-8. Summaryof Design Conditions
Structural Design Summary Chart
Structural Component Critical Condition Design Considerations
Wing:
Primary Sub-Structure
Upper Skin Panels
Lower Skin Panels
TPS Heat Shield
Elevon Sub-Structure
Leading Edge
Wing/Body Attachment:
Fwd Vertical Attach
Center Vertical Attach
Aft Vertical Attach
Drag Attach
Fwd Side Load Attach
Aft Side Load Attach
Center Side Load Attach
Canard
Primary Substructure
Torque Tube
Vert. Tail
Primary Structure
Max c_q --- Boost
Liftoff Sound Pressure
Max g "_ Recovery
Liftoff Sound Pressure
Max g _ Recovery
Max Heating _ Recovery
Subsonic Gust _ Flyback
Max aq _ Boost
Max a q _ Boost
Max Thrust "-- Boost
Max Thrust _ Boost
Max Thrust --- Boost
Taxi
Max g _ Recovery
Max Bq _ Launch
Wing Shear & Bending
Sonic Fatigue
Pressure & Temp Differential
Sonic Fatigue
Air Pressure
Pressure & Temperature
Safe-Life
Safe-Life
Safe -Life
Fail-Safe
Fail -Safe
Fail-Safe
Fail -Safe
C_,lard Structure & Torque
Tube Shear, Bending, Torsion
Box Shear, Bending
16. Two-g landing
17. One-day ground head winds, pressurized
18. One-day ground tail winds, pressurized
19. One-day ground side winds, pressurized
20. Two-week ground head winds, empty
21. Two-week ground tail winds, empty
22. Two-week ground side winds, empty
23. 2.5g positive maneuver
24. -1.0g negative
25. Maximum operating pressure
An envelop of the resulting peak load intensities (N x) for the most critical conditions
is shown in Figure 2-20, where Nx is the longitudinal axial load in tba tank wall. The
major loading conditions on the forward skirt are due to axial loads occurring during
boost phase and shear loads during landing and taxiing conditions.
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Figure 2-20. B-9U Booster Peak Limit Load Intensities
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Proof pressures on the LO 2 tank determine the skin gages of domes and the cylinder.
Stiffening on the cylindrical body is required for flight and ground loads. The aft
dome is grid-stiffened close to the equator because of compressive hoop loads occurr-
ing in the partially filled condition. External stiffening, consisting of tee stringers
and trussed frames, was optimized for the low load intensities typical of the LO 2 tank,
and the results are incorporated in the present design.
LH 2 tank skin gages of domes and cylinders are determined by proof-test requirements.
Tank stiffening is in the form of external frames and tee stringers sized from axial and
bending loads occurring during ground-wind and boost phase loads. An optimization
study was performed on stiffening requirements and the results are incorporated in the
present design.
Critical design conditions for the intertank adapter are derived from axial loads due to
the LO 2 weight forward and the bending and axial load introduced at the forward attach-
ment by the eccentric orbitcr weight.
A total of 27 loading conditions on the thrust structure were investigated, including
ground-wind, launch, and boost phase loads with and without engine-out conditions.
Ground-wind conditions are critical for hold-down fittings, back-up longerons, and
adjacent skin on the skirt. Thrust beams, posts, frames, and skin away from hold-
down longerons are critical for maximum _q and 3g maximum thrust conditions with
one engine out.
Table 2-9 summarizes the orbiter/booster interconnection loads, including loads for
a number of critical conditions.
Total gage pressure (including dynamic head) versus tank station at various times
during boost is shown in Figure 2-21 for the LH 2 tank. These pressures correspond
to the upper bound of a 3 psi regulating band. Also shown is the pressure line for a
pneumatic proof test, which requires a proof factor equal to 1.13 based on 150
missions.
Total gage pressure for the LO 2 tank (including dynamic head) versus tank station at
various times during boost is shown in Figure 2-22. These pressures pertain to the
upper bound of the relief valve tolerance band. Also shown are the pressure lines for
a three-phase proof test program using a lg LN 2 head on a vertical tank position for
the first two phases and a room-temperature pneumatic phase. A proof factor of 1.23
is required based on 150 missions.
The tank proof test factors of 1.13 and 1.23 are based on fracture mechanics analysis,
assuming the given service life spectrum, material, and flaw growth characteristics.
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Table 2-9. Booster/Orbiter Interconnection Loads
X v
?
Condition Wind
Two-Week Head
Ground Winds Tail
Unfueled Side
1-Hr Ground Head
Winds Fueled Tail
Unpressurized Side
Dynamic LiftoffHead
+ 1-Hr Ground Tail
Winds Side
Max c_-q Head
Tail
SideMax _-q
3g Max Thrust
Booster
Burnout
Fx
(xlO 3 lb)
268
268
268
859
859
859
1296
1296
1296
1628
1674
1659
2822
2816
Fy
(xl03 lb)
_121
+33
+21
_37
F Z
(xl03 lb)
65
-151
31
84
25
75
112
74
113
66
162
134
168
115
Ay
(x103 lb)
+37
+10
+2
_.341
A Z
(xlO3 m)
-46
179
38
76
137
99
133
180
149
-367
846
488
376
410
S X
(106 in-lb)
_:22.2
=t=6.10
q:4.52
_50.33
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Critical design conditions for the body, wing, canard, and vertical tail structure are
summarizeU in Table 2-7.
Figures 2-23, 2-24, and 2-25 present critical shear moment and torque values, together
with bending moment curves, for the wing, canard, and vertical tail respectively.
The major critical thermal environment for the booster occurs during the entry por-
tion of the mission. Local critical heating of the base heat shield and rudder occurs
during ascent, and the top of the body and the vertical tail leading edge receive criti-
cal heating during orbiter separation.
Design temperatures used in sizing the booster outer thermal protection system
structure are shown in Figures 2-26 and 2-27.
The acoustical environment to which the booster will be exposed during launch is
shown in Figure 2-28, and summarized for all conditions in Table 2-10. For rocket
noise at launch the exposure is general over the entire vehicle surface. For boundary
layer shock wave interaction and for the air-breathing engine noise, the excitation is
fairly localized. Figure 2-29 shows the wing acoustical environment for both booster
noise at launch and air-breathing engine noise during cruise. The vertical tail acous-
tical inputs for launch are shown in Figure 2-30.
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Table 2-10. External Noise Levels on Booster Structure
Flight
Condition
Launch
Ascent
Reentry
Cruise*
(per engine)
Ferry
takeoff*
(per engine)
Notes:
Max °
1/3
OASPL OBSPL
Noise Source (db)(4) (db)(4)
Rockets 165 (1) 153
154.5 (2) 143
Unperturbed 149( 2 ) 140
boundary layer
(B. t..)
Shock - B.l.. 154.5 (2) 146
I interaction
Unperturbed 151( 2 ) 141
B.L.
ABES (_ 133(3) 123
10, 000-ft
alt. and
0.5 Mach
ABES @ S.L. 170( 3 ) 160
and zero air-
speed
(1) 15 feet above rocket nozzle plane.
(2) Area of crew compartment.
MaX.
1/3
OBSPL
GMF(Hz) Incidence(4)
f
250 Random
63-250 Random
4000 Grazing
10 I Grazing
P
4000 Grazing
560 Grazing/
random
100O Grazing/
random
Corre-
lation
Distance
Large
Large
Small
Small/
medium
Small
Small/
medium
SmalL/
medltma
(3) About 10 feet aft of ellgine exhaust nozzle and 5 feet off engine
centerllne.
(4) OASPL = overall sound pressure level
OBSPL = octave band sound preuure level
GMF = geometrical mean frequency
*These levels are given per engine becatme they represent very near field data that
are subject to wide variations for small changes In reference coordinates. The
levels shown are for a plane through the apex of the Jet exl_tmt core.
dB
5_ TM
159
15 I111
B(X%STER ENGINE NOIBE AT LAUNCH {BOTH _DE8)
Figure 2-30. Contours of Equal Overall Sound
Pressure Levels, Vertical Tall
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2.7 SERVICE LOAD SPE CTRA
This section presents the flightload and pressure load spectra expected during the
100-mission service lifeof the space shuttlebooster. Load spectra for the compo-
nents selected for detailstudy (i.e., tanks, wing, vertical tail,thrust structure, and
orbiter support) are presented. These spectra are obtained from the work accom-
plished under MDAC Contract L.S. 2590-A3 (Determination of Load Spectra).
2.7.1 WING LOAD SPECTRA. Figure 2-31 presents the wing flight load spectra for
a 100-mission vehicle life under ascent, entry, cruise/landing, and taxi conditions.
The spectra are expressed in terms of number of exceedences versus alternating and
mean bending moment, which are shown in percent of the critical value for the condi-
tion considered. These values are converted to number of cycles of mean and alter-
nating stress, with the ascent condition represented by various segments of the total
ascent flight to orbiter separation.
2.7.2 VERTICAL TAIL LOAD SPECTRA. The vertical tail flight load spectra are
presented in Figure 2-32. As with the wing, the numbered lines represent various
segments of the ascent flight.
2.7.3 FUSELAGE LOAD SPECTRA. The spectra of booster fuselage axis/load in-
tensity (i.e., net longitudinalload in the tank shell due to axial and bending loads, in
Ib/in.)are presented in Figure 2-33 for the top and bottom centerline locations at
Fuselage Station2600. Station 2600 is located at the aft orbiter-to-booster attachment
and is the most highly loaded fuselage section. For the top centerline location, the
design load intensityand cyclic load are compression. For the bottom centerline lo-
cation, the design load intensityand cyclic loads are tension.
2.7.4 ORBITER-TO-BOOSTER ATTACHMENT LOAD SPECTRA. The forward
orbiter-to-booster attachment flightload spectra are presented in Figure 2-34. Only
vertical (Fz) and lateral (Fy) loads are shown, as the drag load (i.e., FX) is taken
through the aft attachment.
The aft orbiter-to-booster attachment flight load spectra are given in Figure 2-35.
2.7.5 THRUST LOAD SPECTRA. Figure 2-36 is a plot of the total mean thrust ver-
sus time for the 12 booster main rocket engines. Superimposed on this is the transi-
ent thrust load spectrum presented in Figure 2-37.
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2.7.6 PROPELLANT TANK PRESSURE
SPECTRA. The main LH 2 and LO 2 pro-
pellant tank pressure schedules are pre-
sented in Figures 2-38 and 2-39, respec-
tively. Nominal ullage and ullage plus
fuel head pressure at the lower tank apex
are shown. In addition, the maximum
design pressure (i. e., maximum relief
valve setting plus fuel head) assuming a
pressure regulator malfunction is shown.
For fatigue and flaw growth studies, it
will be assumed that a pressure regulator
malfunction occurs once every 20 flights.
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2.8 STRUCTURAL TEST PLANS
2.8.1 TEST REQIHREMENTS. The booster missions dictate the structural require-
ments from which a vehicle design is evolved. To certify that the vehicle design will
meet the mission requirements, a combination of structural analysis and testing will
be conducted. The test program attempts to verify the structural analysis (in regions
of uncertainty) and drive out overlooked design deficiencies within the limits of physical
practicality and cost.
The booster test program will be broken down into three hardware levels and three
test categories:
a. Hardware levels
I. Subcomponents
2. Components
3. Major combined components or complete vehicles
b. Test Categories
1. Development tests
2. Qualification tests
3. Proof tests
The tests described in the following section represent a minimum "bare bones" test
program, and it is anticipated that when the sensitivities of the structure to safe-life/
fail-safe requirements are established, additional development and qualification tests
will be added (see Sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.1).
2.8.2 TEST cRrrERIA
2.8.2.1 Development Tests. Structural development tests will be conducted to deter-
mine basic design information and assist in designing those structures for which analy-
sis is difficult.
Development tests may serve as qualification tests in those certain cases where confi-
dence is such that this action has a high probability of success and is cost beneficial_
providing the following additional criteria and rigors are met:
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a. Predeclaration of intent to use test for qualification.
b. "No impact" waivers obtained for flight configuration differences.
c. Facility certified (calibrated).
d. Contractor inspection on-site, as necessary.
e. Test requirement/procedure/tolerance approved.
f. Pre-functional and post-functional successful.
Testing will be structured to provide initial information on maintenance, and projected
service life requirements will be established during the operational test phase.
2.8.2.2 Qualification Tests. Qualification tests will be conducted to prove structural
adequacy of the design for all anticipated conditions. This will be accomplished for:
a. Hardware which could potentially result in loss of crew or vehicle shall receive a
qualification test to the specified environments. Environments selected shall be
those that the hardware is expected to experience in its service life (ground and
flight) plus the design margin. The environment levels and durations shall be the
worst case condition and shall demonstrate the design margins.
b. Hardware, the failure of which would result in loss of primary or secondary
mission objectives or launch scrub, shall be certified flightworthy by an accumu-
lation of data from its test history during development, acceptance, off-limit,
checkout, and flight lest in lieu of rigorous qualification testing.
c. Qualification testing requirements may be waived when equipment is selected that
has been previously qualified to the level required for the proposed shuttle appli-
cation. In these cases, adequate substantiation of configuration, lnspection_ facil-
ity certification, etc., must be submitted with supporting rationale to the contract-
ing agency for approval of the waiver.
d. Qualification testing of components and/or subsystems will be accomplished on
the highest practical level of assembly.
e. Qualification test levels must include verification of design safety factors.
f. Components to be subject to qualification tests shall first be subjected to the same
proof tests applied to flight components.
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2.8.2.3 Proof Tests. Proof tests will be conducted as an assist in quality control
procedures by screening manufacturing errors or flaws which could grow to critical
size in the life of the vehicle. Proof tests are required on each production component
based on a safe-life design philosophy and whose criticality requires further testing in
addition to that performed during qualification testing.
Proof test factors will be based on the minimmn of that required by the structural
design criteria (reference Attachment E of first monthly progress report) or from
fracture mechanics analysis considering the anticipated service load spectra and
envi ronm en ts.
2.8.3 STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT TESTS. The development test plans that follow
emphasize the booster structural components selected for detailed study, namely those
listed below and shown in the figures of Section 2.2.
a. Wing structural box (deltaand swept)
b. Vertical tailstructural box
c. Ascent engine thrust structure
d. Orbiter support frame
e. Main propellant tanks
Development testing at the subcomponent level includes:
a. LO 2 Tank. Tank-to-forward support structure joint_pecimens for static/fatigue
loading.
b. Intertank Section
1. Integral plate-stringer panels for staticshear and compression loading.
2. Y-joint specimens for staticloading.
3. Weld jointspecimens for staticloading.
4. Tank-to-intertank section jointspecimens for static/fatigueloading.
5. Stringer-frame intersection specimens for fatigue loading.
6. Tank wall and weld jointflaw growth specimen for fatigue loading.
7. Full-scale quarter-setment frames for static/fatigueloading.
8. Access door cutouts and covers for staUc/fatigue loading.
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9. Fuel and pressurization line cutouts and attachments for static/fatigue loading.
10. TPS attachments for static/fatigue loading.
11. Full scale diameter LO 2 feed line sections for static/fatigue loading.
c. LH 2 Tank
1. Tank-to-thrust structure joint specimens for static/fatigue loading.
2. A wing support bulkhead, full-scale, half-segment for static/fatigue loading.
3. A subscale tank specimen for development of the cryogenic insulation under
combined heat, simulated body loads as required, internal pressure and
vibration. Tests will include tanking and detanking with LH 2.
4. Main landing gear support fitting and back-up structure for static/fatigue
loading.
5. Orbiter support bulkhead, full-scale, half-segment for static/fatigue loading.
d. Thrust Structure
1. Truss columns for static compression loading.
2. Truss end fittings and beam cap intersections for static/fatigue loading.
3. Truss beam caps for static loading at elevated temperatures.
4. Wing and vertical stabilizer support bulkhead shear fittings for static/fatigue
loading.
5. Vertical stabilizer attachment lugs for static/fatigue loading.
6. Base heat shield panels for static loading and sonic fatigue loading at elevated
tempe rature.
7. Thrust cylinder panels for static shear and compression loading.
8. A one-half scale truss beam for static/fatigue loading.
9. Hold-down, release, engine mount, and gimbal actuator support fittings for
static/fatigue loading.
10. Rise-off disconnect, TPS attachment, and wing attachment support structures
for static/fatigue loading.
e. Wing
1. Corrugated web shear beams for static/fatigue loading at elevated temperature.
2. Spar cap tension and compression elements for static loading at elevated
temperature.
3. Cover panels and TPS panels for static shear and sonic fatigue at elevated
temperature.
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4. Cover panel joints and TlaS panel joints for static/fatigue loading at elevated
temperature.
5. Wing spar lugs for static/fatigue loading at elevated temperature.
6. Leading edge skin and rib elements for static/fatigue loading at elevated
temperature.
1
o
Leading edge hinge and front spar attachment for static/fatigue loading at
elevated temperature.
Wing cover access cutout and door for static/fatigue loading at elevated
te mpe rature.
9. Body attachment fitting and backup structure for static/fatigue loading.
10. Full wing support links for static/fatigue loading.
11. A full leading edge rib for static/fatigue loading at elevated temperature.
12. Leading edge slip joint and seals for static/fatigue loading at elevated
temperature.
f. Vertical Stabilizer
go
1. Cover plate stringer panels for static compression _md shear.
2. Vertical stabilizer attachment lugs for static loading.
3. Cover panels for sonic fatigue at elevated temperature.
Orbiter Support Frame (included in LH 2 tank tests).
Development tests will not be accomplished at the full ¢_)mponent level, but the fol-
lowing tests will be performed on simplified components.
a. Body Structures. Component level development tests of the body structure will
include a simplified lntertank adapter, simplified thrust structure, and simplified
LH 2 propellant tank. This tank will be full-scale diameter, with full end domes,
wing attachment and orbiter attachment frames, TPS attachment, shell discontinu-
ities such as access doors, and fuel and pressure line attachments. This article
will aid in developing tooling and fabrication techniques. The major development
test articles for the intertank adapter and thrust structure will be installed on this
tank specimen for final development tests on all three components.
b. Wing Structure. Component level tests will include a wing section at least three
spars wide, a leading edge section, and an elevon (aileron) section, for static and
fatigue tests at elevated temperatures.
c. Vertical Tail Structure. Component level tests will include a section of the heat
sink leading edge and a portion of the three spar box for ststic/i'atigue tests at
elevated temperature.
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2.8.4 STRUCTURAL QUALIFICATION TESTS. The following types of structural
testingwillbe conducted to certify adequacy of the booster design:
a. Statictests to verify that the structure does not experience detrimental deformation
at design limit loads and pressure, and does not rupture or collapse at design
ultimate loads and pressures.
b. Fatigue tests to verify fatigue-liferequirements; as follows:
1. The test articles willbe load-cycled through a spectrum equivalent to one
lifetimes a scatterfactor of four (100 missions x 4 = 400 missions). The
test willdemonstrate thatthe structure experiences no detrimental damage
throughout this testlife;for structures thatdepend on non-destructive in-
spection for structural lifeassurance, itwill demonstrate thatthese tech-
niques are adequate to ensure detection of significantdefects.
2. Fatigue loading includes the effectsof low-frequency cycling due to tank
pressurizations, aerodynamics and inertialoading and high-frequency cycling,
where applicable, due to acoustic fatigue.
c. Thermal cycling, where applicable, concurrent with the staticand fatigue testing,
to simulate environmental effects significantlycontributing to loads (thermal
stresses) or alteringmaterial properties.
2.8.4.1 StaticTests. The following staticqualificationtests are planned for the body
structure components under study. Two major hardware structures are planned.
a. One statictest articleand one fatigue test articlequalifiesthe LO 2 tank, forward
LO 2 tank support structure including the nose landing gear support structure.
b. One statictest and one fatigue test article qualifiesthe LH 2 tankt intertank
adapter, orbiter support and separation structure and mechanism_ and thrust
structure.
The above static test articles will be subjected to five overall static qualification con-
ditions at room temperature:
a.
bQ
Co
Dynamic lift-offplus tailwind. Maximum axial load. Critical on forward inter-
tank adapter, thrust structure.
Maximum _ q plus tail wind. Maximum body bending load. Critical on LH 2 tank
and wing.
Three-g maximum thrust plus tail wind, Critical on LH 2 tank and wing.
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d. Booster recovery. Critical on TPS and wing.
d. Asymmetrical maneuver. Critical on vertical stabilizer.
In addition to these overall load conditions, local areas will be loaded to design ulti-
mate if not covered in the overall conditions as follows:
a. LO 2 Tank
1. All TPS support link attachments.
2. All TPS support roller attachments.
3. All TPS fixed attachments.
b. LH 2 Tank
1. Orbiter support and separation structure attachment.
2. Wing support structure.
3. All TPS support link attachments.
4. All TPS support roller attachments.
5. All TPS fixed attachments.
6. Main landing gear support structure.
c. Thrust Structure
1. Wing support structure.
2. TPS support link attachments.
3. TPS support roller attachments.
4. Hold-down fitting structure.
During the static tests, LO 2 and LH 2 tank internal pressures will be applied, using a
gas for pressurization, combined with external body loads. Pressures will be factored
to account for the difference in material properties between cryogenic and room tem-
peratures. Since the pressure is beneficial to compressive loading, design limit tank
pressures will be combined with design ultimate external forces. However, both tanks
will be pressurized to design ultimate without external loads. For the LO 2 tank ulti-
mate pressure test, the tank will be filled with water, in the vertical position, to
provide partial pressure head simulation. For each combined test condition, full
design limit pressure for that condition will be applied first, followed by application
of external forces in increments to design ultimate.
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2.8.4.2 Fatigue Tests. Separate test articles (noted above), are planned for the body
static and fatigue tests. The use of separate major component articles is justified by
eliminating the high risk of premature structural failures from fatigue flaws during
static ultimate tests on a fatigue test article.
All body qualification fatigue tests will be conducted at room temperature, except for
the LO 2 tank, which will be under LN 2 temperatures in a vertical position. This will
provide a partial simulation of the pressure gradient due to the head of LO 2 as well as
a close simulation of the environmental conditions which significantly affect fatigue and
fracture characteristics. The LH2 tank will be protected by cryogenic insulation, and
consequently does not experience such low temperature extremes. It, therefore, will
be tested at room temperature, in the horizontal position to facilitate loading.
The fatigue test spectrum will be based on flight-by-flight loading. This will provide
the correct interspersal of load distributions and magnitudes. It also will break the
test down into small blocks for the multi-life program. This means the test life can
be equated closely with service life at any time during the test.
The relatively short time from lift-off to the start of the low-altitude flyback cruise
allows fatigue test simulation of this portion of each flight in true t,me. This is
significant for the LO 2 tank tested at cryogenic temperatures, since the true tempera-
ture-time program can be used, ensuring the correct interaction between applied load
and thermal stresses. It also means that the total time at temperature will be correct-
ly simulated throughout the fatigue test, incorporating the effects of material property
variations.
A typical fatigue spectrum per flight for the qualification fatigue tests is presented in
Figure 2-40. Three symmetric overall loading conditions (distributions) are planned:
a launch condition, a recovery condition covering orbiter separation and entry, and an
atmospheric cruise (gust and maneuver) condition. The first two conditions would be
applied with true-time simulation of load, tank pressures and temperatures. The
third condition, with the most load cycles, would be time-compressed in accordance
with aircraft-type fatigue testing practice. Orbiter separation and (booster) landing
loads will be introduced locally as applicable. If possible, the atmospheric cruise
condition load levels will be interspersed to approach a random-type sequence. The
LN 2 cycling of the LO 2 tank will be required to properly cycle the tank structure.
One tanking/detanking cycle per flight will be required. Volume-displacement devices
will be used to expedite tanking and detsnking of LN 2 for the LO 2 tank, and pressur-
ization and depressurization of the LH 2 tank. The total number of load cycles is
relatively low compared to a typical aircraft program.
As shown in Reference 4, the method of component or parallel qualification testing is
planned. This not only minimizes facility requirements, but permits testing in more
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Typical Fatigue Test Spectrum for Body Structure
than one facility. It also offers the best approach for accomplishing a valid structural
test program in the shortest span time, in that failures in one component do not cause
a cessation of testing. Also, the potential for failure of one component to cause un-
related damage to another component will be reduced. The component test articles will
contain sufficient overlap of attaching structure to ensure proper load interactions at
the structural interface of the individual components.
2.8.5 WING QUALIFICATION TESTS
2.8.5.1 Static Tests. The following static tests are planned for the basic wing
structure. One test article will be used, consisting of a complete left wing structural
box and carrythrough structure, all wing attachment links, ABES _.ngine doors, and a
stub portion of the right wing. Test procedures will generally follow rJIL-A-8867
and NASA SP-8044 as guides.
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The wing will be subjected to four overall static conditions, each with appropriate
temperatures:
a. Maximum Otq
b. Maximum g entry
c. 3-g thrust/burnout
d. Subsonic gust
In addition to these overall conditions, the following local areas will be loaded to de-
sign ultimate if not covered in the overall condition:
a. ABES fuel tank support attachments
b. ABES engine support structure and doors
c. Elevon hinge and support structures
d. Elevon actuator support structures
e. Leading edge attachment structure
f. Body attachment links
All staticqualificationtests willbe conducted at elevated temperatures as required.
The time-temperature profile willbe programmed in true time to produce correct
thermal stresses and combined thermal/external force induced stresses.
The planned static test sequence for these thermo-structural tests requires an initial
application of static load only, to a prescribed level, followed by a thermal cycle
while holding the static load. This is repeated in increasing load increments to design
ultimate.
2.8.5.2 Fatigue Tests. A separate wing test article, described above, willbe used
for fatigue qualification tests. The separate article costs are again justifiedby
separation of high risk staticultimate tests from the fatigue article.
A typical fatigue spectrum per flight for the qualification fatigue tests is presented in
Figure 2-41. Three overall symmetric loading conditions will be applied, with true-
time simulation of loads and heating and cooling effects through the first two conditions.
This is followed by room temperature load cycling for the third (atmospheric cruise)
condition, ending in local landing loads as applicable. This means that the total time
at temperature will be correctly simulated throughout the fatigue test, incorporating
the effects of creep and mechanical property degradation.
70
+APPROX. 0.2 [tR
TRUE TIME AND
TEST TIME
LAUNCH [ --I_-
CONDITION RECOVERY
APPROX. 1.5 HRTRUE TIME
COMPRESSED TO SHORTER TEST TIME
SYMMETRICAL CRUISE (GUST AND MANEUVER)
LANDING I_ADS
AS APPLICABLE
¢¢ ¢
TIME
ENTRY ATMOSPHERIC CRUISE
0
il° TIME
Figure 2-41. Typical Fatigue Test Spectrun_, for Aerodynamic Surfaces
2.8.6 VERTICAL TAIL QUALIFICATION TESTS
2.8.6.1 Static Tests. A complete vertical stabilizer with attachment structure,
rudder, and leading edge will be used for conducting static tests. The tail will be
subjected to three major overall conditions, each with appropriate temperatures:
a. Maximum 8q
b. Subsonic gust
c. Rudder kick
The maximum temperature condition, which occurs during entry, is not a critical
overall condition.
In addition to the overall condicUon, the following local areas will b,., qualified at
ultimate loads if not covered in the overall conditions:
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a. Rudder hinges
b. Rudder actuator support
c. Leading edge attachment
2.8.6.2 Fatigue Tests. It is planned that no overall fatigue tests will be conducted
on the vertical tail. The elimination of a fatigue qualification test is considered
justified, as the structure is stiffness designed, and the loads produced by JSq are
rarely encountered. Therefore, the fatigue damage that will accumulate during a life
can be shown by analysis to be too low to require testing.
2.8.7 STRUCTURAL PROOF TESTS. Each test and flight article will undergo
structural proof tests. The LO 2 tank will be proof-pressure tested in three steps:
(1) the lower dome will be pressurized by attaching a jig bulkhead to form a tight
enclosure, (2) the lower dome will be assembled to the lower half of the cylindrical
section, the top sealed with a jig bulkhead, and this pressurized and (3) the complete
tank will be pressurized. All of these tests will be conducted in the vertical position.
The first two steps will be accomplished with LN 2. The final step will utilize pneumatic
pressurization. This procedure will permit a higher proof pressure on the lower tank
than the upper tank area, thus more closely following the design pressure envelope.
The LH 2 tank will be proof-pressure tested in the horizontal position using dry gas and
volume displacement devices.
2.9 QUALITY CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE PLANS
Those portions of the quality control and maintenance plans that are relevant to the
study are presented and discussed in this section.
2.9.1 QUALITY CONTROL AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION. Figure 2-42
presents a schematic of the various elements of a quality control and non-destructive
evaluation (NDE) plan for a typical structural component and their sequencing. For
components which are not welded or proof tested the related elements of the NDE plan
are eliminated.
The important features of the NDE plan which require strong emphasis on the Space
Shuttle Program are:
a, Inspection and non-destructive testing (NDT) at each important phase of fabrication,
qualification, and operation for the life of the space shuttle vehicle. These phases
include material procurement, detail part fabrication, assembly, proof test, post
proof test, and flight operations.
72
IIEJECT _
-- _ REJECT _ DE LTA'x_F__=._ _w_ _.____R__CT
t.. r-,,_, ! I _ ERB _ WlI_ ]
Y t I "_'-VI'---...... _ 65 ACCE_
| t ..... _ ......... 1 REJECT Y _
[ vi.I_.;irr3-.--I e _'la_mSTORV .W- .... "-I Is. ,EI
"'_'"" I I A,'OUSTIC T ..'% I w_ _1
,A2. ':''T ._...t,.:,,,,ss,,,,,,ACCEPT I /",'},o-'X_ -- -'
/hq-)T __ [ PR(X'F !_ ! A \'_I'A_'_V-
_BES_- _ _ ACCEPT /ND,I,X%__
YREJECT _ - _B EST)/-CONDITIONAL
B(bkRl} (EBB) ACTION FOR ANALYSIS
OF DISCRE PAN('Y.
Figure 2-42. Structural Element Non-Destructive Testing Plan
b. Maintenance of a history of each flaw through the phases mentioned above and/or
repair.
C, Engineering Review Board (ERB) action on the reported flaws. The ERB will
consist of qualified engineering personnel representing structural design, stress,
materials, and NDT. The ERB will evaluate all flaw indications, accept or
reject the item under consideration, or plan the corrective action.
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that the differences in the factory quality
control and NDE plans for components designed using safe-life or fail-safe principles
are small and beyond definition at this time - frame of the space shuttle development
program. It is recognized that it may be necessary to inspect for smaller defects
in safe-life structures; however, this mainly applies to the operation phase. In the
factory, all defects above certain specification or engineering standards will be re-
moved, repaired, or rejected regardless of the design approach.
2.9.2 MAINTENANCE PLAN
2.9.2.1 General Maintenance Concept. The space shuttle maintenmme concept is
the principal element of the space shuttle integrated logisticssupport and maintenance
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programs. The maintenance concept is the basis for the shuttle system maintain-
ability program and dictates the basic approach required in all related areas of the
integrated logistics support program, including training, spares, maintenance plan,
technical data, field support, personnel, etc. The baseline maintenance concept as
established herein is in consonance with the following Space Shuttle Program require-
ments.
a. Reduced operational costs
b. Airline type operation
c. A reusable system with a high launch rate capability and short ground turnaround
time.
Maintenance for the shuttle system is defined as the function of retaining material in,
or restoring it to, a serviceable condition. This includes servicing, repair, modifi-
cation, overhaul, rebuild, refurbishment, verification, reclamation, inspection, and
condition determination. Tasks generated by this definition, as it applies to the space
shuttle system, may take a few minutes at or on the vehicle, wherever it may be
located, or several days in a primary support facility. Shuttle systcm maintenance
also includes maintenance activity accomplished in supporting shops and contractor
facilities.
The shuttle system maintenance concept embraces the general philosophy of "as
required" inspection and repair (maintenance). Scheduled maintenance will be minimized
with each requirement fully justified. Maintenance will be facilitated by use of an
optimized mix of onboard, build-in test, fault isolation, and ground support equipment.
Application of non-destructive testing (NDT) processes and techniques will be considered
to the fullest extent at all levels of maintenance, particularly in support of Level I
(line) maintenance. The requirements for specialized facilities for maintenance and
support operations will be minimized.
Specific maintenance concepts upon which detailed shuttle system maintenance and
support policies and procedures will be based are set forth in the following paragraphs.
2.9.2.2 Levels of Maintenance. Space shuttle system maintenance will be categorized
by three maintenance levels:
a. Level I
b. Level II
Maintenance performed in or at the vehicle (system, booster, orbiter
or GSE as applicable)
Maintenance performed off the vehicle in supporting shops, normally
located at primary operations site.
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c. Level III Maintenance performed off the vehicle or equipment at remote sites such
as depots, contractor facilities, etc.
Specific identification of those maintenance actions directly impacting shuttle system
(flight and ground) availability is also enhanced. Table 2-11 depicts general types of
maintenance that will no_znally be performed at each maintenance level.
Level I maintenance is performed at or on the shuttle system flight vehicle or associ-
ated ground support equipment at any point in the ground turnaround cycle. It includes
those actions in support of test, training, ferry, and operational missions.
Level II maintenance is performed in supporting shops normally located immediately
adjacent to or at the primary operations site. This maintenance level includes line
replaceable unit (LRU)test, checkout, repair, calibration, modification, service, etc.,
capability consistent with the basic concept of optimizing maintenance support capa-
bility by level. Shop facilities provide individual shuttle system, subsystem, assem-
bly, and subassembly processing capability consistent with results of maintenance
requirements analysis conducted in accordance with maintenance program require-
ments contained within this document.
Level III maintenance is conducted off the vehicle at a site remote from the normal
operations site. Examples include contractor facilities and vendor facilities. Specific
Level III maintenance requirements will be developed by analysis and justified in each
case on the basis cost related factors including the need fo.r special facilities, skills,
and support equipment. Examples of maintenance requirements that are candidates for
Level III designation include overhaul of main rocket engines, gyro overhaul or repair,
major modification of sclected line replaceable units, etc.
2.9.2.3 Types of Maintenance. Shuttle system maintenance is generally defined as
scheduled (routine) and unscheduled {non-routine). Each of these general categories
contains a number of specific items, some of which are common to both categories
(servicing, calibrate, etc.) in that they will normally be performed on both a scheduled
basis and/or, as a specific need arises, on an unscheduled basis. Table 2-11 contains
a summary breakdown of both of these major types of maintenance. The following
paragraphs contain a discussion of the two basic types of shuttle system maintenance
from a conceptual viewpoint.
Scheduled maintenance is that maintenance (routine) necessary to ensure or maintain
a stated level of system operational readiness. Scheduled maintenance will be initiated
on the basis of pre-determined criteria such as elapsed calendar time, accumulated
operating hours, and cycles. Scheduled maintenance requirements will be predicated
upon specific design requirements, failure and effects analysis, and safety consider-
ations. This type maintenance includes activities such as servicing, inspection,
75
Table 2-11. Typical Shuttle System Maintenance_ _ _ Lmml
Maintenance/Support Actions
Level I Level II Level Ill
Line Shops Contractor-Facility
Scheduled Maintenance
Preflight Inspection x(1)
Posfflight Inspection x
Major Periodic Inspection x(2)
Special Inspection x
Replacement Life Assemblies x x
Overhaul (Refurbishment) x(3)
Calib ration-Service- Clean- Lube- Etc. x x
Co rrosion Control x x
Unscheduled Maintenance
Repair by Replacement Assemblies x x
Repair in Place x x
Service x x
Calibrate-Clean-Adjus t-E tc. x x
Servicing
Post-Maintenance Verification (Checkout) x x
Miscellaneous x x
Modifications x x
Manufacture/Fabricate x(4)
Tow x
Preservation x x
Operational Test x x
GSE Support x x
Non-Destructive Testing x x
(X-ray-Sonic-Etc.)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x(5)
X
X
X
X
Notes: (1) Preflight inspections will be required to support both mission and ferry
flights. Requirements will vary.
(2) Incrementally accomplished. Phased inspections.
(3) Limited overhaul capability will exist in supporting shops in immediate
area.
(4) Within capability of supporting shops in immediate area.
(5) Fully Justified in each case.
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periodic removal and replacement, and calibration. Scheduled maintenance will be
performed only as required and will be minimized with each requirement fully justified.
Scheduled maintenance will normally be accomplished during the turnaround cycle and
phased inspections.
Unscheduled maintenance is basically that corrective maintenance generated as a result
of discrepancies determined by inflight analysis of shuttle system performance using
built-in test and fault isolation capability as well as crew analysis and reporting.
Corrective maintenance requirements are also generated during the performance of
scheduled maintenance. Unscheduled maintenance will be performed at all three levels
of maintenance as indicated in Table 2-11.
On-vehicle (Level I) corrective maintenance will be by replacement of line replaceable
units to the maximum extent possible. This concept will be supported through the
system design approach, augmented by the maintainability program. Defective as-
semblies removed from the shuttle system will be transported to a Level II (shop) or
Level III (contractor facility) maintenance site for disposition. Normally structural
repair will be accomplished at the primary operation site. Emergency repair, nec-
essary to permit ferry, will be performed at alternate landing sites as necessary.
Off-vehicle corrective maintenance involving assemblies and components removed from
the space shuttle will be performed at shop and contractor activities as necessary.
Determination of where to repair each assembly/component will bc n_ade as a level of
repair decision process. This decision process will include consideration for design
characteristics including predicted failure rates as well as economic considerations
involved.
2.9.2.4 Detail Booster Structure Maintenance Plans. A two-week turnaround time
was established by NASA for the space shuttle booster. It was further established that
the work week will be five 16-hour days. This results in a total turnaround time of
160 calendar hours. Eighty calendar hours are allocated to turnaround maintenance,
which includes safing the vehicle and the performance of all scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance tasks necessary to prepare the booster and make all systems operational
for the next mission. The remaining 80 calendar hours are allocated to erection,
checkout, and prelaunch tasks. The maintenance manhours required to perform the
turnaround maintenance tasks were estimated by making a determination of the number
of personnel and the time required to inspect, repair, or replace and check out each
subsystem and the scheduling of the effort within the allocated time. It is estimated
that 2400 maintenance manhours are required to perform the turnaround maintenance
tasks, of which 160 hours are allocated to the structural subsystem. The remaining
2240 hours are allocated to the propulsion, avionics, hydraulic, and similar sub-
systems.
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To the degree possible with the design details available turnaround maintenance actions
have been established for the components selected for study in this program. These
result in the maintenance manhour allocations presented in Table 2-12. For the base-
line boosters, all the structural components studied were considered to be fail-safe
except the propellant tanks, which were considered safe-life. In addition, the require-
ments of the B-9U delta wing booster and B-16B swept wing booster were considered
identical. The turnaround maintenance actions are discussed in Section 2.9.2.5.
These detailmaintenance plans will be reviewed when the sensitivitiesof the structure
to fatigue, safe-life,and fail-safe requirements are determined (see Sections 4.3.2
and 5.3.2).
Table 2-12. Maintenance Manhours/Turnaround Study of Baseline
Boos te r Components
Scheduled
Routine Phased Unscheduled Total
LO 2 Tank 3 7-1/2 2-1/2 13
LH 2 Tank 3 7-1/2 2-1/2 13
Wing Box 2 4-1/2 3-1/2 10
Vertical Tail 1/2 4-1/2 3 8
Thrust Structure 4 12 9 25
Aft Orbiter Support Frame 1/2 3.0 2 5-1/2
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2.9.2.5 Turnaround Maintenance Actions
a. LO 2 Tank
1. Leak check every flight
2. Visual inspection every flight
(a) Forward bulkhead area
(i) For broken/cracked weldments
(2) Security of closure door and fasteners
(3) Forward skirt attachment flange damage
(4) For evidence of corrosion
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.
(b)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(c) Aft
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
P has ed
(a)
Tank body
TPS attachment for condition
Frames, skins and stringers for cracks, damage, and evidence of
corrosion
Separation attachments for condition
bulkhead
For broken/cracked weldments
Security of fluid line attachments
Evidence of corrosion
Condition of inter-tank attachment
inspections (five flight intervals)
First phase
(1) NDE of the forward frame
(2) NDE of the separation system attach frame
Second phase
(1) NDE of aft frame
(2) NDE of propellant line attachment
4. Unscheduled (To be accomplished only if conditic'as disclosed by other in-
spections indicate a need. )
Remove upper forward TPS segment for NDE and visual inspection of the
upper one-half area of the tank structure
Wing
1. Visual inspection every flight
(a) Exterior
(1) Condition of surface for cracks, heat damage, and evidence of
corrosion
(2) Access panels and doors for condition and security
(3) Surface areas for evidence of hydraulic and fuel leakage
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(b) Interior
(1) Exposed structure in engine cavities and main landing gear wheel
wells for cracks, mechanical damage, and evidence of corrosion
(2) Wing to body attach fittings for security and damage
2. Phased inspections (five flight intervals)
(a) First phase
(1) NDE of forward wing to body attach fittings
(2) NDE of inboard elevon hinge fittings
(b) Second phase
(1) NDE of aft wing to body attach fittings
(2) NDE of outboard elevon hinge fittings
3. Phased inspections (25 flight intervals)
(a) Remove selected exterior panels and visually inspect for cracks and
deformation.
(b) NDE selected lower spar caps
LH 2 tank
1. Leak check every flight
2. Visual inspection every flight
(a) Forward bulkhead area
(1) For broken/cracked weldments
(2) Security of closure door and fasteners
(3) Inter-tank attach frame for damage
(4) For evidence of corrosion
(b) Tank body
(1) TPS attachment for condition
(2) Frames, skins and stringers for cracks, heat damage and evidence
of corrosion
(3) Separation attachments for condition
(4) Main landing gear attachments for condition
(5) Wing attachments for condition
8O
do
(c)
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Aft bulkhead
For broken and cracked weldments
Security of fluidlineattachments
Evidence of corrosion
Condition of thrust section attachment.
3. Phased inspections (fiveflightintervals)
(a) First phase
(1) NDE of the forward tank frame
(2) NDE of forward separation system attach frame
(3) NDE of forward, wing/main landing gear attach frames.
(b) Second phase
(1) NDE of aft tank frame
(2) NDE of the aft separation system attach frame
(3) NDE of aft wing attach frame
4. Unscheduled (To be accomplished only if conditions disclosed by other in-
spections indicate a need).
(a) Remove upper TPS segments for NDE and visual inspection of the upper
one-half area of the tank structure
Thrust section structure
1. Visual inspection every flight
(a) Forward bulkhead
(1) Frame segments for distortion, cracks and security of attachments
(2) Truss members for distortionDcraclcs and security of attachments
(b) Aft bulkhead
(1) Frame segments for distortion, cracks and security of attachments
(2) Truss members for distortion, cracks and security
(c) Thrust members
(1) Thrust beams for distortion and cracks
(2) Thrust posts for distortion and cracks
(3) Thrust tubes for distortion, cracks and security of attachment
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(d) Intermediate frames
Frame segments for distortion and cracks
(e) Skin
Skin panels for distortion cracks and condition of skin stringers.
2. Phased inspections {five flight intervals)
(a) First phase
(1) NDE of six thrust posts
(2) NDE of one horizontal and one vertical thrust beam
{b) Second phase
(1) NDE of six thrust posts
t2) NDE of one horizontal and one vertical thrust beam
stabilizer
Visual inspection every flight
(a) Exterior
(1) Condition of surface for cracks and heat damage
12) Access panels and doors for condition and security
13) Surface areas for evidence of hydraulic leaks
(b) Interior
Stabilizer to body attach fittings for security and heat damage
2. Phased Inspection (five flight intervals)
(a) First phase
1_) Remove all access provisions on left hand side and inspect internal
structure for security, cracks, and distortion
(2) NDE rudder attach fittings
(b) Second phase
(1) Remove all access provisions on right hand side and inspect
internal structure for security, cracks and distortion
(2) NDE stabilizer to body attach fittings
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2. l0 COSTS
The baseline configuration for program costs utilized in this study is shown at NASA
work breakdown structure (WBS) level 4 in Table 2-13. The Convair-developed cost
model that was used to generate these total program costs also served as the basis for
calculating the various direct, cascaded, and growth cost penalties associated with the
safe-life/fail-safe design concepts analyzed under this contract. The model calculates
unit manufacturing costs based on parametric cost estimating relationships (e.g.. cost
as a function of sub-element weight) at various levels of detail down to NASA WBS level
6 which corresponds generally to the structural sub-components analyzed in this study
such as the LH 2 tank, wing, and thrust structure. These calculated unit costs are
introduced into the total program cost calculation wherever hardware requirements are
identified (i.e., ground test articles, spares, flight test vehicles, production vehicles,
etc.). In addition, engineering design and development, tooling, and test program
costs are combined to give booster non-recurring program costs. Production hardware
manufacture, and test article conversion activities are accumulated into total recurrin_
production program costs. Recurring operations costs are then added to non-recurring
and recurring production to obtain total program costs.
Table 2-13. Baseline B-9U Program -- WBS Level 4 Summary
Costs ($ million)
Recurring
Nonrecurring Production
Recurring
Ope rations
3-00 BOOSTER 3211 442
-01 Structural Group 1294 227 14
-02 Propulsion Group 552 88 31
-03 Avionics Group 364 46 59
-04 Power Group 276 38 26
-05 Environmental Control 32 2 1
and Life Support
-06 Booster Vehicle 59 41 --
Installation and Assembly
-07 Combined Subsystem 150 -- --
Development Test
-08 System Engineering 162 '-- --
Integration
-09 Booster Facilities 12 -- --
-10 System Support Equipment 273 -- 13
and Services
-11 Booster Management 37 -- --
Total
P rog ram
144 3797
1535
671
469
340
35
100
150
162
12
286
37
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Table 2-14 is a cost calculation summary wmcn breaks dox_u_ the structural group
line item. This breakdown identifies the structural sub-elements to WBS level 6
(I,H 2 tank, thrust structure, etc.) and shows the distribution of total program cost by
the various cost elements which comprise the non-recurring, recurring production,
and recurring operations phases of the booster program. The aerodynamic surfaces
(WBS 3.1.23, thermal protection system (WBS 3.1.3), and landing system (WBS 3.1.4)
costs are similarly broken down and together with the body structure sum to the
$1. 535 billion previously shown in Table 2-14. For analysis purposes the EDD and
tooling level 5 sums were broken down to level 6 in proportion to the lower level
TFU's.
Table 2-14. Baseline B-9U Structural Group Cost Calculation ($ million)
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SECTION 3
ANALYSIS OF BASE LINE BOOSTERS
3.1 STRUCTURAL SIZING FOR STATIC LOADS
This section presents the preliminary stress analysis of the structural components
studied. Included are the analysis used to size the components for Static limit and
ultimate loads.
3.1.1 L__.O2 TANK. The LO 2 tank is critical for the internal pressures and external
loads presented in Section 2.6. Sizing of the various elements of the tank is shown in
the following paragraphs.
3.1. 1. 1 L__O2 Tank End Domes. Upper and Lower LO 2 tank end domes have been sized
for ultimate, yield, and proof test loads. Dome sizing and weight calculations were
performed by a computer program that determines skin thickness requirements at five
stations along the dome and calculates dome weight assuming a stepped thickness chan_,e.
The upper dome is not in contact with liquid oxygen during critical design times; conse-
quently, the structure will be near room temperature. Proof testing of the upper dome
will be performed at room temperature.
The lower dome is in contact with liquid oxygen during critical design times and will be
proof tested with liquid nitrogen.
Dome structural material is 2219-T87 aluminum alloy xvih,the following properties:
At room temperature At -297* F
Ftu = 63 ksi Ftu
Fry = 52 ksi Fty
E = 10. 8(10) 6 E c
c
w = 0. 102 lb/in 3 W
= 75 ksi
= 61 ksi
- 10.8 (10)6
- 0.102 Ib/in3
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At -320 ° F
F = 78.0 ksi
tu
F = 62.0 ksi
ty
E = 10.8(10) 6 psi
c
w = 0. 102 lb/in 3
Design conditions are as follows:
Ultimate design
Upper dome pressure = 17.5 psi
Lower dome pressure = 40.0 psi ullage
Ultimate factor = 1.4
Yield factor = 1.1
Proof pressure test design
Upper dome pressure = 17. 5 (1. 23) = 21.6 psi
Lower dome pressure = 40 (1.23) = 49. 1 psi
Results of this analysis axe presented on the following pages.
86
DOMF STITNG PROGRAM
UPPER DOME L02 (ppooF DFS)
MATFPIAL 2219-T_7 PPOM TEMP
YO
Vl
V2
Y_
YW
_TU = 6_U00 P_T FTY = 5?')09 P_
Er_ IO_OPDO_ PST T HTN = .049 IN
_CqMETRY <
a/_ : 1.4Z A : 198,DD TN F_IEL HEaD ABOVE EOTR : 2,00 IN
TYPE = _ (TYpE._ = IlPPEP NNHF_ TYPE _ =LOWFR DOME)
FACTnR_ <
ULTTM_TC F_ : ].0_
P"E_U_FS <
PULL _CC = ?I,F. PSI p FnllATnO = ?I,SPSI p ADrY = ?%,6D_I
_THFR C_TTFPTA <
OFLTB t = .blrTN _llr_LINq rNF;rTPIENT = _.5X3
DqMF ST_S_ YIFIq nESIG_'_ PNMPA°E STRESS WITH FTY
YIFLq cR = 1,9C A_IAL LnAn r.SqTqR = 1,00
Y DNHE THICK_'F_R F OHT F THETA WEIghT ARFA
(TNCHEm) (TNC_ES) (P_I) (°SIt (LB) (SQ IN)
O.O0 .044 4_?_ _ 2_ 0.3_ 0.00
=6,01 .O_W 5200" 1436W 72_,9_ 714q7,09
_,O2 .Oh_ 5200:] 27540 1Q3,72 38qq2,71
112,02 ,05 _ 52000 kosgo 22_,57 425_6,7u
14_,P? ,G_ 5200_ 5_000 27_,t? 46_ql.k_
(YO T_ AT FQUATNO, v_ IS AT ADEn)
TQT_L qnME WT : lO_C.kO Ln
rLU_P WT (TN DOME) = 0._0 LM.
DOM_ vnLllME = G650.(_ _U CT
WT _r_TCIENPY = O,&CO0
_M_ WT / VnLLIME =
DOME WT I PLUTD WT =
,._.5"4 tn/qU _T
I=I/L B
8"/
nOHF _TTTNG PROGRAM
UPPFR DOH_ L02 (tiLT nES)
MATE_TBL ?21e-T87 Rq0M TEMD
FTU = 6300fl _¢T _TV = 52000 _%I
E_= 10fi000P0 _I T MIN = .0_0 IN
GEOMFTOY <
Atn = 1._I A = tq_,O0 TN rU_t HEAq AqOVE E_T_ = 0,00 IN
TYPF = 1 (TYPE 1 = UoPE D 0NwE_ TYPE 2 : L0kiER nONE)
CAcTnR¢ <
ULTTMATF F ¢ = _ o_
DoEq_lJOCq <
tJLLACC = 17.=oRT n FnIJATnP = IT.SP_I _ A_EY = 17.5mSI
ATHF _ POTTrPIA <
DELT_ T = ,_ICTH nI,PKLTNG _OEcFTCTENT = 5.5 _ )
nnMr _TTCS_ ULTTM_TE r_FSI_N_ _qMoA_E _TRE_ WITH FTU
Y qNME T_TC_gF_ c oHT _ THETA WEIGHT AREA
ETa'CHaR) (TN_E C) (°_T) (PSI) (Lq) (SO TN)
Y0 9.0l .E_t 5_hq6 35 3.30 0.0_
vl _.01 .O_t 6_00 l_kO3 3Q_.X_ 7tkq7.09
v_ _.O? .0_5 _3C0] 33366 17_.56 389q2,71
v3 1_2.n2 .L_q 6_007 WqtT& ?l_.qQ W2556.70
Y4 i.hJ.O? .OSk 6_LO] 6_000 26C._ h6mgl.kk
(YO T_ _T Er'_t_ _-Tn°, v4 ]_" AT APF_)
TNT/_t n_'E WT : qGr.31 L n
_'LtlTr_ _T (TH nnMF) = C.CO lq
nNMF VntlJHF = _O,0? eli I:'T
kiT rFFTf'TEKIPY = O.O_OP
r)nMF WT / VNLIIMF =
or)Me WT / _'LU_D ',fT :
YTFLq _ = 1,1_ AXIAL LOAn _A_TOR = lo00
P lqtL_
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qNMF gTTTN_ _n_Am
tnW_ PQMF LO_ (D_OOF nEE)
H_TEDIAL ??I_-TQ7 _T -_20 F
vO
Vl
v2
YX
v4
PTIJ = 7R000 P_T PTV = F2OO0 o_T
E_= dO_OOUO0 P_T T H_N = .040 IN
GcOMFToy •
Aln : 1.41 A : tq_.09 Y_' Cl;_L H_Aq nqOVF FqTR = 0.00 IN
TY °p = ? (TY°F I = IIoDEP qO"E. TYO_ _ = LPW;R _OM_)
(JLTTM4T_ F_ = 1._d
p_F_tJo-g •
ULLA_ = kQ.I_gT o EOIJAT_O = 51._DSI o _DEy = 53.3D_I
nTM_P r°TTF_T_ <
nEtT_ t = .01fTN ql;rKLTNG PqF_FTCIENT = 5._
OOMF gT_FS_ YTFLq nFgI_, qOMCADF _TRESR WIT, cry
YTFt_ Cg = _.00 A_IAL lO_n C_TqR = 1.00
Y nnME T_IC_NFSg F O_T c TWETA MEIGMT A_&
].00 .0o2 _6056 3W 0._0 O.O_
_6.01 ,Go2 6_ODO 17127 66_,_6 71Wq7.09
_.P? .ong 6200g _2836 3q_.?_ _Sgq?.71
112,07 .109 6200q k_395 _73.06 _2556,7_
160,07 .120 62000 62000 _75o60 h6Rql,##
T_T_I _ME WT = Plld._5 L"
FLUTO Wl (IN _OMC) : _4W768.45 tq
DnMF VnLUM_ = 6650.(? rlJ rT
WT F_FTPIE_CY = 16_,25W3
DOME WT / VOLIJMF =
DOMr WT I _LtJT_ WT =
.3175 L_/CU FT
,0061LR/LR
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DOME _I71NG P_OGRAM
LHWE_ _OME LOT (ULT DES)
MATERIAL 2_19-T67 AT -2q7 F
FTU = 75000 PST FTY =
E_= 10800000 PeT T MIN =
GEOMFT_Y
Aim = i,_t A = $o_.O0 IN
TYPF=
FACTPR_ <
ULTIMAT_ F_ = Jo_O
P ULLAGE = 40,OP_T
,_TW_P _TTFOI_ <
DELTA T =
On_F STT_S,
v nPME T_I_NF_
(T_,CHER) (TN_UE_)
vO J,OP .OP_
Y1 _6.01 .OP_
v? _4.D2 .0o5
Y3 1_2.02 ,105
Y4 t_O.O_ .lJ5
61000 PSI
• 0_0 TN
FUEL HEAD A_IOVE EI3T_ = 0.00 IN
2 (TyD_ 1 = U_OER qOMF, TYPE 2 = LnWE_ qOME)
YIFLD ¢_ = t.lO
P EnLtATO_ = _?-.P, PSI
AXTAL LOAD =APTqq = 1,_0
FTU
o_T = THET4 WEIGHT
[PSI) (PSI) (L_)
6743_ 41 0.00
75000 7371_ 6_I,55
75003 3q772 37B._
7500q 5_54_ 454.32
75003 7_000 5_2._
.O_OIN qI_PKLING POF¢FTCI_NT = 5.533
ULTTMATE _EST_N, _OMmAOE SIRES% WTTW
3rI_8 tqfqU _T
• o05q lqfL Cl
(YO TS AT FqlIAT_O, Y_ IS AT AmEX)
ThT_L nnME WT = 702f._ • L_
FLUTn WT (IN _n_E) _ _76_,45 tm
nqM_ VnLUM_ = 6_0,_ _U FT
WT cc_PTEHPy = ]70._O?l
D_M_ WT I VqLUM_ =
DnM_ ,_T / _LUTn WT =
A_rA
(SO IN}
O.Ou
714q7.09
3_9q_.7i
4_556.7_
46_g1.44
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3.1.1.2 L__O2 Tank Plate-Stringers. Plate-sta'ingers for the LO 2 tank have been sized
to carry tank pressures and fuselage external loads.
Plate-stringers were optimized by sizing the skin for pressure and then sizing longi-
tudinal stiffeners (stringers) for axial loads.
Skins are critical for proof pressure_ as shown on Page 92 , and stringers are sized
for an axial load of 1000 lb/in compression.
Plate-stringer analysis is presented on Page 93, and a plot of skin thickness ,_md equi-
valent plate stringer thiclmess is presented in Figure 3-1.
Material: 2219-T87 plate three inches thick
Room temperature
F = 63 ksi
tu
Fty : 51 ksi
properties
E = 10.8(10) 6 psi
C
w = 0. 102 lb/in 3
Fsu = 38 ksi
_9
¢J
Z
0.20
0.15
0. I0
0.05
1 I I I [
INTEGRAL TEE STRINGERS 12.0 IN. O.C. L' 70.0 IN. /
SECTIONS ARE CONSTRUCTED AROUND TIIE TANK FI]SELAGE
/__ STA 1866
FUSE L_GE _._ /
• STA 1,179
t s DWG O. 010 _/_,._
=._ _ "_ _" t MIN
_ s
.... fl
O 100 200 300 400 500 600
LO 2 TANK STATION (inches)
Figure 3-1. LO 2 Tank Plate-Stringer Sizing
7O0
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Properties at -320 ° F
Ftu = 63(1.24) = 78 ksi
Fty = 51(1. 19) = 61 ksi
Allowable working tension stress at limit pressure
At room temperature
63
Ultimate design 1_ = 45.0 ksi (1.4 ultimate factor)
51
Yield design 1.---_:: 46.4 ksi (1. 1 yield factor)
51
Proof design 1.2"--'_= 41. 5 ksi (1. 23 proof factor)
At -320 ° F
78
Ultimate design 1-_ = 55.5 ksi
61
Yield design 1.--_ = 55.5 ksi
61
Proof design 1.2--"_ = 49. 5 ksi
For pressure design the skins are proof test critical.
Tank skins from the lower dome to LO 2 tank Station 310 will be tested with LN 2 at
-320 ° F.
Proof pressure at lower dome equator: p = 38. 8 psi
Minimum skin thickness 38. 8(198_
= - 61,000 = 0. 126 (at lower dome equator)
Proof pressure at LO 2 Station 310: p = 32.2 psi
Minimum skin thickness - 32.2(198)
61t000 = 0. 105 (at Station 310)
Tank skins from the upper dome to LO 2 tank Station 310 will be tested at room
temper ature.
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Proof pressure: p = 21.5 psi
Minimum skin thickness = 21. 5(198)
51,000
= 0. 084
Drmving skin thickness tolerance is 4-0. 015 inch for nominal thicknesses less than
0. 100 inch and i-0. 010 inch for 0. 100 and over. A minimum thickness of 0. 084 mini-
mum would require a callout of 0.099 i-0. 015 because it is less than 0. 100. A callout
of 0. 100 +0. 010 will be used, giving a minimum skin thickness of 0. 090.
The maximum longitudinal compression load in the LO 2 tank wall is N x
Section Data:
Stringer A{ = 0. 025 inch
F = 8000 psi
e
L' = 70
N = 980 lb/in minimum
X
= -665 lb/in.
to-To
2.0 II t s (0.100 MINI
Plate-Stringer Section
(Stringers a_-e spaced at
12.0 inches on centers)
The same stringer section is used for all of the tank.
3.1.2 L_H2 TANK. The LH 2 tank is critical for the pressu.e and axial loads presented
in Section 2.5. Sizing of the wxrious structural elements F the tank is presented in the
following paragraphs.
3.1.2.1 L.H2 Tank End Domes. Upper and lower LH 2 tank end domes have been sized
for both ultimate des ':-]a and proof test. Dome sizing and calculation of weights was
performed by a computer program that determines skin thickness requirement of five
stations along the dome and calculates the dome weight assuming a stepped thickness
change.
Dome structural material is 2219-T87 aluminum alloy with the following properties at
room temperature:
Ftu = 63,000 psi
Fty = 52, 000 psi
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Ultimate design
Upper dome pressure = 22.3 psi
Lower dome pressure = 26.4 psi
Proof pressure test design
Upper and lower dome pressure = 26.4 (1. 13) = 29.8 psi
Results of this analysis are presented on the following pages.
3.1.2.2 LIt 2 Tank Plate-Stringers and Belt Frames. Plate-stringers for the LH 2 tank
have been sized to carry tank pressures and fuselage external loads. The design criteria
and loadings presented in Section 2 were followed in establishing factors of safety, mini-
mum skin thickness for pressure design, and minimum thickness for stability design.
Plate-stringer and belt frame configurations were optimized for axial loads with the
following constraints:
a. Minimum skin required for pressure and/or shear.
b. Minimum stringer spacing for machining.
c. Maximum stringer height limited by available plate thickness.
Optimum frame spacing was determined for two basic integral stiffener configurations,
tee and blade, by selecting average compressive load intensities and optimum stiffen-
ers for various effective column lengths. Belt frame required moments of inertia were
calculated by the Shanley criterion_
If = Nx
Frame cross-sectional areas were calculated for 9.0 inch deep frames with truss webs
that would have the required moment of inertia. Effective thickness (_) was calculated
for each configuration and plotted as shown in Figure 3-2. As a result of this study,
integral stiffeners with an effective column length of 60 inches were selected for de-
tailed sizing.
Various sizes of integral st2ffeners were analyzed to determine the effect of stringer
spacing and height for several minimum skin thicknesses. Typical results of this study
are shown in Figures 3-3 and 3-4. As a result of this study, a stiffener spacing of 4. 0
inches was selected for the LH 2 tank.
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OOMF qTTTNG PQO_PAM
UPOE_ r)OHE LH? (tILT gET;)
MATERTAL ?_21q-T_.7 RrmM TFMP
FTII = 6_000 PeT
E_= 10_00000 _T
AC_MFTQY <
_TY = 52C00 oqI
T PIN = ._0 IN
YIFLq _S = 1.10 AXIAL LaAn _APTNR = 1. J3
Alnl = 1._1 A = lqq.o0 I_ I _:UTL HEA_q 8qOVE Fr)T o = 0.00 IN
TYPF = I (TY°E I = IlL}PEP qnHF1 TYPE 2 = LqwE _, r)OHE)
F ACTF_RR •
tJLTTMSTE" F_ = _.60
poE_SIJI_E_ •
P ULLAGE = 72,7nql r P Enl/ATgP = ?2._rPgI P 8P--W -- 72.3P_;I
_T_F¢ _ _OTTrOI_ <
.01OT_ qUf'KLIHG PNF_CT_TENT = 5.533
IILTTMATE PFSIr, N, r'}MOA_E _T_E_. _ WTT_ ;T':
OELT_ T :
nqME SITES,
Y nNME T_I_KNFSR c nHI c THFTA , IS_T
(TN_HER) (TNe_E_) (P_T) (o_I% (L_)
YO O.O0 .OFX 5fl_q6 75 O.JO
Y1 _6,01 ,053 63003 17W0] _A5,3_
Y2 P_.02 ,0_7 6_000 _366 ?77o5 _
v3 112.D2 .OF3 63009 Wq176 277.6n
vh 1&g.O_ .o@q 63P0_ 6TO00 _31.9 r
(YO TS AT F_L}ATn_, Y(+ lq AT APE){)
TrtTAL nr}ME WT -- 1217.3_. L n
FLIlTn WT (T",I nnm_) = O,O0 L_
r)C)ME Vr)LtlMF = 66_0.F? r'U FT
WT F_'_'TCTEI_PY = O.O000
r)qME NT / V'3LUME :
DqME WT / ',='LI}'IP wT = o L_IL_
ARF_
(_ TN)
38qq_.71
_255_,7.
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OOMF q[7ING PoOGRA_
IlPPER QOME LH2 (PPOO_ nES)
MATERIAL 2219-T87 qOOM TEMP
FTU : 63000 PSI FTY = 52000 PSI
Ec 10800000 P_I r MIN = ,040 IN
GEOMETRY •
Al_ = 1.41 A = lqR.o0 I_ FUEL _EAq Aq_VE rnT@ = 0.00 IN
TYPE : I [TYPF I : UPPE p qOME_ TYPE 2 = LeWE_ ROME)
F_CTORR <
ULTTMATE F_ = I,00
PRESSURES <
P ULLAGE : _9.PPR! p FOuATnR = 2q,sPST P APEX : ;_DSI
OTHEP CRITEQIA (
DELT_ T = ,0101N qUrKLTNG C_EF_TCIENT = 5,5X_
DOME SI7ES, YIEL q RESIGN, COMPARE STRESS WITH cTy
YTEL_ FS = 1.00 AXIAL LqAO CAeTOR = 1,00
Y ROME T_Te_NESS F _HI _ THETA WEIGHT AREA
(TNCHES) (TNC_E_) (PqI) (_SI1 IL_) (SO IN)
YO 0,00 ,061 W82_3 29 0.00 O,OJ
Y1 56.01 .061 5_000 1_36_ _5,60 71497.09
Y2 84.02 .066 52000 27540 263,13 38g_2,71
Y3 112.02 ,073 52000 W05gO 315,35 42566.7u
Y_ 140,03 ,080 5200_ 5_000 3_3,Tq 46Bql.4_
(YO IT AT FOUATN9_ Y4 IS AT APEX)
TOTAt DOME WT = 1_07.78 LB
FLUID WT (IN DOME) = 0,00 Lq
I
ROME VOLUME = 6650._ CU ET
WT EFFICIENCY = 0,0000
DOME WT / VOLUME = ,2117 L_/CU _T
DOME WT I FLUID WT = P LB/LB
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qOMF 91lING PROGRAM
LOWE_ OOHE LH2 (ULT OE_)
MATFRIAL 2219-Tfl7 POOH TEMP
FTU = 6_JO0 DRT PTY : 52000 oSI
EC= I0_00000 PSI THIN = .0_0 IN
GPOMFTOY <
A/_ = i._I A = iq8.00 TFJ FUEL HEAD AqOVE EOTR = O.O0 IN
TYPF = 2 (TYPE I = UoPER DOMF, TYPE 2 = LqWER qOME)
FACTnRR <
ULTTMATE F_ = ].40 YIELD FS = 1.10
P ULLA_P = _6.cPql P FNUATOP = ?6.4PSI
0THEP rRITCRIA <
O_tT8 T =
OOMF ST7_S.
Y _NME T_Tr_IFSS F PHT C THETA
(T_tCHES) (7Nq_E_) (Pgl) (PSI)
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Y2 P4.02 ._6_ 63_0_
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AXIAL LOAD :_rTnR : 1.00
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_]366
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WT Ec'F_CIE_,_y =
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GEOMETRY <
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FACTOR_ •
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P TII_I A_E : _g,_T D _NU_TOO : 2q.3D_I P APEY : ?_,_P_I
nT_EP rRITE_I_ (
DELTA T = ,OtQTN qtlCKLING r_E_FTCIENT = 5,57]
DOMF ST7_S, YTELD DE_TGN_ CnMPAQE _TRESS WIT_ ;TY
YTFLq ¢_ = 1,90 AXIAL LOAD cA_TOR = 1,90
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WT FFCT_TE_!CY = 0.[000
OflM._ WT / V_LUME : ,2117 Lq/_.IJ FT
nOMF NT / FLUID WT -- R L_ILB
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Figure 3-2. LH 2 Tank Plate-Stringer Effective Thickness Versus Frame Spacing
Detailed sizing of the plate-stringer includes the effects of internal pressure, axial
load, and shear. Minimum skin thickness was determined for pressure design (ulti-
mate, yield, and proof test), shear (principal stress), and .axial load. Sizing of the skin
is influenced by axial loads in determining optimum plate-stringer sizes for minimum
weight to carry biaxial load and not exceed the allowable shear strength of the skin.
Four sections of the LH 2 tank were selected for detailed analysis of a clean structure.
The effect of concentrated loads was calculated separately.
Loads for the selected stations are presented in Table 3-1. A typical analysis is pre-
sented on Page 102 and the final plate stringer sizes in Table 3-2.
Material: 2219-T87 plate 3 inches thick
Room temperature properties
Ftu = 63 ksi
Fty = 51 ksi
Fsu = 38 ksi
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CONSTRAINTS ON SIZES:
STRINGER THICKNESS (tw) = 0.060 MIN.
STRINGER HEIGHT (bw) = 1.50 TO 3.00 IN.
-- MATERIAI,: AI, 2219-T87 AT R.T.
EFFECTIVE COLUMN LENGTH = 60.0 IN.
9
8
0
7 w ..........
bs = 4.0_
o //..
b = 2.75W
4 b s = 6I0_ bw = 2.50
3
= 8.0% "" w ::: 2.25
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Figure 3-3. Integral 'Fee Plate-Stringer, Optimization of Stringer
Spacing and Height -- 0. 122 Inch Skin Thickness
100
e,
m
l!
I0
U
qP
7
t" ........
CONSTRAINTS ON SIZI=:S.
STRINGER THICKNE_ (tw) = 0,060 MIN,
STRINGER HEIGHT {hw_ i,50 TO 3°00 IN,
MATERIAL: AL 2219-TS7 AT R.T.
EFFECTIVE COLUMN LENGTH = 60,0 IN.
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Igure 3-4. Integra/Tee Plate.Strhtger, Opt/m/zaflon of Stringer
Spac/ng and Height -- 0. 162 Inch Sk/n Thickness
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Station
' 2400
2800
3161
3377
r •
Station
2400
2800
3161
3877
Table 3-1. LH 2 Tank Critical Design Loads (Ultimate)
Bottom
N x q C*
-4167 0 7
-6327 0 7
-7269 0 7
-8O55 0 7
Bottom Side
N q C*
x
-4072 49 4
-5614 222 7
-6380 228 7
-7006 66 7
Side
N x q C*
-6062 6 6
-6138 319 6
-6401 346 6
-6536 362 6
Top Side
Nx q C*
-8803 5 10
-8485 624 10
-7817 7O0 10
-7479 743 5
Top
N x q C*
-10,923 0 10
-10,412 0 10
-9,206 0 10
-8,349 0 10
Ultimate Radial Load Intensities * Condition munber
Condition 4 Condition 6 Condition 7 Condition 10
Press Ny
11.9 2356
13.3 2633
15.4 3049
16.8 3326
Press Ny
27.3 5405
27.3 5405
28.7 5683
30.1 5960
Press Ny
11. 9 2356
13.3 2633
15.4 3 O49
16.8 3326
Press Ny
31. 2 6178
31.2 6178
31. 2 6178
32.2 6376
Ec = 10. 8 (10) 6 psi
w = 0. 102 lb/in 3
Allowable working tension stress at limit pressure
Ultimate design --
63
1.4
- 45. 0 ksi (1.4 ultimate factor)
51
Yield design 1. 1-- = 46.4 ksi (1. 1 yield factor)
51
Proof design 1. 13 - 45. 1 ksi (1. 13 proof test factor)
For pressure design the tank skins are ultimate critical.
Minimum skin thickness for the tank will be determined by ultimate design pressure
and proof pressure.
Tae proof pressure is the maximum pressure in the tank multiplied by the proof test
factor of L 13.
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Maximum tank pressure is at the lower dome apex (26.4 psi).
Proof pressure = 26. 4 (1. 13) = 29.83 psi
Maximum tank pressure in constant section: p = 25.5 psi.
$,
The tank constant section is proof test critical
Minimum skin thickness = 29. 83(198) = 0. 116 inch
51,000
Drawing callout = 0. 126 _0. 010
Stability design t = 1.05 (0. 116) = 0. 122
Typical Plate Stringer Analysis -- Section at Station 2800:
Tank Bottom Centerline:
Ultimate loads: N x = -6327 lb/in; Ny = 5405 lb/in; q = 0.
r
3.0
I O. 140
I
'1 I4.0
Plate-Stringer Section
(Stringers are 4.0 inches on Centers)
Section Data:
ts = 0. 140
=0.200
F c = 33,500 psi (L t = 60)
Fsu = 38,000 psi
Note: Thickness shown is for stability
design: 1.05 × tmin
0. 140
for pressure ts = 1. 0"---5"= 0. 133
6327
Compressive stress: f =
c 0. 200 = 31,630 psi
Tensile stress normal to compressive:
5405
ft = 0.133 = 40,700 psi
103
Maximum shear stress:
= e f
fSp 2
1/2
fSp = 37,000 psi
Me Se -
33,500
31,630
-1 = +0. 05 (compression)
38,000
M.S.-
37,000 -1 = +0.02 (shear)
Typical Plate-Stringer Analysis - Station 2800 - Upper Side
Maximum compressive condition:
N x = -8485 lb/in ultimate
q = 621 lb/ln ultimate
3g maximum thrust
Internal pressure maximum ultimate: p = 22.3 (1.4)= 30. 7 psi
T
3. O0
1
i !
0.080 iO.Olfi
Plate Stringer Section
Nominal Section Properties
= 0.242
A = 0.9696/4 inch width
p = I. 099
Section for Stability Design
Skin t = 0. 150 (1.05) = 0. 157
Stringer t = 0. 065 (1.05) = 0. 068
A = 0.9029
--o.226
p = I.014
Plate-stringer compression allowable:
Frame spacing is 66.7 inches
Column fixity is 1.5
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Table 3-2. LH 2 Tank Plate Stringer Sizing
Material: 2219-T87; Stringer Spacing: 4. 0 inches on centers;
Stringer Height: 3.0 inches
Sta2182 2400 2800 3161 3377
_-t s =0.122
=0.175
_t s =0.122
=0.174
ft s =0. 140
; =0.190
.t s =0.160
=0.242
=0.170
=0.292
_-t s = 0.140
= 0.200
rts = 0. 130
= 0. 192
/-t s = 0. 140
= 0. 193
/-t s = 0. 160
=0.240
_-t s = 0. 150
=0.220
rts = 0. 140
m
t =0.206
(-t s = 0. 140
=0.207
f-t s =0. 150
t" =0.236
s =0. 160= 0. 252
_- t s = 0. 150
=0.236
f-t s = 0. 150
=0.212
r-t s = 0. 150
=0.204
f.t s = 0. 150
= 0. 223
= 0.160
=0.246
3681
--Bottom CL
--- Bottom Side
_Side
Top Side
Top
Note: 1. t s is sldn thickness for stability design.
2. t is the equivalent thickness of skin and stringers.
3. Thickness shown does not include effects of local loads.
L I 66. 7
=,f_'. 5 =54.6
F c = 37,600 psi
8485
fc = 0.22"----_= 37,500 psi
37,600
M.S. =---1 = +0.0
37,500
Maximum skin shear: (nominal section)
ft = p_..rr= 38,000 psit
N
x
f =-- = 35,000 psi
o
105
fs =q = 3880 psit
211/2
fsma x = ÷ fsj = 36t500 psi
38,000
M.S. = -1 = +0.04
36,500
LH 2 Tank Belt Frames:
Frames sized by Shanley criterion:
If=N X\ 4LEf /
Typical frame analysis:
Design load intensity: N x = -8000 lb/in
Frame spacing: L = 60 inches
Tank diameter: D = 396 inches
Coefficient: Cf = 62.5 (10) -6
Solution: If
Frame section:
8000(62.5) (10) -6 ff (396) 4.
• 4(60) (10.3) (10) 6
= 15.63 inches 4
Frame depth: d = 9 inches
21
Required cap area: A=--; A=
Effective depth: de = 8.75
2(15.63) _ 0. 408 inch2/cap
(8.75) 2
Equivalent web thickness of the truss: tw = 0. 06
Frame A_: At = [2(0. 408) * 9(0.060)]
6O
= 0. 023 in.
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3.1.3 VERTICAL TAIL BOX. The vertical tall structural box is constructed of 6A1-4V
titanium alloy, and has a three-spar arrangement with the front spar on the 10% chord
line, the rear spar on the 60% chord line, and the mid spar on the 37% chord line as
shown in Figure 3-5. Spars and ribs are of corrugated construction. Welding is used
to attach spar and rib caps to the corrugated webs. Surface coverings are of integrally
stiffened extruded "planks," welded together. The rear spar and mid spar transfer the
bending moments and shear into the body bulkheads through fittings.
The vertical tail was simulated and analyzed by means of a Convair computer procedure
that used the stiffness approach to obtain an internal load distribution. The spanwise
bending moment distribution used for member sizing is shown in Figure 2-25. Another
computer program was used to optimize the skin-stiffener configuration, with the re-
sulting proportions shown on Page 109. The skins of the fin box are fully effective from
the tip to the canted rib.
The section chosen for the fatigue calculations of the present study is at the canted rib,
Section (_ - (_ of Figure 3-5. The spar cap sizing calculations for this section are
shown below. Load distribution coefficients are determined by computer.
V = 352,800 Ib (ultimate)
M = 74.234 x 106 in-lb
T = 9.58 x 106 in-lb
Section (_) - (_) of Figure 3-5 105 IN. 105 IN.
FS RS
h = 42.4 IN. h = 62.4 IN. h = 58.8 IN.
0. 0176(352,800) _ 6209
qFS = 42. 4 42.4 = 146 lb/in
0. 123(352,800) _ 43,394
qCS - 62.4 62.4 - 695 lb/ln
0. 442 (352,800) _ 155,938
qRS = 58.8 58.8 = 2652 Ib/in
Rcmainder of shear is carried in covers and caps, which are tapered.
Spar Cap Loads
0. 013 (74. 234) 106
Forward Pcap = 42.4 = 22,760
107
373. 771 REF
R.S.O.
M.S. 0.37C
F:i_. O. 10C_
STRINGERS (TYP)
BETWEEN EACH
RIBS
0°
42
1
""_-71.5"-_
556.1
278
_--75---_
q_
AFT THRUST BHD
533.8
Figure 3-5. Vertical Tail Configuration
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0. 032(74. 234)(106)
Center Pcap = 62.4 = 38,069
0. 068(74. 234) 106
Aft Pcap = 58.8 = 85,849
Cap Areas Choosing f = 34 ksi
Forward A - 22,760
34,000
- 0. 670 in 2
Center A - 38,069
34,000
= i. 12 in 2
Rear A - 85,849
34,000
Covers
- 2.52 in 2
0.89 (74,234,000) = 66,068,260 in-lb
66,068,260
PX = 55 in. = 1,201,241 lb
N x _ 1,201,241/210 = 5725 lb/in
For the configuration with_ = 0. 180 we have acr = 32,450 psi.
5725 lb/ln
This compares with _eff = 0. 180 in. = 31,805 psi
--------2.00 _
3.1.4 THRUST STRUCTURE. A finite element model was utilized to determine the
theoretical weight of the thrust structure. The idealized model and geometry is shown
in Figures 3-6 through 3-11 and Table 3-3. Figure 3-12 shows thrust structure model
elements.
A total of 14 basic loading conditions were initially investigated, plus one or two engine
failures for the flight conditions. By assuming an identical structural configuration in
each 45-degree segment of the thrust structure model, the number of possible loading
combinations with engine failure was reduced. For one engine failed, one of the four
inner engines or one of the eight outer engines was considered failed -- reducing the
number of combinations from 12 to 2. For two engines failed the number of combina-
tions was reduced from 66 to 12.
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N!
0
2
!
.pl
110
(LOOKINGF_)RW,_tD)
Figure 3-7. Aft Thrust Bulkhead Model, Station 3913
111
÷Z
(_)OKING FORWARD}
Figure 3-8. Forward Thrust Bulkhead Model, Station 3831
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÷Z
(LOOKING FORWARD)
Figure 3-9. Backup Frame Model, Station 3756
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+Z
(IX)OKING FORWARD)
(STATION 3681, X=242, NODE 4O0s)
(STATION 3605, X=318, NODE 500S)
(STATION 3529, X=394, NODE 60OS)
(8TATION 3451, X=4720 NODE 700s)
(STATION 3373, X--550, NODE 800s)
(STATION 3295, X=628, NODE 900s)
Figure 3-10. Y-Ring Tank Frames Model
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LOOKING INBD AT LOOKING OUTBD AT
L/H THRUST BEAM R/l! THRIIST BEAM
L(X)KIN(: I)OWN AT IX)WEll THRUST BEAM
Figure 3-11. Thrust Beam Models
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Table 3-3. Thrust Structure Model Coordinates
Node y z Node y z Node y z
1 -25. O0 196.42
2 -54.50 190.35
3 -i00.46 170.62
4 -140.01 140. 01
5 -170.62 100.46
6 -190.35 54.50
7 -198.00 0
8 -190.35 -54. 50
9 -170.62 -100.46
10 -140.01 -140.01
11 -100. 46 -170. 62
12 -54. 50 -190.35
13 0 -198.00
14 54.50 -190.35
15 100.46 -170. 62
16 140.01 -140.01
17 170.62 -100.46
18 190.35 -54. 50
19 198.00 0
20 190.35 5t. 50
21 170.62 100.46
22 140.01 140. 01
23 100.46 170. 62
24 54.50 190. 35
25 25. O0 196.42
131 -19.20 163.50
132 -54. 50 163.50
133 -90. 74 154.11
134 -122.43 122.43
135 -154.11 90. 74
136 -163.50 54.50
137 -163.50 0
138 -163.50 -54. 50
139 -154. 11 -90. 74
140 -122.43 -122.43
141 -90. 74 -154. 11
142 -54. 50 -163.50
143 0 -163.50
144 54. 50 -163.50
145 90. 74 -154. 11
146 122.43 -122.43
147 154.11 -90. 74
148 163.50 -54. 50
149 163.50 0
150 163.50 54.50
151 154. 11 90. 74
152 122.43 122.43
153 90.74 154. 11
154 54.50 163.50
155 19.20 163.50
161 0 163.50
162 -54.50 109. O0
163 -109. O0 54.50
164 -109. O0 -54.50
165 -54.50 -109. O0
166 54.50 -109, O0
167 109. O0 -54. 50
168 109. O0 54. 50
169 54.50 109. O0
X73 0 54. 50
X74 -54.50 54.50
X75 -54.50 0
X76 -54.50 -54. 50
X77 0 -54. 50
X78 54.50 -54.50
X79 54.50 0
X80 54. 50 54. 50
231 -29.48 180. O0
232 -54.50 180. O0
233 -86.90 147.60
239 -117.25 117. 25
235 -147.60 86.90
236 -180. O0 54. 50
237 -180. O0 0
238 -180. O0 -54. 50
239 -147.60 -86. 90
240 -117.25 -117.25
241 -86.90 -147.60
242 -54.50 -180. O0
243 0 - 180. O0
244 54.50 -180.00
245 86.90 -147.60
246 117.25 -117.25
247 147.60 -86.90
248 180.00 -54.50
249 180. O0 0
250 180.00 54.50
251 147.60 86.90
252 117.25 117.25
253 86.90 147.60
254 54.50 180.00
255 29.48 180.00
27] 0 180.00
331 -27.96 170.73
332 -47.62 166.32
333 -87.78 149.08
334 -122.33 122.33
335 -149.08 57.78
336 -166.32 47.62
337 -173.00 0
338 -166.32 -47.62
339 -149.08 -87.78
340 -122.33 -122.33
341 -87.78 -149.08
342 -47.62 -166.32
343 0 -173.00
344 47.62 -166.32
345 87.78 -149.08
346 122.33 -122.33
347 149.08 -87.78
348 166.32 -47.62
349 173.00 0
350 166.32 47.62
351 149.08 37.78
352 122.33 122.33
353 87.78 149.08
354 47.62 166.32
355 27.96 170.73
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1. One hour ground headwinds
2. One hour ground tailwinds
3. (_hm hour ground sidewinds
Conditions 4 through 11 were run with:
a. No engines out.
b. With one engine out.
c. With two engines out.
4. Liftoff plus one hour ground headwinds
5. Liftoff plus one hour ground tailwinds
6. Liftoff plus one hour ground sidewinds
7. Maxhnum alpha q with headwinds
8. Maximum alpha q with tailwinds
9. Maximum beta q
10. Three g maximum thrust
11. Booster burnout
17. One day ground headwinds
18. One day ground tailwinds
19. One day ground sidewinds
A computerized analysis was made with these loading conditions. From the resulting
internal loads it was determined that only seven loading conditions were critical for
design. Conditions eliminated did not occur in the maximum/minimum search or were
slightly critical in only a few areas; consequently, these conditions have a negligible
effect on the overall results. The critical conditions are as follows:
7 Maximum alpha q headwinds
7 IE Maximum alpha q headwincts (inner engine failed)
70E Maximum alpha q headwinds (outer engine failed)
10 Three g maximum thrust
10 IE Three g maximum thrust (inner engine failed)
10 OE Three g maximum thrust (outer engine failed)
19 One day ground sidewinds
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Ultimate applied loads are shown in Table 3-4. Table 3-5 fists the element number,
maximum load, cross-sectional area and thickness, applied and allowable stress, and
element weight based on the material properties given below.
As noted in Section 2.3, the struc/xtral members of the thrust structure are of Ti-6A1-4V
annealed titanium, having the following room temperature properties:
Ftu = 130 ksi (Reference 14)
Ftu 130
F t at limit load - I. 40 i. 40
- 92.86 ksi
Fcy = 126 ksi
Fsu = 76 ksi
Table 3-4. Thrust Structure Ultimate Design Loads
I_.' 54 32 104
,(;IblblAl I_T_. (]:'_
$,:_ 7_
4. 4 WING ATfAt I! I:lh
i I 7 IO9
_4. 41 II0
Ultimate l,oads (pounds)
Comlit|o.s Px Py Pz Locatloru_
19 1 Day Ground Sid_._,lnds
7 Ma.ximum alpha-q Headwlmls
7 IE M:tximum alpha-q Headwinds 0mmr Engine Out)
70E Maximum alpha-q Headwinds (Outer Engine O_t)
10 3g Maximum Thrust
10 IE 3g Maximum Thrust 0nner Engine Out)
10 OE 3g M_imum Thrust (Outer Euginc Ckit)
1,m;50367 -38,280 4,202 104
I ,Ipl_5,537 -104,926 4,212 llO
2,,t67,059 -104,926 70, ,_Sa 1t6
2,.11;6,889 -38,280 7(_, _5_ 122
a09,000 -187,920 32,36,38,42,44,48,50,54,74,76,78,80
185,610 508, 170 109
46,300 LI2
-185p610 508,470 117
_82,610 -205,(100 32.36,38, 42, 44,48,50, 54, 74,78,80
185,610 508,470 109
46,300 112
-185p610 508. 470 117
882,610 -205,000 32,36,38,44,48,50,54, 74,76, 78,80
185,610 508,470 109
46,300 112
-185,610 ,508,470 117
920,990 -67,680 32,36,38,42,44,48, 50,54,74,76, 78.80
1,004,700 -73,832 32,36,38,42: 44,48,50, 54, 74,78,86
1,00.l, 700 -73,832 32,36,38,44,48,50_ 54, 74,76,78, _0
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3.1. 5 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME. The principal aft support point of the orbiter
to the booster is located at Station 2666. A substantial body frame is provided at this
station to distribute orbiter loads to the booster body shell. Figure 3-13 shows the
critical applied loads (ultimate), and Figure 3-14 shows the element identification.
A finite element computer solution was used to size the frame, and the modelm geometry,
applied loads, section properties and internal loads are shown on the following pages.
The material of the frame is 2219 aluminum alloy, largely in the T851 plate temper.
The room temperature properties of this material are as follows:
Ftu = 62 ksi
Ftu 62
F t at limit load = 1.40 1. 40
= 44. 29 ksi
Fcy = 48 ksi
Fsu = 36 ksi
To allow for the effects of fastener holes, welds, and other stringer reducers, these
properties were reduced for member sizing to the following values for use with ulti-
mate loads.
477K
542.6K 238.5K
l 238.5K 140.6K
Figure 3-13. Critical Applied Loads (Ultimate),
Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame
MAX _q
SIDEWIND
125
20
@
19
I
I
4
6
WEB
t
_BAR
5/NUMBER
7
8
9
10
12 tl
14
3
15
16
18
17
Figure 3-14. Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame Element Identification
Ft = F e = 50 ksi
F s = 20 ksi
Table 3-6 lists cap axial loads and cross-sectional areas, and Table 3-7 lists the web
shear flows and thicknesses.
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Table 3-6. Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame, Cap Axial
Loads and Cross-Sectional Areas
Bar
Ultimate Axial Loads (kips)
Area*
Length Max. Max. _q
(inches) O_l Left Right (in 2)
1 40 -56 302 -375 7.5
2 40 -227 -234 -11 4.6
3 50 -125 220 -376 7.5
4 53 -130 -180 87 3.6
5 52 -223 -1 -260 5.2
6 62 44 30 74 1.5
7 117 -424 -106 -373 8.5
8 64 63 87 -161 3.2
9 98 -110 -52 -62 2.2
10 91 -120 25 -185 3.7
11 102 19 -5 33 0.5
12 91 -82 -14 -87 1.7
13 55 1 1. 7 0 0.5
14 47 3 -7.5 12 0.5
15 69 -5 0. 6 -6. 3 0.5
16 57 15 -0. 5 22 0.5
17 67 -6 -0. 9 -6. 4 0.5
18 53 12 O. 8 14. 1 O. 5
19 80 -6 -2. 2 -4.2 O. 5
20 62 6 1. 1 5.6 0.5
*Assume F T = F e = 50 ksi ultimate
Table 3-7. Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame, Web
Shear Flows and Thicknesses
Ultimate Shear Flow (kips/in)
Area Max. Max. _q t*
Web (in 2) qq Left Right (in.)
1 722 1.1 4.3 5.7 O. 29
2 1493 1.9 6.7 4.7 O. 34
3 2441 1.8 2.1 O. 11 O. 11
4 2048 7.5 O. 57 8.4 O. 42
5 1471 3.5 1.00 2.9 0.50
6 2103 O. 32 O. 16 O. 66 0.33
7 1631 O. 21 0 O. 26 O. 13
8 2483 O. 06 0 O. 01 O. 04
9 2854 O.Ol 0 0 O.04
10 3947 0 0 O.01 O.04
* Assume F s = 20 ksi ultimate
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3.1. 6 B-9U DE LTA WING BOX. Primary structural components such as spars and
ribs are sized by maximum _q loads during boost (Condition W1). This condition is
critical because it combines high air loads and low relieving inertia loads. A finite
element solution was programmed for the IBM 360) Model 65 computer, using a struc-
tural simulation model consisting of 156 nodes and 1073 constant stress elements, as
shown in Figure 3-15. Skin corrugations were simulated in shear with quadrilateral
plate elements. Orthotroptc triangles with negligible shear stiffness were superim-
posed to simulate the unidirectional extensional stiffness of the skins.
Spar cap loads obtained from the computer solution are tabulated in Table 3-8 for Con-
dition Wl. These loads, as well as the spar sizing data of Tables 3-9 through 3-13, are
based on preliminary analysis. However, it is believed that the data shown are suf-
ficiently refined for the present purposes.
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3_7
SS SS
I 1'31 095 0
WS
'9'/ 10"7[17'I77 13_/"I"_ 515
L/
507 /461 _9 IO_ 119129 139 l'T9 -633
5_7_5_ "_'_7353 (;3
Ill 121 131 141 1-_ -751
:101
687 _J3 _ 55/{;5"_75
73 1 _ 5 43
_25 _77q 7 _[1_12313:i 143 1-_-3 9.tl
103 ' '
SS 801
5L,,,,.--I 1
B-9U space shuttle wing box simulation node points
for upper surface. Add "1" to the upper surface node_
to obtain the node numbedng for the lower surface.
Figure 3-15. B-9U Wing Structural Simulation Model
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S. STA.
Table 3-8. Spar Cap Loads, B-9U Wing
861
801
762
PLE
(KIPs)
-3.2
+2.0!
+i.o)
-l.O
731 +I. 0
0.0
637 -29.0
627
567
447
+7.0
-16.0
+43.0
-51.0
+33, 0
-12.0
P1
(KIPs)
P2
(KIPs)
P3
(KIPs)
-75
-235
+II0
-395
+310
P4
(KIPs)
-50
+Z0
-105
+50
-ZOO
+100
-300
+150
-360
+170
507 -145 -525 -430
+37.0 +90 +500 +240
-280
+245
-425337 -IZ.0
+30.0 +385
3Z7 -4.0 -I00 -480
+8.0 +II0 +440
267 -Z. 0 -ZZ0 -595
+255
-295207
+530
-730
+2.0
+375 +670
163 -315 -735
+415 +715
335
+420
-_,50
+415
-825
+700
-1000
+795
-I250
+880
-1385
+ I020
-1375
+1105
-1400
+1150
-1465
+IZZ5
-1555
+1305
-365
-755
+540
-790
+760
-630
+765
+440
120
6O
-400
+460
-520
+625
-650
+660
-810
+935
-Io35
+945
-1180
+i245
-1190
+1265
-1215
+1290
i
-1240
+1330
-1360
+1360
P5
(KIPs)
-I0.
-25
+I0
-47
+18
-85
+40
-120
+80-145
[ +135
-175
+180
-240
+220
-330
+Z45
-410
+275
-505
+320
-460
+445
-465
+500
-482
ZPI-P
+515
(KIPs)
-I0
-75
+30
-152
+68
-36G
+140
-655
+340
-900
+615
-1275
+I010
-1690
+1505
-2230
+1990
-2800
+2555
-3605
+2930
-4050
+3755
-4080
+4000
-4187
+480 +3880
-480 -4340
+4Z70
-495
+510 [
-4640
+4420
129
Table 3-9. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 1 (WS 515), B-9U Wing
Based on Initial Loads
SS A c W c tc Wu tu Wd td
327 3.56 4.08 0. 218 2.09 0. 074 4. 14 0. 036
267 5. 19 4.54 0. 285 2.64 0. 099 4. 39 0. 055
207 6.56 4.86 0. 338 3.88 0. 18 4.62 0. 075
163 6.84 3.90 0.44 3.25 0. 107 3.77 0. 034
120 7.06 3.93 0.45 3.50 0. 11 3.68 0. 023
60 7.30 4.81 0. 38 2.96 0. 081 4. 23 0. 016
0 7.50 4.84 0. 387 2. 48 0. 060 4. 14 0. 016
A c = Spar cap area (in2)
W c = Spar cap width (in.)
tc = Spar cap gage
W u = Spar upright width (in.)
t u = Spar upright gage (in.)
W d = Spar diagonal width (in.)
td = Spar diagonal gage (in.)
tw = Spar shear web gage
R = Spar shear web corrugation radius (in.)
ti = Spar shear web support cap gage (in.)
SS = Spanwlse station
t
W
c
I=
--_0,4W
t c
__----- Wc ---.-_
SPAR CAP
t u, t d
#
I -T
w d
W
U_
W d
SPAR UPRIGHT
SPAR DIAGONAL
SPAR WEB
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Table 3-10. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 2 (WS 633)_ B-9U Wing
Based on Initial Loads
SS A c Wc tc W u t u W d t d
507 2.35 3.80 0. 153 2.50 0. 093 4.04 0. 041
447 4. 05 4.37 0.232 2.61 0. 103 4.29 0. 067
387 5. 92 4.82 0. 307 3.15 0. 129 4.54 0.095
327 7.45 5.10 0. 365 3.5 0. 144 4. 73 0. 109
267 8. 78 5.32 0. 411 3.81 0. 158 4. 90 0. 122
207 9.44 5.42 0. 437 5.05 0.210 5.03 0. 129
163 9.62 4.32 0. 555 4. 13 0. 147 4.20 0.056
120 9. 75 4.33 0. 562 4.40 0. 145 4. 07 0.038
60 9.86 5.26 0. 467 3.64 0. 107 4. 52 0. 019
0 9.87 5.26 0. 467 3.00 0. 075 4.37 0.016
Table 3-11. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 3 (WS 751), B-9U Wing
Based on Initial Loads
SS A c W c tc W u tu Wd t d t w R tf
m
627 2. 54 3.92 0. 162 1.98 0. 085 4.07 0. 124
567 3.64 4.42 0.206 2.82 0. 125 4.24 0.118
507 5. 09 4.80 0. 264 4.27 0. 187 4.42 0. 101
447 6. 83
387 8.48
327 9. 92
267 1L 02 5.69 0. 485 4. 46 0. 194 5. 19 0. 172
207 11. 68 5. 78 0. 505 5.85 0. 254 5.33 0. 177
163 11. 80 4. 59 0. 643 4.77 0. 177 4.51 0. 077
120 12. 07 4.61 0. 654 5. 1 0.1 77 4.38 0. 052
60 12. 17
0 12. 22
0. 095 3.18 0. 238
0. 106 3.50 0.25
0. 115 3.76 0.25
0. 12 3.98 0.25
0. 124 4. 16 0.25
0.040 2.78 0.10
0.032 2.45 0.08
0.020 2.00 0.05
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Table 3-12. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 4 (WS 941), B-9U Wing
Based on Int_ Loads
SS A c W c tc Wu tu Wd td tw R tf
861 0.12 1. 05 0. 029 1 0. 025 1 0. 025
801 0.22 1. 61 0. 034 1.5 0. 062 3.01 0. 029
762 1. 41 3.01 0. 117 1.9 0. 049 3.12 0. 064
731 1. 82 2.42 0. 188 2.08 0. 096 2.17 0. 085
687 2.30 3.54 0. 163 2.21 0. 113 3.32 0. 133
627 3.50 4. 36 0. 200 2.53 0o 117 4° 07 0. 124
567 3.66 4.41 0° 205 2.81 0. 124 4.24 0. 116
507 4. 26 4.55 0. 234 2.43 0. 090 4.42 0. 101
447 5. 17
387 6° 02
327 6. 79
267 7° 49 5.07 0.37 3.41 0. 137 4. 72 0. 096
207 7.86 5.13 0. 383 4.40 0. 176 4° 81 0. 098
163 8.27 4.13 0.50 3.72 0. 127 4.0 0. 045
120 8.89 4.21 0.52 4. 12 0° 133 3.95 0. 033
60 9.86
0 10.96
0° 080 2. 82 0. 199
0. 080 2.90 0° 200
0.081 3.00 0. 203
0. 082 3.09 0. 205
0. 084 3. 21 0. 211
O. 032 2.31 O. 080
O. 025 2.12 O. 062
O. 020 1. 95 O. 050
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Table 3-13. Sizing Data -- SparNo. 5 (WS1042)_B-9U Wing
Based on Initt_d Loads
SS A c W c tc Wu tu Wd td
861 O. 16 1.14 O. 034 1 O.025 1 O.025
801 O.16 1.42 O.029 1 O.050 2.96 O.016
762 O.82 2.51 O.082 1.25 O.050 3.01 O.026
731 1.00 2.00 0.125 1.36 0.056 1.96 0.035
687 i.30 2.93 O. 110 1.42 O.061 3.11 O.051
627 1.90 3.57 O.134 1.59 O.064 3.81 O. 046
567 2.04 3.63 O. 139 1. 78 O. 069 3.91 O. 044
507 2.07 3.77 0. 15 2.42 0. 090 4.02 0. 039
447 2. 87 3.95 O. 181 2.50 O. 095 4. 08 O. 040
387 3.50 4.11 O. 21 2.50 O. 10 4. 15 O. 043
327 4. 13 4.27 O. 24 2.50 O. 10 4. 23 O. 045
267 4. 65 4.39 O. 265 2.50 O. 10 4. 30 O. 047
207 4.72 4.40 O. 268 3.09 O. 11 4. 34 O. 045
163 4.99 3.55 0.35 2.60 0.081 3.45 0.021
120 5. 29 3.60 O. 37 2.87 O. 084 3.45 O. 020
60 5.72 4.47 O. 319 2.50 O. 066 4.05 O. 020
0 6.20 4.58 O. 338 2. 16 O. 051 4. O1 O. 020
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3.1.7 B-16B SWEPT WING BOX
3.1.7. 1 Three-Spar Configuration. The three-spar, safe-life wing with the integrally
stiffened sldn was sized using a computer program written at Convair. The program is
a multiweb, multirib, multistation synthesis of a wing box that sizes the wing box covers,
webs, and ribs for the bending, shear, and crushing loads that occur at various stations
along the span. The upper and lower covers are considered to be skin-stringer wide
columns and are sized as such, using as a basis the structural efficiency equations
developed by Emero &Spunt (Reference 5). The spar webs are also sized using struc-
tural efficiency equations developed in Reference 5. The ribs are sized for crushing
loads due to overall wing bending and as such yield good results for corrugated web
ribs acting merely as formers with no concentrated loads acting upon them. It is nec-
essary for the user to specify minimum gages and maximum allowable stress levels
for this synthesis procedure.
Using skin and stringer proportions input by the user_ the program starts with a base
rib spacing in the first bay outboard of the wing root and optimizes the stringer spacing
and thickness for the specified load. Stringer height and spacing are then maintained
constant along the span by means of variable rib spacing, which is accomplished by
making the rib spacing inversely proportional to the cubic root of the edgewise load
intensity. By making this stipulationm only the skin and stringer thicknesses have to
be varied along the span to accommodate the variable load intensity.
In the computer printout (Tables 3-14 and 3-15)D it can be seen that one of the pages
contains a weight breakdown of the wing as calculated in the program. It should be noted
here that none of the weights as calculated in the program, with the exception of the up-
per and lower structural box covers, was used in the calculation of the wing weights.
Figure 3-16 shows the idealized integrally stiffened skin elements.
FLANGE
-E
THICKN ESS
ltEIGIIT
l
FLANGE
THICKNESS
__t_
SKIN
THICKN E SS
tS'FRINGI,IH
SPACING
NOTE: FLANGE TItlCKNESS IS ALWAYS ASSUMED TO BE EQUAL TO THE WFB THICKNESS
Figure 3-16. Idealized Integrally Stiffened Skin Elements
(Three-Spar, Swept-Wing B-16B Booster)
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THREE SPAR SAFE LIFE WING BOX SIZING
DEFINITION OF INPUT PARAMETERS
ALPHAC
ALPHAT
B
BETAC
BETAT
BTAB (N)
CTAB _)
cY (i)
_)ENS
DENSR
DENSW
D PIVOT
E
ER
EW
EFFCC
EFFRC
EFFTC
EFFWS
= Structural concept parameter*
_. Structural concept parameter*
= Wing structural span (inches)
= Structural concept parameter*
= Structural concept parameter*
= Table of wing bending moments utilized when the
bending moments are to be specified at predetermined
wing span stations (this option was not preferred here
so BTAB (1) was defined as zero to implement alternative
method of determining the wing bending moments)
= Table of wing chords utilized when the cords are to be
specified at predetermined wing span stations (this option
was not preferred here so CTAB (1) was defined as zero
to implement alternative method of determining the wing
chords)
= Wing root chord (inches)
= Material density for the wing covers (lb/in 3)
= Material density for the wing ribs (lb/in 3)
= Material density for the wing spar webs (lb/in3)
= Distance between wing pivot points (parameter necessary
weights portion of computer program which was relied
upon for this study)
= Modulus of elasticity for the covers (lb/in 2)
= Modulus of elasticity for the ribs (lb/in 2)
= Modulus of elasticity for the webs (lb/in 2)
= Efficiency of the compression cover*
= Efficiency of the ribs in compression
= Efficiency of the tension cover*
= Efficiency of the webs in shear
_*For further definition of terms, see Reference 5.
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FNOPCC
FNOPLE
FNOPTC
FNOPTE
FNOI_R
FNOI:rI'W
FCA LL
FSA LLW
FTA LL
G
GAMC
GAMT
HEFFR
HEFFT
HPIVOT
IPRINT
ITAB
KAREA
KB
KCARRY
KL
KLE
KPIVOT
KTE
KTIP
= Non-optimum factor for the compression cover
= Non-optimum factor for the leading edge
= Non-optimum factor for the tension cover
= Non-optimum factor for the trailing edge
= Non-optimum factor for the ribs
= Non-optimum factor for the webs
= Maximum allowable compression stress (lb/in 2)
= Maximum allowable working shear stress (lb/in 2}
= Maximum allowable tension stress {ls/m 2)
= Shear modulus for the computation of GJ (lb/tn 2)
= Structural concept parameter*
= Structural concept parameter*
= Effective height ratio for covers at wing root
= Effective height ratio for covers at wing tip
= Distance between pivot bearings (unimportant to
sizing routine)
= Option to print secondary output (if IPRINT = 0,
option is not exercised)
= Number of data points in data tables (tables not
= Wing box cross sectional area factor
= Wing box chord/wing chord
= Constant for wing carry through weight equation
(unimportant to sizing routine)
= Lift on one wing panel, fraction of total lift
= Leading edge chord/wing chord (average value)
= Constant in pivot weight equation (unimportant
to sizing routine)
= Trailing edge chord/wing chord (average value)
= Constant in wing tip weight equation {unimport_nt to
sizing routine)
*For further definition of terms, see Reference 5.
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KWR
KWT
L(1)
LANDAW
LVAR
NW
NZL
NZU
QTAB (N)
RBFC
RBFT
RBWC
RBWT
RTWC
RTWT
TBLE
TBMG
TBMGR
TBMGW
TBTE
TOCR
TOCT
I/WAIL
UWFLAP
= Average web height at the wing root divided by
the root chord
= Average web height at the wing tip divided by
the tip chord
= Rib spacing in the bay just outboard of station one
= Wing taper ratio
= Non-operable option key parameter
= Number of spar webs (number of spars)
= Ultimate load factor at critical negative load condition
= Ultimate load factor at critical positive load condition
= Table of wing shear loads utilized when the shears are to
be specified at predetermined wing span stations (this
option was not preferred here so QTAB (1) was defined
as zero to implement alternative method of determining
the wing shear loads)
= Flange width/web height (for compression cover stringer)
= Flange width/web height (for tension cover stringer)
= Stringer web height/stringer spacing (for compression
cover stringer)
= Stringer web height/stringer spacing (for tension cover
stringer)
= Stringer thicknes,_/skin thickness (for compression cover
stringer)
= Stringer thickness/skin thickness (for tension cover stringer)
= Leading edge T bar (inches)
= T bar for minimum gage covers (inches)
I
= T bar for minimum gage ribs (inches)
= T bar for minimum gage webs (inches)
= Trailing edge T bar (inches)
= Airfoil thickness ratio at the wing root
= Airfoil thickness ratio at the wing tip
= Unit weight of aileron fib/ft 9")
= Unit weight of flap Ilb/ft _')
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WAREA
WTD
YFLAPI
Y F LA PO
= Wing reference area (ft 2)
= Vehicle design weight at critical design condition (lb)
: Station of inboard flap rib (inches)
{unimportant to sizing routine)
= Station of outboard flap rib {inches)
{unimportant to sizing routine)
DEFINITION OF SELECTED OUTPUT TERMS
BFLANG
BSKIN
BSTR
TBC
TBR
TBT
TBW
T SKIN
TSTR
= Flange width of stringer
= Stringer spacing
= Stringer height
= T bar of compression cover
= Rib thickness
= T bar of tension cover
= Web thickness
= Skin thickness
= Stringer thickness
Table 3-14. Input, Wing Box Multiple Station Sizing
Program, B-16B Three-Spar Wing
TTTI _ : _OH l_g[[ _PlP -* _aF_ rIFE WING _INAL $I?IN6 _UN
r_[Ar _ _,_q?AO, _fT&T : 9._q_POt qTA_(|I • O,OOe
_I_0¢1l = 0.0_, _V(|) " 66A.8_+ OrNS • O,160t
n_r,_ _ : _.t60. _r_N = 0.16_, ODIVOT • O,OOp
_F_C e : 0.76_. _FFRC _ O._On, _FFT_ • 0._60,
rF_ : l,OO0, Kt'OP_C = l. OOO, FNOPLF • 1,|0C_
F_ '_'_ = 1.000. ¢)'OPT[ r |.O00* FNOP_R • |*OOOt
FT_I L - _0O_0_.n_ _ z h,Tr_h_ _4MC • O._Ot
_L _ O._q. <L _ • 0.1_0, KP|¥OT • O.OO,
xT : _.7_, VTTP _ 0.0_1_$_. KWR • _,OqOt
LVA_ : 1, NW z _,q_ N_L • _*_Ot
Y_F + 0.0_+ TOCP = 0.300, T_CT s 0.100,
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Table 3-15. Output, Final Sizing Run, B-16B Three-Spar Wing
KW(N)
(IN)
OqO0
OQOO
OqO9
0909
4QOn
0900
.0900
,oqo_
.0900
,oqo0
.0908
,oqo8
CPwrQrKKIn_ rnVrR htlTrUT nAYA
KT^TT_ TF_F V_rr fqE _YI aYq NWTf_ eTrr PHOR_O TSK]N _SKIN |SIR P%T_ _FL&NG
rt_t fT_) (|e,l tN_ _Y_) (IN _) ftal rP':l) (I_) (I_'_ (IN) (INI (TNi (INI
_,_ ._-i ._*_r _ ''_ _?.rn '_._, ;,,t.r', _llr_ .qqn . I_,_ 2.s_ .t_fll I.,,I .70
r,,_._I . " .n _r_, '**r ._n.,,r _..'.I _ tl.o_ ' ''.,, ._iI .tl, ¸' ..' .11/' 1.',J °?n
_',,'. I ¸' .l_, I 'Ir_ r_,,.,._ /_°l. _ /._._ _j ,,i_i ,,, ._'_ ,it,' ..,' . t I_,_i t._t f(l
I' t,_ .211' .n//1 _11_ _,/,_ F_. =,, _,,,?. t_ _5 ._q .11 t'. -,-• .' .III_ I._I .?0
• ._.qv .17qP .n47_ .I?q7 4q.q_ _5._q _78._? 4_7_5 oq30 o0_r,_ 7.,7 .0q_5 lo_t ._0
$?_.?_ ,1_ ,01ol .1_75 _,?_ ?1,?_ 375,$5 1_OlA ,Q_O 00bq q 2._2 *0699 l.kl .70
T(l_rn_ ¢_VrO _qll_lll _AT_
_^_In=o v_: lq_T ._y _vl &v_ nWT1C _I_T _M_P_ _SXI_, q_] _P _SI_ _TR R_LANG SI_ T_rf
_r_ (IN_ lte't _'_t t?-?) tiN?| (Lt') (_T) (INS tIN) fIN) (INt _I_ fIN) (P_I| (INt
• 7_,*? .tOY1 *0670 ,tOTt ?_,_ ?V.ta ?Pb. O0 5_1_6 ,719 *09L_ _*t8 ,OSKS l*Og *S_ 20_?0 *01_8
S_._q .Onl7 *OI_ ,q_i? _fl.?_ tA,_ ??A,37 W?27_ ,?iq ,04_1 7, t8 ,04_1 I,oq *5_ 15081 ,OiOk
b_,_ .o_qn ,010 o ,o_oo q.e_ 7.t_ 157,(0 1_2]_ ,719 .031_ ?.l_ .O3tb t. Og ,$k &_13 ,0030
77_,_0 O,O0_n ,_ ,_',oq _.aq O,O_ 0,00 0 0*000 *O?h_ _.18 ,_2k4 I.Oq ._W 0 *0000
.°
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Table 3-15.
WT._rD_ = ?a,I l.n*_ Wl° FLfo_ D 1"00_1
................. wr, T|_T = 1_2 (.OOX}
_mT_ WT_C W_I_T : l_.q_ t_lrt?
Output, Final Sizing Run, B-16B Three-Spar Wing, Contd
3.1.7.2 Five-Spar Configuration. The five-spar, fail-safe wing structural box was
sized for the same critical shear and bending moment loads as the three-spar, safe-
life wing structural box. The method of sizing was different, however. The five-spar
box was sized by a hand analysis method, which, it was felt, yielded good results.
Since the sizing procedure was accomplished by hand, only two stations, one near the
root and one near the tip, were completely sized. The areas and gages resulting from
the sizing procedure at these two stations were then linearly extrapolated to root and tip
values, and these were linearly interpolated to obtain values over the length of the span.
The basic sizing procedure consisted of first determining the moment and shear loads
along the span and then distributing the moment to the spars. The moment was propor-
tioned to the spars on the basis of percent of effective heights i. e.,
M (per spar) = Mtota 1
(h)2
x eff spar
Z; (heft)2
After determining the moment at each of the five spars, the upper and lower cap areas
were determined using the following equations:
_ 1Msp ar ×
Atension hcf f tension allowable
A - Mspar ×
compression h eff compression allowable
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The allowables were chosen such that the tension allowable was equal to 75% of Ftu at
both the inboard and outboard stations and the compression allowable was equal to Fcy
at the inboard station and 50% of Fcy at the outboard station.
The spar webs were sized by assuming a generalized allowable working shear stress of
30,000 psi and then assuming that the webs reacted the shear load in such a manner that
all the gages were equal at any particular station. Web gages were then interpolated
between the two sized stations to obtain gages over the length of the span.
For the maximum stress in the upper caps use F e = Fcy = 132 ksi ultimate at Station
102.16, F c = 0.5 Fcy = 66 ksi ultimate at Station 604. 07.
For the maximum stress in the lower
use F T = 0.75 Ftu = 100.5 ksicaps
ultimate.
The method of distributing moment to
spars is to assume that the load is
reacted in proportion to the stiffness.
I = Aldl2 + A2d:
=M /I(iPer spar)_
M(per spar) (total)\ (total) ]
A
l(
NEUTRAL AXIS-
A2(
d
1
d
2
At the wing root,
Chord = 668.80 inches
t
--= 0. 1 = thickness ratio
e
t = 66.88 inches : maximum height or t at Suar 2
Express height of Spars 1, 3, 4, and 5 as a percent of Spar 2
Spar No. % of Spar 2 height
1 0.9545
3 0.9785
4 0.9083
5 0.7662
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Taper ratio = 0.28
Tip chord = 668.8 × 0.28 = 187.264
Total Height at Root
Spar No. {Station 0)
Total Height at Tip
(Station 775. 90)
1 63.84 17.88
2 66. 88 18.73
3 65.44 18.33
4 60.75 17.01
5 51.24 14.35
Total box heights (including skin) at Station 102.16:
Spar No. Height
1 57. 79
2 60. 54
3 59.24
4 54.99
5 46.39
At Station 604. 07
Interpolated values
Spar No. Height
1 28.06
2 29.39
3 28.76
4 26.70
5 22.52
Station 102.16:
Station 604. 07:
Interpolated values
M = 220,497,489 in-lb*; S = 794,191 pounds*
M = 9,782,892 in-lb*; S = 122,951 pounds*
Station 102.16
The effective section depth, hef f, of a wing spar will be taken as the contour depth at
that spar, htota 1, less the sum of the distances from contour to each spar cap centroid.
Assuming the thickness of each corrugated cover to be one inch and the distance from
the inside of the cover to each spar cap centroid to be two inches,
* Moment and shear values from computer run on three-spar wing.
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hef f = htota 1 - 2 (1.0 + 2.0) = htota 1 - 6.0
At Station 102.16,
Spar No. hef f
1 51. 79
2 54. 54
3 53.24
4 48.99
5 40.39
(heff)2
2682.2041
2974.6116
2834.4976
2400.0201
1631.3521
_(heff) 2 = 12,522. 6855
Spar No.
(heft)2/Z;(heff) 2
% of Moment Reacted
1 0.2142
2 0.2375
3 0.2263
4 0. 1917
5 0. 1303
Distributing total moment at spars on basis of percent of (heft) 2,
Spar No. % Moment (in-lb)
1 21.42 47,230,562
2 23.75 52,368,154
3 22.63 49,898,582
4 19.17 42,269,369
5 13.03 28,730,822
Total moment = 220,497,489 in-lb
M 1
Atensio n = (heff----_ • F T
M 1
Ac°mpressi°n -(heft)" F-ccy
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Spar 1:
A = 47,230,562 . 1
T 51. 79 100,500
= 9.074 In 2
47,230,562 1
AC = 51.79 132,000 = 6.909 in 2
Spar 2:
52,368,154 1
AT = 54.54 " 100,500 = 9.554 In 2
52_368_ 154 1
A C = .54. 54 132,000
= 7.274 in 2
Spar 3:
49,898,582 1
AT = 53.24 100,500 - 9.326 in 2
49,898,582 1
AC = 53.24 " 132,000 - 7. 100 in 2
Spar 4:
42,269,369 1
AT= •48. 99 100,500
- 8.585 in 2
42,269,369 1
AC - 48.99 132,000 = 6. 536 In 2
Spar 5:
28,730,822 1
AT - 40.39 " 100,500 = 7.078 In 2
28,730,822 1
A = •
C 40. 39 132,000
= 5. 389 in 2
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Station 604. 07
The spar effective depth, heft, will be computed in the same manner as at Station
102.16, except that the distance from the inside of the cover to the spar cap centroid
will be taken as 1-1/2 inches. Therefore
heft = htota 1 - 2(1.0 + 1.5) = htota 1 - 5. 0
At Station 604. 07
:_ (heff) 2
Spar No. heft (heft)2
1 23.06 531. 7636
2 24. 39 594. 8721
3 23.76 564. 5376
4 21. 70 470. 8900
5 17. 52 306. 9504
= 2469.0137
Spar No. (heft)2/_(heff) 2
1 0.2154
2 0.2409
3 0.2287
4 0.1907
5 0.1243
Distributing total moment to spars on basis of percent of (heft) 2,
Spar No. % Moment(in-lb)
1 21.54 2t107,235
2 24.09 2,356,699
3 22.87 2,237p347
4 19.07 lm865,598
5 12.43 1p216s013
Total moment = 9,782,892
M 1
Atensi°n -(heft)" _TT
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M 1
compression (heft) F T
Spar 1:
2,107,235 1
AT- 23.06 " 100,500
-- - 0.9093 in 2
2,107,235 1
AC- 23.06 " 66,000
- 1.385 in 2
Spar 2:
2,356,699 1
AT = 24.39 " 100,500
2
- 0. 9614 in
2,356,699 1
AC - 24.39 " 66,000
2
- i. 464 in
Spar 3:
2,237,347 1
AT = 23.76 " 100,500
2
- 0. 937 in
AC = 2,237,347. 123.76 66,000
2
- 1. 427 in
Spar 4:
1,865,598. 1
AT - 21.70 100,500
= 0.8554 in 2
1,865,598 1
AC- 21.70 " 66,000
= 1. 303 in 2
Spar 5:
1,216,013 1
AT= 17.52 100,500
= 0. 691 in 2
1,216,013 1
AC= 17.52 66,000
= 1. 052 in2
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SparNo.
1
2
Upper Cap
Cross-Sectional Area (in 2)
Station 102.16 Station 604. 07
Lower Cap
Cross-Sectional Area (in 2)
Station 102.16 Station 604. 07
6. 909 0. 692 6. 806 0. 682
7. 274 0. 732 7. 166 0. 721
7. 100 0. 713 6. 994 0. 703
6. 536 0. 651 6. 439 0. 642
5. 389 0. 526 5. 308 0. 518
Let the minimum cap cross sectional area be 0.20 in 2.
For spar webs, assume a generalized allowable working shear stress of 30,000 psi,
and assume spar heights = heft
At Station 102. 16
Spar No. heft
1 51.79
2 54.54
3 53.24
4 48.99
5 40.39
_hef f = 248.95
Shear at Station 102. 16 = 794,191 pounds
Spar web thickness = 0. 110 inch
At Station 604. 07
Spar No.
1
2
3
4
5
heft
23.06
24.39
23.76
21.70
17.52
_-_neff = 110. 43
Shear at Station 604. 07 = 122,951 pounds
Spar web thickness = 0. 037 inch
Let minimum spar web thickness = 0. 030 inch
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3.2 FATIGUE ANALYSIS
On the following pages, a cumulative fatigue damage analysis is made for each of the
baseline components to determine the safe-life number of missions to initiation of
fatigue cracks, assuming initially flawless material. The service load spectra shown
in Figures 2-31 through 2-39 are used.
Material information used in classical fatigue analysis is usually in the form of S-N
curves, constant life diagrams, or some such presentation of stress versus cycles-to-
failure of test specimens. Although this information is in terms of complete failure
rather than fatigue crack initiation, S-N curves are being used as indicating crack
initiation for purposes of this study. This interpretation is justified by the fact that the
standard test specimen configuration used to generate S-N data has a small cross-
section compared to space shuttle booster structural members. The specimen is there-
fore more sensitive to a given amount of fatigue damage, and progression of fatigue
damage to complete failure is rapid. The fatigue curves of Figures 3-17, 3-18, and
3-19 provide S-N data for 2219-T87 aluminum alloy at room temperature, and
Ti-6A1-4V annealed titanium alloy at room temperature and 650°F, respectively.
The service loading spectra and fatigue damage analyses for the selected components
are shown in Tables 3-16 through 3-25.
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Figure 3-17. Estimated Fatigue Curves for 2219-T87 Aluminum
Alloy at Room Temperature with K = 3.0
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Figure 3-18. Fatigue Curves for Annealed Ti-6A1-4V at Room
Temperature with K = 3.0
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Figure 3-19. Fatigue Curves for Annealed Ti-6A1-4V at 650°F
with Kt = 3.0
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Figure 3-18. Fatigue Curves for Annealed Ti-6AI-4V at Room
Temperature with K = 3.0
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Table 3-20. B-9U Wing Load Spectrum
Wing Root M MA t l
Flight MDesign M MA MA /in. klps_ [in. kips[ ne n
Phase (in. kips limit) (%) (%) (%) ,_x 10 -3 ] _ x 10 -3 ] {Cycles) (Cycles)
3
Ascent 189. I x I0
zLimit = 91.2 ksi
i
Ascent 189.1 x 103
0 1.0 100,000
1.5 0 2.84
0 2.0 10,000
2.5 0 4.73
0 3.0 1,000
3.5 0 6.62
0 4.0 100
4.5 0 8.51
0 5.0 10
5.5 0 10.40
0 6.0 I
15 3.0 I00,000
3.5 28.37 8.62
15 4.0 10,000
5.0 28.37 9.46
15 6.0 1,000
6.5 28.37 12.29
15 7.0 100
7.8 28.37 14.75
15 8.5 10
9.3 28.37 17.59
15 I0.0 I
0 4.0 I00,000
5.5 0 10.40
0 7.0 I0,000
9.0 0 17.02
0 II.0 1,000
12.5 0 23.64
0 14.0 100
15.5 0 29.31
0 17.0 10
18.5 0 34.98
0 20.0
40 5.0 I00,000
8.3 75.64 15.70
0 11.5 I0,000
14.5 75.64 2'7.42
40 17.5 1,000
20.8 75.64 39.33
40 24.0 100
27.0 75.64 51.06
_Mean/ I SAlt/
aLimit I a Limit
(_) ] (2)
90,000 0
9,000 0
900 0
90 0
9 0
• 015
• 025
• 035
.045
• 055
90,000 .15
9,000 .15
900 .15
90 ,15
9 ,15
• O35
• 05
• 065
• 08
.09
90,000 0
9,000 0
900 0
9O 0
9 0
90,000 40
9,000 ,40
900 .40
I .055
i .09
• 125
t .155
J
• 185
•08
• 145
.21
90 .40 l .27
l
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Wing Root
'litht i MDosign
_ha 9e I (in. kips limit)
_sc_nt[ 189.1x 103
Co it) [
As,_ent 189. x 103
Enlry 189. x 103
Er_ fry 189.1 x 103
Table 3-20. B-9U Wing Load Spectrum, Contd
M^ _A
_) (%) (%)
40 L0.0
;3.3
40 [6.5
10 6.5
.0.5
I0 t4•5
_8.5
I0 ),2.5
|0.0
I0 YI. 5
15.3
i0 53.0
30.5
10 68.0
15 8.5
13.5
15 18._
20.0
15 21._
36.8
15 52. (
61C
15 70.(
79._
15 89. (
5.( 5.0
"/.E
I0.( I0.0
13.._
17.q 17.0
18.,'
20J 20.0
23.(
26,q 26.0
36._
47. 47.5
47.t
47. 47.5
I 50. 50.0 50.1
_ [
_n. _s _I iln. kit_I
x 10 TM II _ x lO-al
15.64
18.91
18.91
18.91
18.91
18.91
28.36
28.36
28.36
28.36
28.36
9.5
18.9
32.1
37.8
49.2
89.8
94.6
62.97
19.86
34.98
56.73
85.66
114.41
25.53
37• 82
69.58
115.35
150• 33
14.2
25.5
35.0
43.5
69.6
89.8
94.6
[Cycles)
10
1
I_0,000
I0,000
1,000
I00
I0
1
I00,000
10,000
1,000
100
10
1
00,000
10,000
1,000
500
250
100
0
n
(Cycles)
9
90,000 I .10
9,000 .10
900 .10
90 .10
9 .10
}0,ooo .15
9,000 .15
9OO .15
90 .15
9 .15
90,000 .075
9,000 .135
500 .185
250 .23
150 .37
100 .47
1 i .50
V[ean/ UAlt /
Limit _I..tmit
(1) (2)
.40 .33
.105
.185
.30
.45
.605
.135
.20
.37
.61
.80
.075
.135
.185
.23
.37
.47
• 50
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Table 3-20. B-9U Wing Load Spectrum, Contd
Wing Root ]
Fli _kt MDosign M
Ph_ t ;e ',in. kips limit) (%)
Cr]se/ 189.1x 103 20
I 20
20
20
20
Crl i: se/
Lal,ttng 189. x 103 20
Ta:c_ 189. x 103 -2.1
-2.1
-2.1
-2.1
-2.1
Ta:: 189.1 x 103 -2.1
(1) _h___mit. lS9.1
(2) (Yalt Ma
(rlimit 189.1
MA _A /in. kii.)sl] / In. _IPI
_) (%) _x 10-a /[ 'xx 10-° /
2
7 I 37.8 I 13.2
12
17 [ 37.8 [ 32.1
22
27 I 37.8 ] 51.1
32
36 ] 37.8 [ 68.1
40
43 ] 37.8 ] 81.3
46
3.0
4.0 [ -4.0 [ 7.6
5.0
6.0 I -4.0 I 11.3
7.0
8.0 I -4.0 I 15.1
9.0
9.5 [ -4.0 I 18.0
10. o i
11.0 I -4.0 I 20.8
12.0 _
(Cycles)
100,000
10,000
1,000
100
10
1
lO0, OOO
10,000
1,000
100
10
1
O'Mean / CrAlt/
n _Limit trLimit
(Cycles) (1) (2)
90,00O .2O .07
9,000 .20 .17
900 .20 .27
90 .20 .36
9 .20 .43
90,000 -.021 .040
9,000 -.021 .060
900 -.021 .080
90 -.021 .095
9 -.021 .110
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Phase
Ascent
Ascent
_sccnt
Ascent
Se[
mc
(I)
(2)
Table 3-22. B-9U Vertical Tail Load Spectrum
(3)
(4)
Tail Root-_M M_
MDestgn _ cX_
(in. kips llmlt_l) 11)
78.8 x 103 I0 2.1
(aLimlt . 34)
0.0
78.8 x 103
(#limit = 34)
78.8 x 103
((Zlimit 24)
78.6 × 103
allmlt _ 34ksi)
k
M A r (in. IODE
% I x 10')}
4.0 0
7.6 0
9.2
11.1 0
13
14.5 0
16
18.0 0
20
6.0
11.3 0
16.6
21.9 0
27.2
32.6 0
38.0
43.5 0
49.0
54.5 0
60.0
10.0
19.0 0
28.0
37.0 0
t6.0
55.0 0
M.O
73.0 0
_2.0
91.0 0
}0.0
7.5
13.8 0
_0,0
26.2 0
2.5
38.8 0
5.0
51.2 0
7.5
_3.8 0
0.0
(In.kiopa
x I0 °)
6.0
8.7
11.4
14.2
8.9
17.3
25.7
34.3
42.9
15.0
29.2
43.3
57.5
71.7
10.9
20.6
30.6
40.3
50.3
(in. _pa ne n OMax/ It./
x 10 °) (Cycles] [Cycles) OlJmit I ('Limit [ ¢rI.Imit
I00, 00{
3.2 _3.2
_0
8.7
11.4
14.2
i8.9
17.3
25.7
34.3
42.9
JlS.0
29.2
43.3
57.5
71.7
t10.9
20.6
30.6
40.3
50.3
10, 00(
1,00(
10(
IC
1
100, 00_
1 O, 00_
1, 00_
100
10
1
100,000
I0,000
1,000
100
10
1
I00, 000
IO, 000
1,000
100
10
90,000 0,041 0 ] 0.041
9,000 .076 0 .076
900 .110 0 .110
90 .145 0 .145
9 .180 0 .180
90,000 .113 0 .113
9,000 .220 0 .220
900 .326 0 .326
90 .435 0 .435
9 .545 0 .545
90,000 .190 0 .190
9,000 .371 0 .371
900 .550 0 .550
90 .730 0 .730
9 .910 0 .910
D0,000 .138 0 .138
9,000 .262 0 .262
900 .388 0 .388
i
90 .511 0 .511"1
9 I .639 0 .639 I
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Phase
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Table 3-22. B-9U Vertical Tail Load Spectrum, Contd
Tall Ro_t M MA M MA
Seg- MDeaign % % MA (In. kips (in. kips n °Max/ aMean/ OAR./
men_ (in. kipstlmlt) (1) (1) % x 103) x 103) ICycles) crI lmlt WLimlt °Limit
(5) 78.8 x 103
(alimlt = 34ksi
(6) 78.8 x 103
(CHImlt = 34ksl
(7) 78.8 x 103
(allmlt = 34bi)
Cruise/ 78.8 x 103
Lndg. allmtt = 34ksl
Mmax
(in. kips ne
x 103) (Cycles)
0 4.3 I00, 000
9.1 0 7.2 ±7.2
0 13.9 10,000 I
18.4 0 14.5 14.5
0 23.0 1,000
27.5 0 21.7 21.7
0 32.0 100
36.5 0 28.8 28.8
O 41.0 I0
45.5 0 35.9 35.9
0 50.0 1
0 3.0 100, 000
5.9 0 4.6 ±4.6
0 8.8 I0,000
11.4 0 9.0 9.0
0 14.0 1,000
16.6 0 13,1 13.1
0 19.3 100
21.6 0 17.0 17.0
0 24.0 10
27.0 0 21.3 21.3
0 30.0 1
0 1.5 100. 000
2.2 0 1.7 1.7
0 3.0 10,000
3.6 0 2,8 2.8
0 4.2 1,00_
5.0 0 3.9 3.9
0 5.9 100
6.5 0 5.1 5.1
0 7.1 10
7.9 O 6.2 6.2
0 8.7 1
0 18.0 100,000
21.0 0 16.5 16.5
0 23.9 10,000
26.7 0 21.0 21.0
0 29.5 1,000
32.2 0 25.4 25.4
0 35.0 100
38.0 0 30.0 30.0
0 41,0 10
43.7 0 34.4 34.4
0 46.4 I
90,000 .091 0 .091
9,000 .184 0 .184
900 .276 0 .276
90 .366 0 .366
9 .455 0 .455
90,000 .058 0 .058
9,000 .114 0 .114
900 .166 0 .166
90 .216 0 .216
9 .270 0 .270
90,000 .026 0 .026
9,000 .036 0 .038
900 .050 0 .050
90 .065 0 .065
9 .079 0 .079
90,000 .210 0 .210
9,000 .267 0 .267
900 .322 0 .322
90 .380 0 .380
9 .436 0 .436
(1) Mean and alternating bending moments in percent of design bending moment, from Figure 2-32.
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Table 3-23.
Mission Phase
Ascent - Segment (1)
Ascent - Segment (2)
Ascent - Segment (3)
_scent - Segment (4)
_scent - Segment (5)
Ascent - Segment (6)
Ascent - Segment (7)
B-9U Vertical Tail Fatigue Damage Analysis
T rlimlt amean
('F) ksi Crlim it ] tm It
FiT 34 0 0.041
34 0 .076
34 0 .110
34 0 .145
34 0 .180
I_T _ 34 0 .113
34 0 .220
34 0 .326
34 0 .435
34 0 .545
RT 34 0 .190
34 0 .371
34 0 .550
34 0 .730
34 0 .910
RT 34 0 .138
34 0 .262
34 0 .388
34 0 .511
I 34 0 .639
RT 34 0 .091
34 0 .184
34 0 .27_
34 0 .36(_
34 0 .455
RT 34 0 .05_
34 0 .114
34 0 .166
34 0 .216
34 0 .270
RT 34 0 .026
34 0 .036
34 0 .050
34 0 .065
34 0 .079
Tmean alt i
(ksi) ksi)
0 [.4
0 _.6
0 3.7
o 1.9
o 6.1
O 3.8
0 7.5
0 1.1
0 4.8
0 8.5
0 6.5
0 2.6
0 8.7
0 4.8
0 6.9
0 4.7
0 8.9
6 3.2
0 7.4
0 ',1.7
0 3.1
0 6.3
0 9.4
0 L2.4
0 L5.5
0 2.0
0 3.9
0 5.6
0 7.3
0 9.2
0 0.9
0 1.2
0 1.7
0 2.2
0 2.7
Kt
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.6
3.C
3.C
N n
90,000
9,000
9OO
9O
9
90,000
9,000
90O
9O
9
90,000
9,000
9OO
9O
1.8 x 105 9
= 90,000
9, OOO
=- 900
90
1.9 x 106 9
90,000
9,000
9OO
9O
9
90,000
9,000
9OO
90
9
90,000
9,000
900
9O
9
10 7
ac
oc
10 7
6 x 105
/NI
J
ol
ol
ol
ol
01
0 1
0
o
o
o
O
0
0
0
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
0
0
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 3-23. B-9U Vertical Tail Fatigue Damage Analysis, Contd
Mission Phase
Cruise/Laedg
i
T / alimit a_eaa _Rlt .... _mear
(-FIt
RT ' 34 0 .210 0
34 0 .267 0
34 0 .322 0
34 0 .380 0
34 0 .436 0
Summary
Mission Phaso n/'N
Ascent .0002
Cruise/Landg 0
"'(n/N) .0002
100 100
Fatigue life = -
S.F. x E(n/N) 4(. 0002)
(_alt
(ksl) Kt
7.1 3.0
9.1 3.0
Ii.0 3.0
12.9 3.0
14.8 3.0
125,000 missioas,
- based on a scatter
factor of 4.
N n
180,000
18,000
1,800
180
18
__
n/N
0
0
0
0
0
NOT ES:
1) To provide for one ferry flight per mission, the number of cycles for the cruise/landing phase has
been increased to a factor of 2.
2) Material is Ti-6Al - 4V annealed.
Table 3-24. Thrust Beam Cap Fatigue Damage Analysis
Design
¢rlim it T
(ksi) CF)
92.9 RT
92.9 R T
92.9
92.9
92.9
92.9
92.9
Kt TrT T a am
(v_] (c_) (ksi)
........
3.0 96._ 0.05 89.9
3.0 96._ 0.37 89.9
RT 3.0 98. 1.08 89.9
RT 3.0 96._ 1.79 89.9
RT 3.0 96. 2.50 89.9
RT 3.0 96. i 3.20 89.9
RT 3.0 50 50 46.4
__ _±._ ___
Y(N)thrust beam cap
1
Fatigue life =
4(0.000285)
% I ne
(ksi) I (cycles)
I2)
______+-. _.
0.05] 15,000
5,000
0.34l 10, o0o
9,000
1.001 1, oo0 !
9o0
1.661 100
9O
2.321 i0
9
2.97 [ 1
46.4 ] I I
0.000285 [or one flight
n 6a b n/ll
(cycles) (ksi) ] (cy :lesl
12> L.............
0.195 0
0.67 0
1.33 0
1.99 0
2._ 0
47.4 [3.5x 103 0.000',8!
= 887 mission_
NOT ES:
(1) Alternating thrust in percent of design thrust from Figure 2-37.
(2) Cycles for one flight.
(3) Material: Ti-6Al-4V annealed.
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3.3 SAFE-I,IFE ANALYSIS
This section presents the results of crack growth studies when the structural compo-
nents are assumed to contain crack-like flaws. Flights to failure are caVculated for
all components.
The crack growth analyses are based on a Convair crack growth computer program
called CRACKPROP, which calculates crack growth for both cyclic and sustained
loads. Initial flaws are assumed to be elliptical surface flaws or through-cracks for
the LO 2 and LH2 propellant tank walls and the vertical stabilizer skin. Corner cracks
emanating from flange edges are assumed for the thrust structure, orbiter support
bulkhead, and wing spar caps. An analysis is also made assuming a crack initiating
at a fastener hole in those components where mechanical fasteners may be used,
i.e., the wing structure, thrust structure, and the orbiter aft support bulkhead.
For the LO 2 and LH2 propellant tanks the initial flaw size is assumed to be that flaw
screened by proof test using a plain strain fracture toughness (KIC) value. When the
calculated elliptical surface flaw screened by the proof test is greater than the tank
wall thickness an equivalent through-crack of an area equal to the area of a surface
flaw on the verge of leakage is assumed.
Minimum fracture toughness values were used for all calculations of initial and criti-
cal flaw sizes. Because of this, the safe-lives calculated for the tanks should be
treated with caution. However, where the initial flaw size was not dependent on
material toughness the use of the minimum toughness in determining the critical flaw
size does give the shortest life.
3.3.1 CYCLIC AND SUSTAINED FLAW GROWTH RATE CURVES. Figures 3-20
through 3-25 present crack growth rate curves of da/dn versus AK I and da/dt vs ZkK I,
which are used in the safe-life analysis of structural componc_ Is containing flaws in
this section.
The cyclic growth rate curves (da/dn versus LLKI) for the 2219-T87 aluminum base
metal at room temperature and at -320°F were derived from data found in Reference 6.
The sustained growth rate curves (da/dt versus AKI} for the 2219-T87 aluminum base
metal at room temperature and at -320°F were derived from data found in Reference 7.
The cyclic growth rate curve (da/dn versus AK I} for the Ti-6Al-4V annealed titanium
base metal at room temperature was derived from data found in Reference 8. The
sustained growth rate curve for the same material and temperature was derived from
data found in References 8 and 9.
3.3.2 LO 2 TANK SAFE LIFE-ANALYSIS. The LO2 propellant tank is assumed to
contain t---wedistinct types of flaws. These are an elliptical surface flaw and a through
crack, for which the initial size of each flaw is propagated to a specified failure cri-
terion under the influence of the applied pressure spectrum loading. The critical
crack lengths for both types of flaws are also developed here.
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The applied pressure spectrum loading for the LO2 tank was developed from the
curve of Figure 2-39. Only those portions of the total loading spectrum that could
contribute to the growth of the flaws was included in the spectrum for the tank. It
should be noted here that it was necessary to take average pressures over a given
time span to truly approximate the curve. The pressures used in developing the
final spectrum are as follows:
LO 2 Tank Upper Dome Equator Pressures
Prossure
(psi)
18.0
12.0
20.0
Time at Pressure
(minutes)
4.0
6.0
4.0
Description
Nominal ullage pressure
Vent after staging pressure
Pressure regulator malfunction stress
(assumed to occur once every 20 flights)
The tensile stresses in the LO 2 tank at the upper dome equator were developed from
the pressures in the preceding list through the use of the following formula.
(r
PR P (198 in.)
m
t (0.090 in. )
P = internal pressure (psi)
R = 198 in. = tank radius
t = 0. 090 in. = tank wall thickness at the upper dome equator.
The results of this calculation and the final form of the pressure loading spectrum is
as follows:
Minimum
Stress
(ksi)
0.000
0.000
0.000
LO 2 Tank Pressure Loading Spectrum
Maximum
Stress
(ksl)
39. 600*
39. 600*
26. 400
Cycles
per
Flight
Time per
Flight
{minutes)
4.0
6.0
*Once every 20 flights, this nominal ullage pressure stress is replaced with the
pressure regulator malfunction stress of 44.0 ksi.
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The elliptical surface flaw is assumed to have two different initial aspect ratios,
a/2c (see sketch below). These two aspect ratios are a/2c = 0.1 and a/2c = 0.4.
i_.-- 2C :-- I
I / / iLO 2 a t :0. 090f_ANKWALL IN.
The initial flaw size, which is calculated here for both the 0.1 and 0.4 aspect ratios,
is the maximum flaw size that would be screened by a proof test of the tank, using a
minimum value for the material toughness parameter, KictO be consistent with the
value used in the crack growth analysis, and using the yield stress for the maximum
stress developed in the tank wall during a proof test.
The equation for the maximum stress intensity factor for the elliptical surface flaw,
which is used to calculate the maximum flaw size screened by a proof test, is as
follows:
K I
1.1or Jr _ (M K)
VQ_0 " 2
(Reference 3, Equation IX-8)
whe re
a = applied stress (ksi)
ay = tensile yield stress (ksi)
a = flaw size (inch)
¢2 = a function depending upon the value of a/2c
fora/2c= 0.1, ¢2= 1.10355
for a/2c = 0.4, 02 : 2. 01096
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M a function depending upon the value of a/t, {deep flaw correction factor)
K
defined in tim following list:
a/2c : 0. l a/2c = 0.4
a/t M K a/t M K
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
000
1 010
1 030
1 0(;5
I 110
1 185
I 290
1 430
1. 565
1. 680
1. 770
0 1. 000
0. 1 1. 005
0.2 1. 010
0.3 1. 015
0.4 1. 020
0.5 1. 035
0.6 1. 055
0.7 1. 085
O. 8 1. 130
0.9 1. 180
1.0 1. 210
(From Reference 10, Page 135)
The LO2 tank is proof tested at room temperature so that the value of KIc used in
the following calculations will be the minimum value of KIc at room temperature
This value is KI C = 32.0 ksi _/inc-h- (Reference 6, Figure 52, lower curve).
Substituting this value of Kic into the equation for the stress intensity factor and
using (ry = 51.0 ksi (2219-3"87 aluminum base meLal at room temperature) as the
proof test stress, we can arrive at a value of 'a' f_'om the following equation:
1.1 (51.0) ,]_ x/h (MK)
32.0 =
2 0. 212 0/51.0) 2(5i.
Note in the above equation that the variable M K is a function of the flaw size, 'u', and
that a trial and error solution is necessary to find the correct value of 'a'. The
results of this solution f()r beta aspect ratios of 0.1 and 0.4 are shown below.
For a/2c = 0.1, the maximuJ, flaw size that would be scre(_.(', by a p_oot test is:
a = 0. 05464 in(::,
i
178
For a/2c = 0.4, the maximum flaw size that would be screened by a proof test re-
suited in a flaw size, '_', which was larger than the thickness of the tank wall. t --
0. 090 inch.
Since the 0.4 aspect ratio results in an initial flaw size greater than the thickness, an
equivalent through crack, with an area equal to the area of a surface flaw of aspect
ratio a/2c _ 0.4 on the verge of leakage, is calculated here.
TANK
WAI, L
2c
! / /• a/2c 0.4
Cross-sectional area of flaw - A
C
A _ 7r(a)(c) 0.01590 in 2
c 2
For a through crack, the area would be calcuated by
A
A = (2c) x t or (2c) : __c
c t
Therefore the equivalent through crack would have a (2c)i dimension of
A
c 0. 01590
--(2c)i - t - 0.090 = 0.17671 inch
The elliptical surface flaw of initial size a i = 0. 05464 inch and the through crack of
initial size (2c)i = 0. 17671 inch are propagated to failure The run to failure is made
using material properties and growth rate curves for 2219-T87 aluminum base metal
at -320°F. The -320°F temperature is used because growth rates at this temperature
are more critical than those at room temperature, and the LO 2 tank at the upper dome
equator is assumed to be prechilled to -320°F. The critical flaw sizes must there-
fore be calculated from the properties of the material at -320°F.
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The minimum value of Kic is used to calculate critical flaw sizes, and for the -320°F
temperature this value is 35.5 ksi _ (Reference 6, Figure 52, lower curve at
-320'F). The tensile yield at this temperature is taken to be (Ty = 61.0 ksi. The
maximum stress in the spectrum, on which the critical flaw sizes must be based, is
cr = 44.0 ksi.
For the elliptical flaw of aspect ratio a/2c = 0.1, the critical flaw size, acr, is
calculated from the equation
35.5 =
, ca (MK)1.1 (44.0) \;Tr _ cr
1. 10355 - 0. 212 (44.0/61.0) 2
which results in a value of a -- 0. 07091 inch.
cr
For the through crack the equation for the stress intensity factor is
KI
(7 ,JTr .j2c
_/2 - (_r/(Ty)2
(Reference I0, Page 28)
Substituting the critical values into this equation results in
44.0 ,"*r _/(2_c r
35.5 =
_/2 - (44.0/61.0)
or (2e)c r = 0.30660 inch
Results of flaw growth calculations:
Carrying out the analysis described above by use of a computer program, the follow-
ing results were obtained.
Elliptical Surface Flaw, a/2e = 0.1 (See Figure 3-26)
Starting with an initial flaw size of a i = 0. 05464 inch, it took 294 flights for the flaw
to grow to the critical s_ze of acr = 0. 07091 inch (see sketch below). Note that a
scatter factor of 1.5 was used on the number of flights to failure.
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Figure 3-26. Crack Growth in LO 2 Tank for Pressure I,oad Spectrum
(Surface Flaw. a/2c = 0.1)
IIILI
a.=0.05464--_i V a=°'07091IN'cr
Through Crack (See Figure 3-27)
Starting with an initial flaw size of (2c)i = 0. 17671 inch, it took 867 flights for the
flaw to grow to the critical size of (2C)c r = 0. 30660 inch. Again a scatter fact,,r of
1.5 was used on the flights to failure.
3.3.3 LH 2 TANK SAFE LIFE ANALYSIS. The LH 2 propellant tank is assumed to
contain two distinct types of flaws. These are an elliptical surface flaw and a through
crack, for which the initial size of each is developed in this section. These flaws are
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propagated to a specified failure criterion under the influence of the applied pressure
spectrum loading. The critical crack lengths for both types of flaws are also devel-
oped here.
The applied pressure loading spectrum for the LH 2 tank was developed from the
curve of Figure 2.38. Only those portions of the complete loading spectrum that
could contribute to the growth of the flaws was included in the spectrum for the tank.
The pressures used in developing the final spectrum are:
Pressure
(psi)
15.0
22.0
16.0
23.5
LH 2 Tank Upper Dome Equator Pressures
Time at Pressure
(m in ute s)
2.5
35
6.0
3.5
De sc ription
Tank lockup pressure
Nominal ullage pressure
Vent after staging pressure
Pressure regulator
Malfunction pressure - assumed to
occur once every 20 flights
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Stresses in the tank at the upper dome equator were developed from these pressures
through the use of the formula
(-j- --
PR P (198)
t O. 116
whe ro
P = pressure (psi)
R = 198 inches = tank radius
t = 0. 116 inch = tank thickness at the upper dome equator
The calculated stresses and the final form of the pressure loading spectrum is shown
be low
Minimum
Stress
(ksi)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Maximum
Stress
(ksi)
25.603
37.552*
37.552*
27.310
Cycles per
Flight
Time per
Flight
(minutes)
2.5
3.5
6.0
*Every 20 flights, this stress is replaced with the pressure regulator malfunction
stress, which is 40. 112 ksi.
The elliptical surface flaw is assumed to initially have aspect ratios, a/2c. of 0.1
and 0.4 (see sketch below).
"FANK
WALL-_
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'l'h(, initial flaw size fore:_ch of these aspect ratios is cal(rulated here, based on the
n_:tximum flaw size that w_nJld be screened by the proof test. usinga minimum value for
the m;lterial toughness i_aramt, t(;r KI C for consistency with the crack growth analysis.
For 2219-T,'_7 aluminum base metal at room temperature the minimum wHue of the
material toughness parameter. KIe. is 32.() ksi_/inch (Referenc.e 6, Figure 52,1ower
curve). Using this value (,f KI(. in the equaLion for the stress intensity factor, mid
suhstituting 0" :- (:ry for tim l)r()o[ test stress, the equation becomes
32.0
1. 1 (5 I. 0) _n-q/-a- (MK)
_/-02 _ O. 212 (51.0/51.0) 2
This equation can now be solved for 'a', which is the maximum flaw size that would
be screened by a proof tesl. It should be noted that M K is dependent upon the value
of'a' so that a trial and error solution is necessary. This equation was solved for
both aspect ratios of 0.1and 0 1 and the results are shown belc_w.
For a/2c = 0. l, the flaw screened by a proof test, a =0.06195 inch This value be-
comes the initial flaw size. a i, for the flaw propagation studies.
For a/2c = 0.4. the flaw that w¢)uld be screened by a proof test turned out to be greater
than the thickness of the tank wall, t = 0.116 inch. An equivalent through crack with
an area equal to the area of a surface flaw of aspect ratio, a/2c = 0.4 on the verge of
leakage is calculated here.
TANK
WA 1,1,
a/2c O. 4
I 0.116
l
Area of flaw -- vac
2 a = 0. 116 inch Area = 0. 02642 in 2
The equation for the stress intensity factor KI, for the elliptical surface flaw. is as
follows:
K I
I.1 o"_;_-v/a (MK)
V O - 0.212 (_r/Cry) 2
(I_eference 3, Equation IX-8)
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a = applied stress (ksi)
CTy = tensile yield stress := 51 ksi
a = flaw size (inch)
2
o = is a function which depends on the value of a/2c
For
a/2c = 0.1. 02 = 1.10355
"2
a/2c = 0.4, 0 = 2. 01096
M K is a function which depends on both the value of a/2c and a/t
For a/2c = 0. 1 For a/2c = 0.4
a/t M a/t
K MK
0 1. 000 0
0.1 1.010 0.1
0.2 1. 030 0.2
0.3 1 . 065 0.3
0.4 1. 110 0.4
0.5 1.185 0.5
0.6 1.290 0.6
0.7 1. 430 0.7
0.8 1. 565 0.8
0.9 1.68O 0.9
1.0 1.770 1.0
1. 000
1. 005
1.010
1. 015
1. 020
1 035
1 055
1 085
1 130
1 180
1 210
(From Reference 10, Page 135.)
An equivalent through crack would have an area of (2c) x t
2
(2c) ×t = 0.02642 in 2c = 0.2278 inch
This value becomes the initial size of the through crack in the flaw propagation
studies.
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The critical flaw size of the elliptical surface flaw of aspect ratioa/2c - 0.1 is
(::tl('ulatcd in a manner similar to that in which the initial Haw size was calculated.
()}ttaining the minimum value of the material toughness parameter, from the min-
KI e ,
imum curve of Figure 52 of Ih'ference 6, K I : 32.0 ksi _/inch and the applied stress
bt_colnc,s tile " c
maxlmum stress from the applied pressure loads spectrum (el= 40. 112
ksi). The stress intensity factor equation then becomes
1.1 (40. 112) @-q/-acr (MK)
32.0 =
_L_ 0.212 (40. 112/51.0) 2
Solving for act, we find act = 0.08053 inch. The critical flaw size for the through
flaw is found by using the same minimum Kic value of 32.0 ksi v/]n-c--h and the same
applied stress of 10. 112 ksi tiowever, the equation for the through crack now
becomes
_-x/i2C ic r
KI = r
V 2 - ((r/(_y)2
or
32.0 =
40. 112 _/_ V/_c r
V2 - (40.312/51.0) 2
,)
Solving this equation for (.C)cr, we find (2C)c r = 0.2798 inch.
Results of flaw growth calculations:
Elliptical Surface Flaw, a/2c = 0.1 (see Figure 3-28)
Starting with a i = 0. 06195 inch, it took 626 flights for the flaw to grow to acr =
0. 08053 inch (scatter factor of 1.5 used on flights) as shown in Figure 3-28.
Through Flaw (see Figure 3-29)
Starting with 2c i = 0. 2278 inch, it took 160 flights for the flaw to grow to (2C)c r =
0.2798 inch (scatter factor of 1.5 used on flights).
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:i.:_. 1 VCING SPAR CAPS SAFE LIFE ANALYSIS, In the anal.v-sis of the wing spar
_'al,s, these members were assumed to contain two types of flaws: a ¢.t)rT_er crack of
an inilial size of 0.1 inch (see sketch below), nd a crack _)f 0.1 inch initial length
en_analing fr(m_ a fastener hole. The initial size of the cracks was chosen based on
judgment of the capabilities of nondestructive evaluation.
The wing loading spectrum experienced by the flaws described above is essentially
the same spectrum as was used in the wing fatigue analysis and found in Table 3-21.
Certain necessary modifications were made, however, touse this spectrum in the
crack growth study. These included the addition of some sustained load, which while
not necessary for fatigue analysis can be of great significance in crack growth analy-
sis, and the reduction of the spectrum, which is for 100 missions, to a spectrum for
_mly one mission. The results of these modifications and the final wing loading spec-
trum can be found in Table 3-2(; This spectrum is a very severe loading spectrum,
much more so than experienced by any of the other components being analyzed in this
study.
The crack growth studies were done on the wing assuming the spar caps were main-
tained at room temperature Thus room temperature properties were assumed and
crack growth rate curves for Ti-6Al-4V annealed titanium base metal at room tem-
perature were used in the flaw propagation computer program.
3.3.4.1 Corner Crack. The configuration of the corner crack assumed for the flaw
growth analysis was as shown in the sketch.
SPAR
CAP
I,' I,A NGI': I
(1° 100 IN.
The maximum stress intensityfactor equation for a corner crack is
KI
¢T,A (07o )
1 - 0. 177 (c,,1Oy) 2
whe re
(r = applied tensile stress
Cry = tensile yield stress
a = flaw size
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Table 3-26. Wing Spar Cap Loading Spectrum
1,'1 ight °Mcan
Phase (ksi)
Ascent 0. 000
I
0.0(10
13.6S0
13. 680
O. 000
I
0. 000
36..180
I
36. 1_o
9. 120
I
9. 120
13. {;s(}
Ascent 13.1;nil
Entry 6. _ t0
12.312
16. s72
20. :)76
33.7,14
42.86,1
42. _6t
45. 600
45. 600
18.210
l
18. 240
Entry
Cruise/
Landing
Cruise/
I,anding
trAit
(ksi)
]. 3[i_
2.28O
3. 192
4. 104
5. 016
3. 192
4. 560
5. 928
7.29G
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5. OlG
h. 20_
11.4OO
14. 13(;
16. $72
7. 296
13. 221
19. 152
2.1. t;2,1
3O. 09{;
9.57[;
lfi. 872
27. 360
-I1. 040
55 176
12. 312
1S.210
33. 744
55. 532
72.9{;0
6. _t0
12.312
16. 872
20. 976
33. 744
42.86 t
42.86.1
45. 600
45. 600
19. 152
23.712
29. 184
34. 656
40. 128
Cycles per i,'light
(Unless Otherwis(: Noted)
900
90
9
1
1 cycle every 10 flights
9OO
90
9
]
I cycle every 10 flights
900
9O
9
1
1 cycle every 10 flights
900
90
9
1
1 cycle every 10 ['lights
900
9O
9
1
1 cycle every 10 flights
900
90
9
1
1 cycle every 10 [lights
900
9O
5
2.5
l 5
1
1 minute sustained load per flight
1 cycle every 10 flights
1 minute sustained load every 10 flights
1 _00
180
18
2
2 cycles every 10 flights
189
The (.ritical value of the material toughnessparameter, KIc usedhere f(,r IIw Ti-
5AI-IV annealedtitanium base metal as room temperature w;ts Kle : 7x.0 ksi _ineh.
(l{eference x. Vigure 35. Pag(_ s9). The tensile yiehl stress used was ay = 120.0 ksi.
The lnaximum olmrating str_,ss (recurring in the spar cap can be found from the spec-
trum Io be cr : 91.2 ksi. Substiluting all these valu_,s into the stress ildensit.g, factor
equation results in
(91.2) q/-_: /aer (0.705)
78.0 =
0. 177 (91.2/120.0) 2
This expression can be solved for the critical value of 'a', which turns out to be
= 0.42057 inch.ae r
Results of flaw growth calculations:
Under the influence of the al)plied loading spectrum, it took ;_1 flights for the initial
= ,," = 0..12057 inch. The reasonflaw size of a i 0. 100 inch to _tow to the critical flaw aer
for the very small number of flights to failure is undoubtedly the very severe loading
spectrum experienced by the spar cap. It differs from the ()ther components in this
study in that it experiences exlreme loads during the entry and cruise/landing flight
phases as well as the ascent ph:_se. The flaw growth is shown in 1, i-ure a-ao.
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;_.:_..1.'2 C t'ack Emanatiu_g'trom liole. The flaw c,mfigur:ttion investigated in this
._ccli()n is as shown in tile sketch. The length o[ the flaw is specified I)y 'a', the diam
e[t_l' o[ the hole is 't)', ;rod thc applied tensile stress is '(:r'.
Tim equation for the sll'css intcnsity factor at the tip of the crack is
K
I
(rv_]v a ((;KT)
77 (_r/(T )2
Y
(Reference 3, Equation VII-10 modified to
acc()unt fo_" the plastic zone correction)
(r applied tensile stress (ksi)
r_ tensile yield st_'ess (ksi)
Y
a crack length (inches)
The quantity GKT in the equation is a factor included to account for the stress gradient
due to the introduction of the hole into the uniform stress field. It can be thought of as
a stress concentration factor. The (lU'.lntity GKT has a maximum value (GMAX) at the
periphery of the hole and decays exponentially to a minimum value (GMIN) at some
specified distance (AREI.') [roln the edge of the hole (see sketch on next page).
T
('RACK |
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The curve for GKT is defined by the equation
(;KT - GMIN + (G:_,I:\X - GMIN) e
From the equation, it can be seen that AIIFF is actually the lengl.h at which 99% of the
difference between GMAX and (;M1N is reached. In other words, if
a = AREF, then GK'I : GIVlIN +- I). 01 ((;MAX - GMIN).
With GKT defined as shown, the equation for the stres:_ intensity factor becomes
(--
(7 "_ IT [1
_ 2
Y
3MIN _ (GMAX- GMIN)e
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l.'m" this portion of the study a value of 3.0 was used for GMAX, 1.0 was used for
_;MIN, aml AREF was taken tobe 0.250 inch (one hole diameter). Figure 3-31 is a
i)lot of GKT versus a/AIIEF for GMAX = 3.0 and GMIN - 1.0. With the specified
values for GMAX, GMIN, ;md AREF, the equation for the stress intensity factor
I)o c o Y__e S
II (-18"42a) 1
..... ,_f_a .o _ 2.0 e
KI ' '2
1 - O. 177 (_r/_r)
Y
This is the final form of the stress intensity factor used in this portion of the study.
By substituting values for the mmximum operating stress in the spectrum (a), the
tensile yield stress 0ry), mid the critical value of K I (KIe was used here), the critical
crack length (act.) ctm be found from this equation using a trial and error method.
The wing material is taken to be Ti-BA1--4V annealed titanium maintained at room
temperature. Therefore, the following material properties are used:
K 78.0 ksi i_/_-nctl (Reference 8, Figure 35, Page 89)
I
c
cr 120.0 ksi
Y
Again using the wing loading spectrum of Table 3-26, the maximum operating stress
is found from the applied loading spectrum to be cr = 91.2 ksi. Substituting this
stress and the appropriate material protxzrtics into the equation for the stress inten-
sity factor for a crack emanating from a hole results in the following expression:
78.0 .- cr 1.0 _ 2.0 e
_/1 -0"177 (91"2/120 0)2.
This expression is solved by a trial and error method for the critical value of 'a',
which turns out to be a 0. 18308 inch.
cr
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took three flights for the ini-
tial flaw (a i = 0. 100 inch) to grow to the critical flaw size (act = 0. 18308 inch), in-
cluding a scatter factor of 1.5 on the number of flights to failure.
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Figure 3-31. Stress Intensity Factor (AKI) Multiple for a
Crack Initiating at a Fastener Hole
The small number of flights to failure can be attributed to two things. First is the
fact that the loading spectrum experienced by the wing spar cap is an extremely
severe spectrum in that it incorporates high magnitude loads during the entry and
cruise/landing flight phases as well as the ascent phase. Secondly, the flaw configura-
tion being investigated here is a very critical configuration, especially since a stress
gradient multiplication factor is being used on the stress intensity factor to account
for the stress concentration around the hole. Consequently, the critical flaw size is
not much greater than the initial flaw size, meaning the flaw does not have to grow
very much to reach the critical size.
3.3.4.3 Determination of Acceptable Safe-Life Stress Level for Spar Caps. In the
analysis of the wing for a crack emanating from a hole, the results show that the
initial crack (a i = 0. 100 inch) grows to the critical size (acr = 0. 18308 inch) in just
three flights. Due to the fact that the number of flights to failur¢ is so small, a study
was undertaken to determine the allowable maximum limit stress level that would re-
sult in an acceptable safe-life of 100 missions.
The loading spectrum used in the initial analysis of a crack emanating from a hole in
the wing spar cap is based on a maximum limit operating stress level of (rMA X = 91.2
ksi (see Table 3-26). The procedure used here consists of reducing this maximum
limit stress level by some percentage, calculating a new critical flaw size based on
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the new maximum stress level, and then propagating an initial flaw size a i = 0. 100
inch to failure using a reduced applied loading spectrum based on the reduced maxi-
mum stress level. The critical flaw sizes (acr) were found using the following
expression:
78.0
i (-18.42 acr)l
: '""/'; .o 2,.o e
1 -0.177 (r/120.0
By substituting values of the stress level (_) into this equation, the critical flaw size
(acr) can be found for the stress level by using a tri_d and error method. Figure 3-32
is a plot of stress level versus critical flaw size for a crack emanating from a hole in
the wing spar cap.
After determining the critical flaw size for vario _s maximum stress levels, an initial
flaw of size a i = 0. 100 inch was propagated to failure for the various levels and the
curve of Figure 3-33 was obtained. From this curve it can be seen that to obtain a
safe-life of 100 missions, the maximum allowable operating stress level must be re-
duced to 50% of the original maximum stress level. In other words, all load levels in
the applied loading spectrum must be reduced by 50% so that an initial crack of size a i
= 0.100 inch emanating from a hole will reach criticality in 100 missions, using a
scatter factor of 1.5 on the number of missions.
3.3.5 VERTICAL TAIL SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. The flaw growth analysis of the ver-
tical tail was done assuming that there was an initial through crack in the skin of
length (2c)i = 1.00 inch (see sketch below). This initial size was chosen based on a
judgment of the capability of nondestructive evaluation.
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Figure 3-32. Critical Flaw Size Versus Stress Level for the Titanium Wing Spar Caps
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Figure 3-33. Allowable Maximum Operating Stress Level versus the Number of
Flights to Failure (Safe-Life) for the Titanium Wing Spar Caps
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The vertical tail loading spectrum experienced by the flaw configuration shown in the
sketch is essentially the same spectrum that was used in the fatigue life determination
shown in "Fables 3-22 and :; 23. The only change made was to reduce the spectrum,
which is for 100 missions, to a spectrum for only one mission. The results of this
modifioation and the final vertical tail loading spectrum are listed in Table 3-27.
Table 3-27.
Flight Mean Stress
Phase (ksi)
Vertical Tail Loading Spectrum
Alternating Stress Cycles per Flight
(ksi) (Unless Otherwise Noted)
•_\ scent O. 000
1. 394 900
2. 584 90
3. 740 9
4. 930 l
6. 120
1 cycle every lO flights
3. 842 900
7.480 90
11.084 9
14.790 1
18. 530 1 cycle every I0 flights
6.460 900
12.6 14 90
18. 700 9
24. 820 1
30.940 1 cycle every i0 flights
4.692 9O0
8.908 90
Ascent O. 000
13. 192 9
17. 374 1
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Flight
P ha s c
z\ SCCl)|
A scent
Cruise/
Landing
Cruise/
Landing
Table 3-27.
Mean Stress
(ksi)
O. 000
,
i
O. 000
O. 000
0.000
Vertical Tail Loading Spectrum (Cont'd)
Alternating Stress
(ksi)
g i. 726
3. 094
6. z56
9. 384
IZ. 444
15. 470
1. 972
3. 876
5. 644
7. 344
9. 180
O. 884
i. 224
I. 700
X.210
2. 686
Cycles per Flight
(Unless Otherwise Noted)
1 cycle every 10 flights
900
9O
9
1
1 cycle every 10 flights
900
9O
9
1
1 cycle every 10 flights
9OO
90
9
1
1 cycle every 10 flights
7. 140
9. 078
I0. 948
12. 920
14. 824
1800
180
18
2
2 cycles every I0 flights
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The crack growth studies were done on the vertical tail assuming the structure was
nmintained at room temperature. Thus room temperature properties were assumed
and crack growth rate curves for Ti-6A1-4V _mnealed titanium base metal at room
temperature were used in the flaw propagation computer program.
The equation for the maximum stress intensity factor for a through crack of length 2c
is:
K
I _/ 2 - (cr/_r)2
Y
(Reference 10, Page 28)
where
(r = applied stress
(r = tensile yield stress
Y
The critical value of the material toughness parameter, KIe, used here for the Ti-
6A1-4V annealed titanium base metal at room temperature was Kic = 78.0 ksi _--_.
(Reference 8, Figure 35, Page 89.) The tensile yield stress was (ry = 120.0 ksi.
The maximum operating stress in the vertical tail can be found from the spectrum to
be _ = 30. 940 ksi. Substituting all these values into the stress intensity factor equa-
tion results in:
78.0 =
30. 940 ,_#-x/(2 C)c r
_2 - (30.9,l(}/120.0) 2
This equation c_m be solved for the critical value of 2e, which turns out to be (2C)cr
= 3. 9115 inches.
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took 534 flights for the initial
flaw of size (2c)i = 1.00 inch to grow to the critical flaw size of (2C)c r = 3. 9115 inch-
es. Note here that a scatter factor of 1.5 has been used on the number of flights to
failure. A plot of flaw size versus flights to failure can be found in Figure 3-34.
3.3.6 THRUST BEAM CAP SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. For the thrust structure beams,
as for the wing spar caps, a safe-life analysis was carried out using two types of ini-
tial flaws: a corner crack, and a crack emanating from a fastener hole.
The thrust structure loading spectrum used in the safe-life analysis is the same as
that used in the fatigue life determination and shown in Table 3-24.
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Figure 3-34. Crack Growth in the Vertical Tail Skin
3.3.6.1 Corner Crack. In the analysis of the thrust structure, one of the thrust
beam tension caps was assum¢,d to contain :t corner crack of an initial size of 0. 1 inch
(see sketch). This initial size was chosen based on a judgment of the capability of
nondestructive evaluation.
---_ -_ a. o. i oo m.
1
(
Pl IllYll JN (ll" ,,_
TIlIIIIST BEAM
"I'ENSI(IN f'AP _
The crack growth studies were done on the thrust structure assuming it was main-
tained at room temperature. Thus room temperature properties were assumed, and
crack growth rate curves for Ti-6AI-4V annealed titanium base metal at room tem-
perature were used in the flaw propagation computer program.
The eq':ation for the maximum stress intensity factor for a corner crack is
K I
(0.705)
d l - 0.177 ((s/Cry)2
(Reference 3, Equation VII-7 modified to
account for the plastic zone correction)
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a = applied stress
Cry = yield stress
a = flaw size
The critical value of the material toughness parameter, Kic, used here for the TL-
6AI-4V annealed titanium base metal at room temperature was KI -- 78.0 ksi
c
(Reference 8, Figure 35, Page 89). The tensile yield stress used was oy = 120.0
ksi. The maximum operating stress occurring in the thrust beam cap can be found
from the spectrum to be = 92.9 ksi. Substituting all these values into the stress inten-
sity factor equation results in
78.0 =
92.9 (0.70 )
71 - 0. 177 (92.9/120.0) 2
This equation can be solved for the critical value of Vat, which turns out to be acr
= 0.4036 inch.
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took 1555 [lights for the initial
flaw of size a i = 0. 100 inch to grow to the critical flaw size of act = 0.4036 inch.
Figure 3-35 is a plot of flaw size versus flights. A scatter factor of 1.5 was used on
the number of flights to failure.
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Crack Growth in the Titanium Thrust Beam Caps
(Flaw Configuration -- Corner Crack)
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3.3.6.2 Crack Emanating from Hole. The flaw configuration and method o! analysis
for determining the growth of a crack emanating from a hole is the samL ,,_ ,vas used
in the wing spar cap safe-life analysis and shown on Pages 191 through l'"..
The maximum operating stress is found from the applied loading spectrum t o be
: 92.9 ksi. Substituting this stress and the appropriate material properties into
the equation for the stress intensity factor for a crack emanating from a hole results
in the following expression:
78.0 : [1
1 - 0.177 (92.9/120.0) 2 [/ • 0 + 2.0 e (-18" 42 acr) ]
This expression is solved by a trial and error method for the critical value of tat,
which turns out to be acr = 0.1694 inch.
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took 101 flights for the initial
flaw (a i = 0. 100 inch) to grow to the critical flaw size (acr = 0. 1694 inch). Note here
that a scatter factor of 1.5 was used on the number of flights to failure. Figure 3-36
is a plot of flaw size versus flights.
2
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Figure 3-36. Crack Growth in the Titanium Thrust Beam Caps (Flow
Configuration -- Crack Emanating from a Hole)
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3,3.7 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. In the analysis of
the z,ft orbiter support frame, one of the frame flanges was assumed to con "tain a
corner crack of an initial size of 0.1 inch, or a crack having a length of 0.1 inch ema-
nating from a hole. This initial size was chosen based on a judgment of the capabilttv
of nondestructive evaluation.
The aft orbiter attachment frame loading spectrum experienced by this flaw configura-
tion is essentially the same spectrum that was used in the safe-life determination for
fatigue crack initiation listed in Table 3-25. The only change made was to reduce the
spectrum, which is for 100 missions, to a spectrum for only one mission. The re-
sults of this modification and the final aft orbiter support frame loading spectrum are
listed in Table 3-28.
The crack growth studies were done on the aft orbiter support frame assuming the
strucCure was maintained at room temperature. Thus room temperature properties
were assumed and crack growth rate curves for 2219-T87 aluminum base metal at
room temperature were used in the flaw propagation computer program.
Table 3-28.
Mean Stress
(ksi)
12 000
/
12.000
Aft Orbiter Support Frame Loading Spectrum
Alternating Stress
 si)
1.000
2.000
2°000
4.000
6.000
3.000
5.000
9.000
14,000
20.000
t
Cycles per Flight ]
(lraless Otherwise Noted) I
900
9O
1 cycle every 10 flights
900
9O
J
1 cycle every 10 flights
---A
2O4
3.3.7.1 Corner Crack
/
PORTION 0 F ]
SU P I'_)R'I" _,_
ff
FI.ANGE r (
_-----a t 0.100 IN.
a i _O. IOOIN.
The equation for the maximum stress intensity factor for a corner crack is
KI
cr _ (0.705)
/ 1 - 0.177 (_/_y)2
(Reference 3, Equation VII-7 modified to
account for the plastic zone correction).
cr = applied stress
= tensile yield stress
Y
a = flaw size
The critical value of the material toughness parameter, KL, used here for the 2219-
T87 aluminum base metal at room temperature was KI = _2.0 ksi _//n-c-h (Reference
6, Figure 52, lower curve). The tensile yield stress uCsed was _y = 51.0 ksi. The
maximum operating stress occurring in the support frame can be found from the spec-
trum to be _ = 32. 000 ksl.
Substituting all these values into the stress intensity factor equation results in
32.0 =
32.000 _ act (0.705)
/1 - 0.177 (32.000/51. 000) 2
This equation can be solved for the critical value of 'a', which turns out to be a
= 0.5958 inch. cr
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, the initial flaw ot size a = 0.100
inch grew only 0.00004 inch in 4000 flights. Conscquently, the safe-life of this struc-
tural component can be considered to be extremely large.
2O5
3.3.7.2 Crack Emanating from Hole. The loading spectrum, material p,'ope, l,,
,nd maximum operating stress will be the same as those used m the cJ _lc_ _,.,_,,_
analysis of a corner crack, above. Substituting the appropriate values n,,to ,!.
equation for the stress intensity factor for a crack emanating from a h,)le , _,t _
the following expression:
32.0
32.0 #a
cr
V1 - O. 177 (32.0/51.0) 2 I (-18.42 acr) ]
1.0+2.0e
This expression is solved by a trial and error method for the critical , alue ,,t '_
which turns out to be a -- 0. 29063 inch.
cr
Under the _fluence of the applied loading spectrum, the initial flaw (a, u. I
grew 0.01815 inch to a = 0.11815 inch in 26i)7 tlights, using a scatter factor
the number of flights to failure.
Since the initial flaw of size 0. 100 inch grew only 0.01_15 inch in Z667 flights.._,._
since the critical flaw size for this structural component has been showy, to ,,ea L r
= 0.29063 inch, the safe-life of this structural component cm_ be consLdel ed to bv t x-
tremely large.
3.4 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS
The damage tolerance of each of the selected components is analytically determme_l
below, as a measure of its fail-safe capability. Two criteria are used i,, judging ade-
quacy of fail-safe design:
a.
b.
In structure composed of a number of discrete elements (e.g.. the w,n_ _H,,.}
a crack can proceed to the point of complete failure of one principal m_mb_
The remaining structure must possess a residual strength capabilltv st ,a,
rying critical limit design load without failure.
In monolithic structure (e. g., the integrally stiffened vertical tail box) ,_ ,..
ture arrest can be provided by integral _titteners. tear straps i_, 4th, ,
means so that a rapidly propagating crack ns arrested at such le,Lgth a._ ,o
make detection certain prior to the next flLght b_ normal prefligh, Lrsp_ -
tions, but not so long as to degrade residual strength to an unacceptahh le_,i
3.4.1 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS- LO 2 TANK SKIN UNDER INTERNAL PR}SSURE.
longitudinal section through the tank skin was taken at the upper centerlme }ust-aflr,t
the forward dome equator, for analysis of fail-safe capability.
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An initial flaw was assumed in the form of a through crack in the center of the panel.
Since the weld and frame lands are so widely spaced, the tank skin panel was assumed
to be of infinite width. Other assumptions were:
a. Material is 2219-T87.
b. Temperature is room temperature.
e. Gross hoop stress is 44.0 ksi, resulting from maximum relief valve pres-
sure (see Table 3-16).
Determination of Critic I Hoop Stress for the Onset of Crack Instability:
_y
C
K
C
K a
e
ao + -- Z i , C
2_o"
yB
(Equation I:X-14 of Reference 3)
where
a -- initial crack half length
O
Kc -= critical stress intensity factor, assumed as 2 KIc = 64 ksl x/_ch
c = bulge correction, shown as 9.5 for 2024-T3 in Table XVI of Refer-
ence 3. This value is used here for 2219-T_7
R = radius of curvature = 198 inches
ay B = material yield strength in a 2:1 biaxial stress field, assumed to be
1.25 Fty or 64 ksi
Solution of the equation for a range of values of ao gives values of a c that are plotted
as cr versus 2a In Figure 3-38. They indicate a critical initial crack length of slightly
less than one inch at a hoop stress of 44 ksi.
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LO 2 Ta, k Crack Arrest Effectiveness of Graphite/Epoxy Tear Straps
In an effort to increase the critical crack length at this gross stress and to evaluate
fail-safe tank concepts, crack arresters in the form of graphite/epoxy straps were
tried. The straps were assumed to have a 0.50 by 3.00-inch section of HT-S/X904
unidirectional graphite/epo×T with the following properties:
Ftu = 168 ksi
3
E = 20 ksi×10
Section at Strap
O. 50
0.090 (R) 2.5B
= 0. 225
GIiA I)tllTE/EPOX_ STRAP
INTEGRAL STRINGER
"_q'ANK WALL
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Determination of the effectiveness of the Graphite/Epoxy tea," straps to arrest unstable
cracks is evaluated by the following method for various strap spacings and hoop stress
levels. The method is:
(1) The applied stress intensity for a centrally located crack of variable length be-
tween the straps is determined by the method of Reference 11 which accounts
for the presence of straps where:
K = Co'_a
C = stress intensity correction factor
A typical plot of applied stress intensity versus crack size is presented in
F_gure 3-37.
(2) It is hypothesized that the stress level or strap spacing which causes the
applied stress intensity curve to fall below the critical stress intensity factor
(Kc) of the skin Ixanel (i.e., fracture toughness) will cause dynamic fracture
arrest and a fail sate structural arrangement. This condition is illustrated
in Figure 3-37. The values of strap spacings and stress levels which satisfy
this fracture arrest hypothesis are plotted in Figure 3-38.
Also plotted in Figure 3-38 is the total weight of straps on the LO 2 tank for
the strap spacings shown. The curve shows that the weight penalty required
to provide fracture arrest at a hoop design stress of 44 ksi is 3450 pounds.
Siace this is a 19% weight penalty on the LO 2 tank, it is considered imprac-
tical to use these crack arrest straps.
3.4.2 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS- LH_ TANK SKIN UNDER INTERNAL PRESSURE.
The general constructional features of the LH 2 tank are similar to those of the LO 2
tank described on Page 206. The assumptions for the fail-safe analysis were the
same except for the gross hoop stress, which is 40.1 psi per Table 3-17, and the skin
thickness, which is 0. 116 inch with 0.290 inch land thickness.
For the tank without tear straps, the critical hoop stress is the same as for the LO 2
tank (see Page 207), for a given initial crack length. If tear straps were added simi-
lar to those shown for the LO 2 tank on Page 209, the results would be similar to the
IX) 2 tank. A check was therefore made on increasing the size of the straps from 1/2
by 3 inches to 1 by 3 inches.
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The critical hoopstresses for dynamic fracture arrest for various tear strap
spacingswere calculated using the same method as for the LO2 tank and the resulting
curve of crack arrest effectiveness of the 1 by 3 inch graphite/epoxy straps as shown
in Figure 3-39. A plot of strap weight versus spacing is also shown. It canbe seen,
by comparing the upper curve of Figure 3-38 for tile LO2 tank with the equivalent curve
of Figure 3-39 that the effectiveness of the graphite/epoxy tear straps was not signifi-
cantly enhancedby a doubling of the cross-sectional area of the straps. It can also be
seen from the strap weight curve that the straps are extremely heavy; at the strap
spacing required for the limit stress of 40.1 ksi, the weight penalty would beover
20,000 pounds.
3.4.3 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS -- LH 2 TANK SKIN UNDER LONGITUDINAL LOADS.
Takin_ a transverse section through the integrallystiffenedrank skin in the region of
thc ,,ottom centerline at Station2600, the following configuration is obtained.
t O. 122
sk
:I. 00 t r
[ _ N .|, O0 --
Using the method given in Reference 11:
Percent stiffening
100
Ask
A
str
]00
0.488
l+_
0.264
- 35.1%
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-!0
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q]
Figure 3-39.
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LH 2 Tank Crack Arrest Effectiveness of Graphite/Epoxy _lear Straps
Values of the stress intensity factor, K, are computed by use of the formula
K = CO" _¢_-K
where
C = stress intensity correction factor
(r = gross stress level
a = crack half length
and C is from Figure 3-41. The resulting values of K are plotted versus crack length
in Figure 3-40. For this curve it is assumed that the stringer is not completly sever-
ed until the crack tip in the sheet has advanced a distance equal to the height of the
stringer past the eenterline of the stringer. Between the edge oi the stringer and the
point at which the stringer is assumed to be completely severed, K is ass<,ned to in-
crease linearly with the crack length, a, as shown.
Figure 3-40 shows that once rapid fracturc has begun for a transverse crack under
longitudinal loading the stress intensity doesn't go below the critical value, K c, again.
Therefore, once ra_lld fracture begins, it progresses to complete failure and the LII 2
tank therefore has no failsafe capability for transverse cracks under longitudinal loads.
212
m
_fJ
0
r._
c.o
II
0
Z
\
_<_
0_
ao
r._ ¢_
r._
o
0
\
o o
( _ !S_ ,--5/) _IO,IDV.ff XJ_ISIK',J3.,_I S_ILLS
q
¢o
213
3.4.4 B-9U DELTA WING FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. Fail-safe strength of the B-9U
wing was evaluated analytically with the aid of a finite element computer program.
The idealized structural model used in the fail-safe analysis is the same as that used
in the sizing calculations and shown in Figure 3-15. Major tension or tension/shear
members of the model were analytically "failed," one at a time, and limit design
loads were applied to the weakened structure. Considerable beef-up was required to
make the structure adequate for design limit load. Total added weight was 534 pounds
or 2.16% of the total ultimate strength model weight of 24,660 pounds.
The ascent loading condition W-1 (maximum aq with headwinds) that produces maxi-
mum tension in the lower surface was used for the fail-safe _malysis.
Structural members "failed," one at a time, were: 1) *he spar lower cap between Sta-
tions 207 m_d 267 of Spars 2, 3, 4 and 5; 2) the spar shear diagonal between Stations
207 and 267 of Spar 3; 3) the spar lower cap and web between Stations 267 and 327 of
Spars 3 and 4, and 4) the spar lower cap and web of Spar 4 between Stations 447 and
507. In the engine area, where spar shear is carried by webs x_elded to upper and
lower caps, a lower cap/web failure was treated as a single failure with a weld crack
assumed to propagate in two directions (i. e., through the tens_¢m cap and through the
shear web). Note that this type failure appeared only slightl_ rm_re ('r_tical than a
simple lower cap failure inboard of the engine area.
Results of the fall-safe analysis are listed in Tables 3-29 and 3-30. Table 3-29 com-
pares wing internal load distribution for ultimate load with the load distribution for
limit load with a major tension member failed. The comparison is confined to that
part of the wing where the redistribution of limit load due to a single member failure
results in loads higher than those experienced by ultimate load on an intact wing.
Table 3-30 lists: 1) margins of safety due to fail-safe redistribution of limit load on a
structure sized for ultimate load, 2) required increase of bar area (or plate thickness)
for zero margins of safety on members under fail-safe limit load redistribution, and
3) weight increases associated with the added material.
Table 3-30 shows a total weight increase of 534 pounds for the requirement that the
wing carry limit design load with any reasonable in-service structural failure. Of the
534 pounds, 69% is in spar caps, 21% in spar diagonals, 6% in spar webs, and 4_ in
skins. All skins requiring beef-up (three per side) were originally 0. 016 gage for ul-
timate requirements. This gage is probably unrealistically thin when handling, sonic
fatigue, and thermal stress requirements are considered. Maximum gage increase
was 0.009 for a total gage of 0.016 + 0.009 - 0.025 inch therefore, it is doubtfm that
any skin beef-up would be needed for fail-safe primary loading requirements.
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Table 3-29. Internal Loads -- Ultimate Versus Fail Safe -- B-9U Wing
63-73
73-87
87-99
99-109
109-119
64-74
74-88
88-100
100-110
110-120
63-74
73-88
87-100
99-110
109-120
43-55
55-65
65-75
75-89
89-101
101-111
111-121
44-56
56-66
66-76
76-90
Member
Spar 2
Upper
Cap
Spa:, 2
Lo_ er
Cap
i Spar 2
', Truss
Diag's
Spar 3
Upper
Cap
S,,ar 3
, Lower
Cap
Ultimate
(lb)
-354,199
-497,417
-628,314
-774,735
-769,428
344,726
473,172
580,829
680,139
746,9_6
77,9S7
98,7:5
110,340
162,279
50,668
-528,592
-641,513
-842,087
-1,046,631
-1,256,888
-1,590,023
-1,537,001
488,278
683,280
731,348
817,553
Failed
Element
102-112
(lb)
-281,238
-413,813
-524,138
-580,767
-562,900
3_2,984
557,997
754,527
_56,912
10-1,763
130,333
127,462
62,027
21,085
-370,866
-465,418
-587,695
-682,779
-765,161
-995,483
-993,688
276,724
318,786
249,463
165,112
Member Loads
Failed
Element
104-114
0b)
-273,932
-376,286
-476,391
-594,141
-588,97_
279,59.1
386,942
.194,338
564.003
612,343
43,457
5%082
63,901
125,919
40,882
-417,546
-497,600
-674,859
-865,611
-1,050,835
-1,275,347
-1,210,439
450,650
655,]59
713,915
812,416
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
_9-90-
! 102-101
i (lb)
-278,766
-416,02s
-544,319
-603,342
-579.,_s3
40___5_67
599,4_S
766,134
_49.0S9
765,105
112,634
152,653
176t297
86,582
22,966
-381,026
-482,734
-609,472
-698,986
-750,035
-944,438
-953,750
280.787
316,922
233,734
122,890
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
Oh)
-271,280
-373,735
-478,988
-588,782
-584,184
283,011
390,504
481,679
554,615
601,494
44,223
61,161
69,903
111,255
40,799
-418,886
-496,145
-665,296
-842,755
-1,026,506
-1,279,230
-1,215,727
466,883
675.788
733,795
835,242
Failed --
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb)
-276,710
-380,104
-467,626
-562,813
-556,712
266,205
360,845
434,472
501,286
544,571
61,353
72,975
78,130
108,811
36,594
-399,785
-495,060
-643,451 t
-764,095
-887,269
-1.n96.75o j
-1,061,835 i
!
417,658
603,218 j
637,414
677,512 I
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Table 3-29. Internal Loads -- Ultimate Versus Fail Safe -- B-9U Wing, Contd
Member Member Loads
90-102 Spar 3
102-112 Lower
112-122 Cap
43-56~ Diag
55-56-66-65
65-66-76-75
75-76-90-89
89 _-101
101-112 } Truss111-122 Diag
45-57
57 -67
67-77 Spar 4
77-91 Upper
91-103 Cap
103-113
113-123 )
46-58
58-68
68-78 Spar 4
78-92 Lower
92-104 Cap
104-114
114-124
Ultimate
(Ib)
913,936
984,374
1,179,282
173.274
3,199 (1)
l Spar 3,471
(1)
Web 3,540(1)
3,625(1)
338,957
66,842
-546,210
-615,093
-750,268
-904,096
-1,083,289
-1,375,423
-1,365,959
2 47,467
399,349
687,190
993,679
1,318,270
1,457,074
1,487,248
Failed
Element
102-112
(lb)
63,198
0
212,045
90,455
Failed
Element
104-114
(lb)
903,960
1,087,060
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
(lb)
1,414( 1)
1,122( 1)
814( 1 )
996( 1)
167,025
259,118
-383,012
-420,090
-519,456
-642,663
-789,176
-1,003,112
-9S1,314
225,522
365,110
576,154
808,765
1,056,206
1,177,657
1,186,034
3,267(1)
3,_16(1)
4,003(1)
3,769(1)
0
39 481
323,493
_9,083
224,912
35,034
-376,980
-446,691
-515,431
-562,341
-593,802
-812,022
-851,983
6,333
-28,338
53,305
85,586
84,617
0
159,092
1,329( 1 )
907( 1 )
_28(1)
0(1)
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
(lb)
950,683
965,102
1,004,734
167,676
227,263
71,509
-376,685
-409,497
-502,112
-623,832
-790,184
-1,030,636
-1,005,879
217,837
353,887
569,783
816,134
1,096,882
1,188,325
1,161,699
3,240 (1)
3,772 (1)
3,953 (1)
3,847 (1)
257,611
38,038
-386,762
-464,523
-529,526
-557,866
-587,508
-802,961
-840,493
-33,114
-99,125
-45,874
-44,716
0
164,581
450,694
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb)
725,665
761,635
869,468
143,874
2,866(1)
2,108( 1 )
2,002 (1)
2,132 (1)
214,704
45,605
-366,689
-386,686
-449,000
-578,471
-723,816
-947,346
-939,664
-16,146
0
200,502
474,391
752,421
889,401
956,022
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Table 3-29. Internal Loads -- Ultimate Versus Fail Safe -- B-9U Wing, Con_
Member
45-58 - Diag
57-58-68-67 ]
67-68-78-77 _Spar
w°b
103-114 / Truss
113-124 J Dlag's
69-79
79-93 Spar 5
93-105 Upper
105-115 Cap
115-125
70-80
80-94 Spar 5
94-106 Lower
106-116 Cap
116-126
69-80
79-94 Spar 5
93-106 Truss
105-116 Diag's
115--126
Ultimate
(lb)
87,227
2,327( 1 )
2,536( 1 )
2,743( 1 )
3,093( 1 )
232,114
69,298
-367,143
-467, :,91
-518,177
-659,747
-498, 8O4
287,356
320,662
354,609
417,071
570,641
199,153
204,001
189,357
255,098
-120,755
Failed
Element
102-112
(lb)
_0,842
2,061( 1 )
2,448(1)
2,752( 1 )
2,906(1)
162,798
29,374
-270,251
-:_33,448
-383,219
-4(;0,291
-336,421
223,990
269,254
314,838
361,265
483,167
130, 92O
133,985
126,113
185,261
-93,957
Member Loads
Fail-Safe
Failed
Element
104-114
(lb)
-2,533
284(1)
211( 1 )
572(1)
134( 1 )
225,701
s0,214
-157,854
-'_)64,572
-dO1,53?,
-,112,639
-244,786
326,206
451,116
644,392
X77,7_4
904,873
212,179
255,727
269 086
118,626
-152_44.6
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-(,)0 -
102-101
(lb)
75,425
1,980(1)
2,438( 1 )
2,93s(I)
3,63411)
176,894
30,741
-268,718
-336, 875
-394,563
-,t72, -192
-34(;, 210
218,,t33
260,559
305,804
364 091
489,670
136,625
138,656
125,014
179,028
-95,340
t
t
i
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92 -
104-103
(lb)
-14,733
31(1)
587 (1)
1,032(1)
0
198,845
67,574
-183,944
-332,019
-413,497
-408,899
-259,481
396,204
558,924
735,727
758,517
698,942
251,173
301,802
212,948
120,140
-120,351
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
([b)
4,458
0
1,972 (1)
2,3880)
2,562 (1)
181,784
50,663
-238,428
289,319
34o,348
435,002
326,626
334,0_4
301,793
288,105
30q,480
41-,741
118,345
125,575
126,414
184,415
-84,073
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Table 3-29. Internal Loads -- Ultimate Versus Fail Safe -- B-9U Wing, Contd
Member
Skins
73-87-89-75
74-88-9O-76
87-99-101-89
88-100-102-90
99-109-111-101
100-110-112-102
75-89-91-77
110-120-122-112
89-101-103-91
101-111-113-103
102-112-114-104
65-75-77-67
112-122-124-114
77-91-93-79
78-92-94-80
91-103-105-93
92-104-106-94
103-113-115-10._
104-114-116-10_
Ultimate
(lb)
1,659(1)
2,029 (I)
1,481 (1)
2,095 (1)
1,148 (1)
1,017 (1)
1,347 (1)
24 (1)
1,257 (1)
1,091(1)
1,700 (1)
1,348 (1)
570(1)
i,260 (1)
2,32o (1)
1,154 (1)
2,071 (1)
1,897 (1)
917 (1)
Failed
Element
102-112
(lb)
1,oo8(1)
2,370 (1)
978 (1)
2__648(1)
533 (1)
I,248 (1)
1,457 (1)
I__t576 (1)
1,318 (1)
983 (1)
912 (1)
1,435 (1)
1,094 (1)
885 (1)
1,128 (1)
848 (1)
I, 009 (1)
I, 494 (1)
824 (1)
Member Loads
Failed
Element
104-114
(lb)
I, 518(1)
2,315 (1)
1,428 (1)
2,567 (1)
981(1)
494 (1)
559(1)
659 (I)
456 (1)
516 (1)
2,138 (1)
630 (1)
1,451 (1)
_,72o (1)
733 (1)
992 (1)
57 (1)
1,72_ (1)
317(1)
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &.
89-90-
102-101
(lb)
817(1)
2,416 (1)
679(1)
1,782 (1)
327 (1)
836 (1)
l_j543 (1)
(1)
1,371
1,237 (1)
1,093 (1)
2,165 (1)
l_!___ (1)
989 (1)
827 (1)
1,2 58(1)
623(1)
1,017 (1)
1,529 (1)
412 (1)
Failed
E lements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
0b)
1,546( 1)
2,171 (1)
1,503 (1)
1,987 (1)
924 (1)
1,100 (1)
392 (1)
368 (1)
651 (1)
460 (1)
294 (1)
460 (1)
965 (1)
I,570 (1)
751 (1)
1,438 (1)
1,690 (1)
1,822 (1)
3,174 (1)
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb)
1,159(1)
1,309 (1)
1,001 (1)
1,303 (1)
734 (1)
651 (1)
996 (1)
55(1)
914(1)
758 (1)
953 (1)
1,027 (1)
239 (1)
839 (1)
2, o8o(1)
701 (1)
1,731 (1)
1,217 (1)
977 (1)
218
Table 3-29. Internal Loads -- Ultimate Versus Fail Safe -- B-9U Wing, Contd
Member Member Loads
Fail-Safe
Skins
55-65-67-57
114-124-126-116
43-55-57-45
44-56-58-46
67-77-79-69
68-78-80-70
57 -67-69-59
58-68-70-60
59-69 Spar 5
60-70 Caps
59-70 ~ Diag
47-59 Spar 5
48-60 Caps
Ultimate
(lb)
1,393 (1)
755 (1)
1,995 (1)
2,775 (1)
1,003 (1)
2,059 (:)
1,135 (D
2,149 (1)
-263,923
260, !)17
181, _66
-207,6_3
223,745
Failed
Element
102-112
Ob)
1,390 (1)
675(1)
1,59o °)
1,499 (1)
690 (1)
1,001 (1)
758(1)
1,141 (1)
-203,747
186,214
12[), 609
-16,t, 768
150,512
Failed
Element
104-114
0b)
745 (1)
2,oz7(I)
1,432 (1)
2,852 (1)
1,731 (I)
1,068 (I)
1,738 (I)
1,433 (1)
-s5,067
25_, 68',)
167,789
-67,596
204, ] 46
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
(lb)
1,4S9(I)
497 (1)
1,666 (1)
(1)
1,5:}1
714 (1)
1,129 (1)
815
1,257 (1)
-199,860
184,229
125,253
-160,649
151,286
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
0b)
637 (1)
1,392 (1)
1,400 (1)
2,989 (1)
], 794 (1)
904 (1)
1,9os (1)
1,330 (1)
-85,133
191,049
-58,932
227,955
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb)
1,103 (1)
340 (1)
1,485 (1)
2,623 (1)
904 (1)
2,191 (1)
1,218 (1)
2,156 (1)
-2O3,68O
296,265
199,963
-131,085
240,001
Member Member Loads
99-116 } Truss
103-114 Diag
78-92-94-80 } Skin
92-104-106-94
Ultimate
(lb)
162,279( 1 )
232,114(1)
2,320( 1 )
2,071(1)
Failed
Element
100-110
(lb)
Not
Critical
Fail-Safe
Failed
E lement
106-116
(lb)
2,461( 1)
2,463( 1)
Failed
Element
101-112
0b)
246,200( 1 )
25%200(1)
Notes:
(1) Designated values are shear flows in pounds per inch.
(2) Underlined values are maximum fail safe load of all cases considered. 219
Table 3-30.
Member M.S.
6,1-74 -0.15
74-8n -0.21
8S-100 -0.24
10C-I 10 -0.24
110-120 -0.13
9_-102 -0.04
I0_-I IZ -0.01
4_-60 -0.07
60-70 -.0.13
71)-_0 -0.17
_0-94 -0.43
94-106 -0.52
106-1 ] 6 -0.53
116-125 -0.35
63-74
73-68
_7-100
111-122
113-12-t
59-70
69-_0
79-94
93-106
115-126
55-56-66-65
65-66-76-75
7 r_-76-90-89
89-90-102-101
77-7 a-,'32-91
91-92 - 104-103
74-8_-90-76
87-99-101-89
88-100-102-90
lO0-1 I 0-112-102
75-89-91-77
110-120-122-112
_9- ICH -109-91
102-I 12-114-104
6 5-75-77 -67
I1Z-122-124-114
_5-65-67-57
't4-56-5_-46
57-67-69-59
58-68-70-60
67-77-79-69
68- 7_-80-70
77-91-93-79
91-103-105-93
104-114-116-106
114-124-126-116
78-9;_ 94-80
92 -104-106-94
99-110
103-114
Weight
Margins of Safety for Baseline Structure, and Area Increases
for Fail-Safe Design, B-9U Delta Wing
Spar Caps
Added
Area
(in 2 )
0.51
I. 05
1.55
1.7_
0.92
0.31
0.30
0.13
0.33
0.90
1.98 I
3.1_ I
3. _3
Z. 62
Added
Weight
(Ib)
,5.10
10.67
1,5.74
1 _ _'_
6. ,t0
3.15
3.07
1. :t0
3.20
9.00
19. '_o
31. "_0
:1'_. 60
1".2_)
I
-0.34
-0.05
184.53
184.53 * 55.19 ' 16.8V,
Spar DiagonMs
.....Ad Added
|Are. a I A'eight
M.s_. 1 _°_""2112_)__
-0.31 0.29 3._6
-0.35 o.-t5 6.32
I
-0.37 _I. 55 I _.07
-0.07 0.04 0.53
-0. 14 t).09 1.06
-0.04 0.07 : 0. Sl
-o. 17 I 35 [ 1.09
-il.29 _b" " I S.70
-0.2fi O ,_ 7.05
-iLl7 I). :!l 2.22
0.70
0.13
10.60
10.68
1.80 [
I
55.19 [
= 534 Ib/boog_r.
Spar Webs
-- Med Tick Added
_s_ _ Weight
M.S. ich) | (Ib)
i
i
i
I
i
t
-O. O1 001 0.68
-0.09 o04 3.96
-0.11 005 i 3.95
-0.05 O. 003 ". 50
--0. Oa ,o03 1.98
-0.16 .007 4.81
i
16.88
Total Added weight for fail-safe = 2
Skins
Added
Thick- Added
ness Weight
M.S. (inch) 0b)
+0.40 0 0
+1.26 0 0
÷0.28 0 0
+1.72 0 0
+1.20 0 O
-0.14 .003 2.98
.1.57 0 0
_0.56 0 0
+1.20 0 0
-0.07 .001 0.76
_1.28 0 0
¢0.13 O 0
40.78 0 0
+0.57 0 0
40.89 0 0
*0.55 0 O
_0.97 0 0
÷1.36 0 0
*0.07 0 0
-0.37 .008 6.86
+0.38 0 0
+0.38 0 0
10.60
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3.4.5 B-16B FIVE-SPAR SWEPT WING FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. A five-spar wing
with all spar depths being nearly the same is normally considered to be a fail-safe
structure (i.e., with one spar failed, approximately four-fifths of the original ultimate
strength remains). For the B-16B wing, the calculated distribution of bending moment
to the various spars is shown on Page 142 for Wing Station 102.16 and on Page 145 for
Wing Station 604.07. Conservatively assuming that the most effective spar at Station
102.16, Spar 2, is completely failed, the percentage of load carried by the remaining
spars is 1.0000 -0.2375 = 0.7625, giving 0.7625 × 1.4 ultimate factor of safety _ 100 =
107% of design limit load. Therefore the wing is fail-safe for bending. A similar re-
lation exists for wing shear.
The five-spar B-16B wing is a four-cell torsional structure. With the skin failed on
one surfa,:e of any one cell, there are three complete cells remaining plus considerable
differential bending stiffness and strength because of the wide chord structural box.
Since three-fourths of design ultimate strength is greater than design limit, the effec-
tiveness of the five spars in differential bending will provide very adequate torsional
fail-safe stiffness and strength.
3.4.6 B-16B THREE-SPAR SWEPT WING FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. Integrally stiffened
skins are the predominant beam bending load carrying members of the three-spar
B-16B wing. If a singlb skin panel between any two spars is fractured on either sur-
face of this wing, the remaining structure is not inherently fail-safe by virtue of num-
ber of remaining parts. Accordingly, a crack propagation study was undertaken on
the critical lower (tension) surface to determine the critical skin crack sizes and to
evaluate the crack stopping properties of the integral skin stiffeners. A crack pro_a-
gating through skin and stringers is assumed.
The method of analysis employed was that presented by C. C. Poe, Jr., in Reference
11 and extended in Reference 12. In particular, Figure 9(b) of the latter reference is
replotted in Figure 3-41, and is the basis of the stress intensity factors calculated and
plotted on subsequent pages of this report.
The stress intensity correction factor plot presented in Figure 3-41 of this report and
Figure 9(b) of Reference 12 are based on a stiffness ratio D of O. 22 (Reference 12, Page 5).
This ratio for the B-16B three-spar, lower surface skin is 0.42 as shown in Table
3-31; therefore, the data of Figure 2 of Reference 12 can conservatively be applied to
the analysis of the wing lower surface.
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Figure 3-41. Relationship Between Stress Intensity Factor and Crack
Length for Panels with Integral Stringers {from Ref. 12)
Table 3-31. Percent Stiffening and Gross Tension
Stresses in B-16B Wing Lower Surface
Span
Station
259
379
506
664
776
Skin
Area
0.1357
0.1231
0.1050
0.0689
0.0575
Stringer
Area
0.0975
0.0889
0.0745
O.O505
O,O423
Percent
St_fening(I)
41.8
41.8
41.5
42.4
42.4
Gross
Stress (2)
50400
41500
30200
13000
0
I00
(1) Percent stiffening = Skin Area
1+
Stringer Area
(2) Gross Stress obtained by dividing ultimate stress from Table 3-15
by 1.4 to obtain limit stress.
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Applied stress intensities at limit load for two wing stations of the B-16B wing lower
surface are calculated as a function of skin crack length andplotted in Figure 3-41,
where:
Kapplied = C _a(_applied)
C = stress intensity c,Jrrection factor from Figure 3-41.
_applied = applied limit gross area stress (see Table 3-15).
a = half crack length in skin
The allowable stress intensity factor (Kc), conservatively taken to be twice Kic
(Reference 3, Figure 13), is also plotted.
Figure 3-41 shows that the B-16B three-spar wing lower cover has critical skin crack
lengths varying from 7.2 inches at Station 259 to 8.0 inches at Station 379, and that
the stringers have marginal or no crack arrest capability. In addition, the lower ten-
sion skin is covered with a permanently attached TPS panel (see Figure 2-17), pre-
venting inspection. From these facts, it is concluded that the B-16B three spar wing
is not fail-safe.
3.4.7 VERTICAL TAIL FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. At Section (_) - (_ (Figure 3-5),
the plate-stringer configuration is as shown below.
0.157----_
i
I
0.080
)'
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100
5O
--- 2.18 _"
ONSET OF RAPID
FRACTU RE AT
LIMIT LOAD
KC = 156 KSI_/T_
KAPPLIE D AT LIMIT LOAD
I
STA 259
STA 379
CRACK ARREST
0 1 2 3
HALF CRACK LENGTH, a (inches)
Figure 3-42. B-16B Three-Spar Wing Lower Surface Stress
IntensityFactor Versus Cr .;k Length
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The material is annealedtitanium alloy Ti-6A1-4V, having anultimate tensile strength
of 130 ksi. As in previous examples, Kc will be taken as 2 KIe, or 156 ksi \finch.
Using Poe's method (Reference12)
Percent stiffening - 100 100
Ask 1 + 2.00(0.080)
1 +-- I.27 (0.157)
A
str
= 55.5
Stress intensity factor K = C (_ \,rr_a
Values cf K are calculated by the substitution in this expression of values of the
stress intensity correction factor C from Figure 3-41, and the design limit stress
level of 34 ksi from Table 3-22. The resulting values of K are plotted versus
crack length in Figure 3-42, which shows that over the range of crack lengths
considered (up to eight inches), K for the integrally stiffened panel does not approach
the critical stress intensity level of 156 ksi flinch.
One conclusion to be drawn is that the vertical tail box possesses a high degree of
fail-safe capability, even though of monolithic construction. The principal reason _s
that the stiffened covers of the box are designed for compression, which results in
low tensile stresses.
3.4.8 THRUST STRUCTURE FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. Fail-safe strength of the thrust
structure was evaluated analytically with the aid of a finite element computer program.
The idealized structural model used for the fail-safe analysis is the same as that de-
scribed in Figures 3-6 through 3-11. Two major tension members of the model were
analytically '_ailed, " one at a time, and limit design loads were applied to the weak-
ened structure. Five members required some beef-up because of the redistribution
of loads. Total added weight was 76 pounds or 0.34% of the total weight of 22,373
pounds.
Loading conditions considered were: one hour ground sidewinds; maximum alpha g
headwinds and 3g maximum thrust.
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Figure 3-43. Vertical Box Stress Intensity Factor Versus Crack Length
Two major tension members were '_atled, " one at a time. The members were truss
elements from one of the four thrust beams (Figure 3-6) and were selected, first, be-
cause they were tension members, and second, because they carried very large loads
in the unfailed configuration. Engineering judgment indicated that these were the crit-
ical members to be considered in fail-safe analysis.
Results of the fail-safe analysis are listed in Table 3-32. Note that, although the anal-
ysis was run for a 360-degree model with a single failed member, the results listed
refer to the 45-degree model shown in Figure 3-12. The results are, therefore, max-
ima for the entire structure. Table 3-32 shows that one element (eight on the con,-
plete structure) of the aft thrust bulkhead and four elements of the forward thrust
bulkhead have negative margins of safety if fail-safe loading is assumed equal to
design limit loading. Four elements are truss members; one is a web stiffener.
Margins of safety vary from a low of -4% on the aft bulkhead to a -37% on 'he forward
bulkhead. It is doubtful that any rational fail-safe criterion could eliminate beef-up
of the forward bulkhead with the existing geometric configuration. A slightly different
geometry might be less critical for fail-safe loading.
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3.5 FATIGUE AND SAFE-LIFE USING ALTERNATIVE MATERIALS
The effects on fatigue life and crack growth safe-life of the use of alternative materials
in certain of the selected components are investigated below.
3.5.1 ANALYSIS OF B-9U DELTA WING BOX USING 2219-T87 ALUMINUM ALLOY.
Aluminum alloy 2219 is a material that could be used in the structural box of the wing.
It is assumed that the heating period is so short and the aluminum substructure is of
sufficient mass (i. e., heat sink design) that the temperatures essentially remain at
70°F as assumed in the titanium substructure wing design.
For the B-9U wing, the condition producing maximum tension in lower surface is W-I,
which is the maximum _ q (headwind) condition in the ascent phase.
This is a room temperature condition, and for Ti-6-4,
F = 134 ksi
tu
Using a hole-out factor of i. 05,
Maximum Crlimi t -
134
1.05(1.4)
- 91.2 ksi
This value was used in the titanium wing box damage analysis.
alloy is substituted for titanium,
If 2219-T87 aluminum
F = 64 ksi
tu
and
Maximum alimit -
64
1.05(1.4)
- 43.5 ksi
Table 3-34 presents the fatigue analysis of the aluminum substructure. The aluminum
wing substructure has a calculated safe fatigue life of 44 flights versus 175 flights for
the titanium wing substructure (see Table 3-21).
Figure 3-44 presents the results of a crack growth analysis of the aluminum wing sub-
structure compared to the titanium wing substructure. It can be seen that the alumi-
num has a large calculated safe-life versus 31 flights (see Page 190) for the titanium
when an initial 0.10 inch corner crack is assumed.
The differences in the calculated fatigue and crack growth safe-life can be attributed
to the different material fatigue and crack growth characteristics.
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Mission
Phase
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
A scent
Ascent
Ascent
Ascent
Table 3-33. B-9U Wing Box Fatigue Analysis -- 2219 Aluminum Alloy
T alimit lamean aalt °alt
(° F) (ksi) alimit 61imit (ksi) Kt
0 .015
0 .025
0 .035
0 .045
0 . O55
• 15 .035
• 15 .05
• 15 • 065
• 15 • 08
• 15 .09
0 .055
0 .09
0 .125
0 .155
o .185
.40 .08
•-tO .145
.40 .21
.40 .27
• 40 .33
• t0 .105
• lO .185
• l0 .30
. 10 •45
.10 .605
• 15 .135
• 15 .20
• 15 ,37
• 15 • 61
• 15 .80
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
liT 43.5
liT 43.5
RT 43• 5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
liT 43.5
RT 43.5
liT 43.5
RT 13.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43.5
RT 43, 5
RT 43.5
amean
(ksi)
0
0
0
0
(}
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
0
0
0
0
0
17.4
17•4
17.4
17.4
17.4
4.4
4•4
4.4
4•4
4.4
6.5
6.5
6.5
6,5
6.5
.7 3.0
l•l 3.0
1.5 3.0
2.0 3.0
2.4 3.0
1.5 i 3.0
t
2.2 3.O
'2.8 3,0
,'1.5 t 3.0
i
',1.9 ! 3.0
l
2.4 3.0
3.9 ! 3.0
i
!
5.4 [ 3.0
6.7 3• 0
8.0 3.0
I
!
3.5 3.0i
i
6.3 I 3.0
9. 1 3.0
11.7 3.0
14.4 i 3.0
I
4.6 3.11
8.0 3.0
J
1 ;I. 1 3.0
19.6 3.0
26.3 3.0
5.9 3.0
8.7 3.0
I
16.1 '3.0
i
26.5 ] 3. 0
T
34.8 i 3.0
N
(Cycles)
n
(Cycles)
oO
oO
ao
oO
ao
¢o
oo
o¢)
90,050
9,000
900
90
9
90,000
9,000
900
90
9
90,900
n/N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
oO
oo
i
9,000 0
900 0
9O 0
9 0
oO
I
oO
5.6, 106
6.6 _ 104
2.8 * 104
cO
107
1.1 _ 105
1•6 _ 104
4.3 _ 103
2.4 _ 106
4
3.4_ 10
! 3,7y 10 3
9.3 _ 10 2
90.000
9,000
900
90
9
90,000
9,000
900
90
9
90,000
0
0
,00016
.00137
•00032
0
.00090
.00818
.00562
.00209
9,000 .00375
900 .02650
90 .02433
9 •00968
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Table 3-33. B-9U Wing Box Fatigue Analysis -- 2219 Aluminum Alloy, Contd
Mission T alimit trmean Salt amean trait K N
Phase (0 F) (ksi) alimit alimit (ksi) (ksi) t (Cycles)
Entry 350 43.5 .075 .075 3.3 3.3 3.0
Entry 350 43.5 .135 .135 5.9 5.9 3.0 ¢_
Entry 350 43.5 .185 .185 8.0 8.0 3.0 3.5 _ 106
5
Entry 350 43.5 .23 .23 10.0 10.0 3.0 2.5 - l0
Entry !350 43.5 .37 .37 16.1 16.1 3.0 2.0 _ l04
I 3
Entry 1350 43.5 .47 .47 20.4 20.4 3.0 6.4 . l0
3
Entry 1350 43.5 .50 .50 21.8 21.8 3.0 4.7 . l0
5
Cruise/Landg R'F 43.5 .20 .21 8.7 9.1 3.0 6.3 _ l o
5
Cruise/Landg FiT 43.5 .20 .26 8.7 11.3 3.0 1.4 l,m
,t
Cruise/Landg RT 43.5 .20 .32 8.7 13.9 3.0 5.7 . 10
4
Cruise/Landg RT 43,5 .20 ,38 8.7 16.5 3.0 2.6 > 10
4
Cruise/Landg RT 43.5 .20 .44 8.7 19.1 3.0 1.4 _ 10
Taxi RT 43.5 -. 021 .040 -. 9 1.7 3.0
Taxi RT 43.5 -. 021 .060 -. 9 2.6 3.0 _
Taxi RT 43.5 -.021 .080 -.9 3.5 3.0 _o
Taxi RT 43.5 -. 021 .095 -. 9 4. 1 3.0
Taxi RT 43.5 -.021 .110 -.9 4.8 3.0 _o
GAG RT 43.5 11.1 16.8 3.0 2.0 _ 104
|_
(Cycles)
90,000
9,000
5OO
250
]
100
1
180,000
18,000
1,800
n/N
0
0
• 00014
.00100
.00750
.O1562
.OO021
.28590
.12_60
.03159
180
18
180,000
18,000
1,800
180
18
200
.00692
.00127
0
0
0
0
0
.0100
I
I
SUlTL mar_
Phase n/N
Ascent .0829
Entry .0245
Cruise/Landg .4543
Taxi 0
GAG .0100
E(n/N) .5717
100
Safe Life = -- = 44 Missions
.5717(4)
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Figure :_-44. Comparison of Crack Growth in Aluminum
and Titanium Wing Span Caps
3.5.2 ANALYSIS OF THRUST STRUCTURE USING 2219-T87 ALUMINUM ALLOY.
Aluminum alloy 2219 is a material that could be used in the thrust structure because
the base heat shield prevents heating of the thrust structure during the ascent flight
phase when the main rocket engines are operating.
For the titanium thrust structure, a maximum limit stress (alimit) = Ftu/ultimate
factor of safety : 130/1.4 = 92.9 ksi was used. If 2219-T87 aluminum is substituted
for titanium:
F -= 64.0 k,_i
tu
(_limit = 64.0/1.4 -- 45.7 ksi
Table 3-34 presents a fatigue analysis of an aluminum thrust structure for comparison
with that of the titanium thrust structure presented in Table 3-24. The aluminum
thrust structure has a calculated safe fatigue life of 824 flights versus 887 flights for
the titanium thrust structure.
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Figure 3-45 presents the result of a crack growth analysis of the aluminum thrust
structure compared to the titanium thrust structure. It can be seen that the aluminum
thrust structure has a calculated crack growth safe-life greater than 3,000 flight
versus 1,555 flights for the titanium thrust structure for an assumed initial flaw
of a 0.10 inch corner crack.
The difference in the calculated fatigue and crack growth safe-life can be attributed to
the different material fatigue and crack growth characteristics. Figure 3-46 compares
the crack growth rates of the two materials. The AKma x with the initial flaw
size at the maximum stress levels in the aluminum and titanium thrust structures
are shown. It can be seen that the average flaw growth rate between the initial
AKma x and KIC is generally higher for titanium which leads to the more rapid
crack growth shown in Figures 3-44 and 3-45.
0.4 r--
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N 0.
0°
ASSU ME D INITIA I,
a i 0. 100 INCIIES
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TIIRUST BEAM CAPJ
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Fl-mre 3-45. Comparison of Crack Grouth in Titanium and Aluminum
Thrust Beam Caps (Flaw Configuration - Corner Crack)
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SECTION4
DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE-LIFE BOOSTER
The results of the fatigue, s_ffe-life, and fail-safe analyses in Section 3 are summarized
in Section 6, which shows that (1) all studied baseline booster components have adequate
fatigue life from the standpoint of crack initiation of flawless material, and (2) all
components but the wing box possess safe-life capability of 100 missions or more when
initial flaws of the asswned type and size are present (reference Section 3.3). The
wing box is shown to lack this capability in all three configurations (B-9U delta and the
three-spar and five-spar B-16B swept wings) when the initial flaw is taken to be a
critically located crack of 0.10-inch length originating at a 0.25 inch diameter fastener
hole. This initial flaw size is considered to be the largest that is likely to escape
detection in manufacturing inspection, given the present state-of-the-art capabilities
of the available NDE processes.
The measures that can be taken to provide the required safe-life generally involve one
or more of the following:
a. Reducing the working stress level to a point where cyclic and sustained load
propagation of a flaw will not cause it to reach critical size in the required service
life.
b. Reducing the inspection interval to less than the number of flights in which the
flaw will reach critical size. This method requires a maximum allowable flaw
size sufficiently large to b(, detectable by methods of inspection to be used in in-
service NDE, and also requires that all critical structural areas be accessible
for such inspection.
c. Changing the material in critical areas to one having superior flaw growth character-
istics.
In the following paragraphs the recommended means of enhancing the safe-life capa-
bility of the wing box and other critical safe-life components are described. Tables
4-1 and 4-2 summarize details of these changes while their impact on weight and
performance is discussed in Section 6.1.
Where n,_ changes are given, the baseline configuration and develcpment plans are
conside red adequate.
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4.1 DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES
Since the material and stress levels are assumed to be identical in both the B-9U delta
wing and the B-16B swept wing boosters, the same changes are considered applicable
to both.
The achievement of the required safe-life (i. e., 100 flights) solely by reducing the
operating stress in the lower wing surface necessitates a 50-percent reduction in
stress, as indicated by Figure 3-33. This effectively doubles the weight of the wing
lower surface bending material, and results in a weight increase of approximately
3400 pounds in the B-9U wing and 2300 pounds in the three-spar B-16B wing. To
reduce this weight increase to a more acceptable level, it is recommended that the
stress level be reduced by 30 percent rather than 50 percent, which imposes a limit-
ation of 25 flights between inspections of the wing lower spar caps (see Figure 3-33).
The resulting weight increase is 1030 pounds to the B-9Uwing and 1151 pounds to the B-16B wing.
4.2 EFFECTS OF SAFE-LIFE APPROACH ON DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Previous paragraphs describe the changes required to achieve full safe-life capability
in the B-9U and B-16B boosters as (1) reduction in wing lower surface working stresses
of 30 percent by a similar increase in lower surface bending material, and (2) inspection
of the wing lower surface for cracks every 25 flights. Also, additional structural
development and qualification tests are required to verify the predictions of safe-life
and demonstrate the adequacy of the inspection plan. The effect of these changes on
structural test plans, quality control, and maintenance plans and costs is discussed
below.
4.2.1 STRUCTURAL TEST PLANS
4._. I.1 Additional Element Tests. Cycling tests for 240 wing and 60 thrust structure
element specimens will be conducted in a fixture incorporating four loading frames.
Each frame will be capable of loading three specimens simultaneously in tandem
arrangement. Each frame will contain a servo-controlled hydraulic cylinder and a
two-bridge load cellfor load feedback and monitoring. Loads will be programmed to
the desired spectrum by a General Automation SPC-12 digitalcomputer, using the
basic command signal from an oscillator generating a sine wave function. This pro-
grarnmer can intersperse up to 20 different load levels for up to 8 control channels,
while varying frequency with load level for optimum cycling speed. Loads willbe
monitored on a cathode ray tube bar graph display. Periodic inspections will be
conducted to observe flaw growth.
Specimens will be designed to represent 20 wing locations and 5 thrust structure
locations. Two initial flaw sizes will be selected for each of two types of flaws, and
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three specimens will be tested for each data point. Wing specimens will be run to
failure or 200 simulated flights (assuming 2000 load cycles per flight), whichever
comes first. Thrust structure specimens will be run to failure or 400 simulated
flights (assuming one load cycle per flight with a 3-minute-dwell at load), whichever
comes first. Load spectrums will be applied to approximate a flight-by-flight loading
profile for the respective structural areas. All testing will be at room temperature.
4.2.1.2 Additional Tests On Three-Spar Wing Box. Safe-life tests will utihze the
baseline test setup and equipment, for application of 100 simulated flights, assuming
240 load cycles per flight. Aerodynamic heating will be simulated by programming
surface temperatures to a flight profile. Initial flaws will be introduced by cuts with
a jeweler's saw, and precracking induced by cycling (without heating) for approximately
500 load cycles. Loads will be programmed by a digital computer-programmer and
electro-hydraulic servo system; temperatures will be programmed by an analog com-
puter-programmer with drum type function generator. Heating will be accomplished
using quartz infra-red tubular lamps with radiant reflectors mounted over the box
surfaces, powered by ignitron voltage controllers. NDE will be accomplished at
intervals of 25 flights to monitor flaw growth and verify the NDE methods.
4.2.1.3 Additional Tests On Fatigue Wing. Safe-life testing on the fatigue qualification
wing test article will be conducted at the Convair Aerospace Fort Worth operation.
Tests will utilize the baseline setup, and the same general plan as described above for
the wing box specimen will apply.
4.2.1.4 Additional Tests On Fatigue Thrust Structure. The fatigue qualification
thrust structure, which is a part of a full-body structure in the baseline plan, will be
tested at NASA-MSFC. Tests will utilize baseline equipment, and the same general
plan as described above will apply, except that 300 simulated flights of one 3-minute
cycle each will be assumed, with no temperature profile. Inspections will be conducted
at 75-flight intervals.
4.2.1.5 Test Costs. Safe-life test costs are given in Table 4-3.
4.2.2 QUALITY CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE PLANS. The development of a
safe-lifedesign for the structure of the selected components requires a maintenance
approach thatprovides for determination of changes in structural integrity. This
requirement places emphasis on time consuming inspection and NDE methods to trace
known dt;fectsand identifythe intensityof new defects (crack size and location).
In the development of the baseline values in Section 2.9, all routine and phased
maintenance requirements were established without detailed structural data. Also
reflected in Table 2-12 was a constant factor of 56 percent applied to the scheduled
maintenance to establish the unscheduled maintenance values. The safe-life concept
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Table 4-3. Costs for Safe-Life Tests
ELEMENTS TESTS - SPECTRUM FATIGUE (CONTRACTOR)
20 Wing Configurations × 12 Specimens = 240
5 Thrust Structures × 12 Specimens = 60
Total 300
Tas ks
Specimen Design
25 Configurations @ 20 hr
Specim en Material
Assume 8 _2 × 20 in. bar/specimen
Titanium (_ 0.16 lb/in 3 = 5 lb/specimen
(5 lb/specimen)(300 specimens) ($12/lb)
Specimen Fabrication 300 (_ 20 hr
Attacn Fixture Design
25 Configurations (_ 8 hr
Load Setup Design 1 man 4 weeks
Assume 4 Load Frames, Hydraulic Servo
With Sine Wave Oscillator Type Programmer
Fixture Material
5000 lb steel @ 0.15
Bolts/nuts, weld rod
Load Setup Material
Assume erector beams on hand
Assume hydraulic cylinders on hand
Servo valves 4 @ 600
Load cells 4 @ 500
Hydraulic fittings, tube
Load Setup Fabrication
Shop 4 men 3 weeks
Eng 2 men 3 weeks
Drill Specimens 300 @ 4 hr
Flaw Preparation 300 @ 1 hr
Setup 300 Specimens @ 1 hr
Engrg Shop Matl
M-H M-H $
5OO
600O
200
160
480
240
1200
300
300
18,000
750
200
2,400
2,000
250
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Table 4-3• Costs for Safe-Life Tests, Contd
B•
Tas ks
Test-Wing. Assume 3 3 cps
(240 spec) (200 flts/spec) (2000 cyc/flt)
(3 hr ) := 9600hr
• 3 _60 ×60cyc
Assume 3 specimens in tandem, 4 setups,
9 specimens in test simultaneously average
9600 hr
Full time attendance: 9
Test - Thrust Structure
(60 spec) (400 flts/spec)
3 min_ hr
,200hr-Wr]
1200
9
Inspections 300 specimens @ 1 hr
Equipment Down Time
1070 _ 133
25% run 4
Test Report 1 man 4 weeks; photos 30 (_ 15
Tear Down
Design, Stress Support
Scheduling 1070 , 133 + 300 _ 300 = 1803 hr
1803
- 11 mo. 2men_2mo
167
Project office, supervision 10%
Totals
3-SPAR WING BOX (CC TRACTOR) 4 cpm =
240 cph
Flaw Preparation, Setup 1 wk
3 eng
2 shop
Pre-eraek (500 eye) _ eye = 2 hr
Engrg Shop Matl
M-H M-I-I $
1070 100
133 20
300
300 100
160
668
433
120
4764 8020
120
80
4
45O
$24,050
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Table 4-3. Costs for Safe-Life Tests, Contd
Engrg Shop Matl
Tasks M-H M-H $
C*
240 cyc hr
Test (100 flts)( _]_ ) (_Ocy-c)
Heat Up and Cool Down 1 hr/flt
Equipment Down Time 50% Run
= 100 hr
= 100 hr
= 50
Total 250
Materials: Quartz Lamps 25 in. 50 @ 12
CO 2 0.1 ton/flt ×100 = 10 tons @ 100
Inspections 4 (_ 8 hr = 32 hr
Test Report 4 photos @ 15
Design/Stress
300 hr
- 2 mo 3 men 1/2 time for 2 mo167
Project office, Supervision 10%
Totals
FATIGUE WING (CONTRACTOR) 4 cpm =
240 cph
Flaw Preparation 1 wk
4 eng 1 shift
4 shop 1 shift
Pre-Crack 500 cyc 2 hr
Test (Same as Wing Box) = 250 hr
Materials: Quartz Lamps 300 (_ 12
CO 2 0.5 ton/flt × 100 = 50 tons at 100
Inspections 4 @ 24 hr = 100 hr
Reliability Control Support; X-ray/Ultrasonic
Test Report: Photos 20 @ 15
Design/Stress Support
650
= 4 mo 6 men 1/2 time167
Project Office, Supervision 10%
Totals
75O
96
40
500
150
1662
160
8
1000
400
100
120
1000
280
3068
5OO
64
648
160
8
1000
400
1568
600
1,000
6O
$ 1,660
3,600
5,000
2O0
300
$ 9,100
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Table 4-3. Costs for Safe-Life Tests, Contd
Engrg Shop Marl
Tasks M-H M-H $
D. FATIGUE THRUST STRUCTURE (NASA MSFC)
Flaw Preparation 1 wk
6 eng 240
10 shop
Pre-Crack 2 hr 12] \hr
Run Time (300 flts) (3 min/flt) [60min}
] _ hr + 25 downtime _0 hr 240
Materials: Oil, Fittings, Bolts, etc.
Inspections 4 @ 24 hr = 100 hr 600
Heliability Control X-Ray, etc. 100
Test Report: 20 photos @ 15 120
Design/Stress 6 men 1 mo 1000
Project Office, Supervision 10% 230
General Dynamics Totals 2542
NASA Support
10006 eng 1 mo10 shop
E. Summary
Assume following rates for both General
Dynamics and NASA:
Engineering: $20/hr
Shop: $15/hr
Engineering Shop
Element Tests
3-Spar Wing Box
Fatigue Wing
Thrust Structure (GD)
GD Total
Thrust Structure (NASA)
NASA Total
400
20
400
1000
1820
1700
Materials
$ 95,280 $120,300 $24,050
33,240 9, 720 1, 600
61,360 23,520 9,100
50,840 27,300 1,500
240,720 180, 840 36,310
20, 000 25,500 0
20,000 25,500 0
1,000
200
300
$ i, 500
Total
$239,630
44,620
93,980
79, 640
457,870
45,500
45,500
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provides for structure that isnot designed for easy repairability,and inspection
results thatindicate out-of tolerance defects will lead to replacement rather than
repair. With this concept the ratio of scheduled maintenance (inspection)to unscheduled
maintenance (repair) will be higher. For the safe-lifeconcept a value of 25 percent of
scheduled maintenance is a more viable apportionment than the 50 percent used for the
baseline concept.
For the establishment of maintenance values for the safe-life design, the structural
data developed by this study and the application of the 25 percent constant to determine
unscheduled maintenance was used. The results of this evaluation is shown in Table
4-4.
Table 4-4. Maintenance Manhours/Turnaround Safe-Life Concept
Scheduled
Routine Phased Unscheduled Total
LO 2 Tank 3 7-1/2 2-1/2 13
LH2 Tank 3 7-1/2 2-1/2 13
Wing Box 3 10 3-1/2 16-1/2
Vertical Tail 1 6 2 9
Thrust Structure 2 6 2 10
Aft Orbiter 1 4 1-1/2 6-1/2
68
4.2.3 COS____T_SS.Consistent with the objectives of the economic analysis task, program
cost differences between the baseline design and a design based on safe-life criteria
were calculated. These cost differences were expressed as total booster program
cost increments (deltas) from the baseline B-gu delta-wing configuration. This base-
line configuration for costing was as documented in the Space Shuttle Phase B Final
Report (Reference 15). Delta costs were calculated for two cases: a safe-life design
of the B-9U delta wing booster, and a safe-life design of the B-16B swept-wing booster.
The methodology employed in the analysis involved the calculation of cost differences
in three distinct categories: direct costs, cascaded costs, and growth costs.
The direct cost differences are those program costs that are attributable to the
specific subsystem hardware element being analyzed, such as the thrust structure,
wing, etc. _,Veight and complexity changes from the baseline design result in differ-
ences to the respective subsystem 's engineering design and development (EDD),
248
ground test hardware, flight test hardware, flight vehicle production, test article
conversion, and operational spares costs. Tooling cost differences, which normally
contribute to the direct cost differences, were felt to be negligible for thes analysis
because of the relatively small weight changes encountered and the absence of any
significant shape or surface area differences in the components. The basic method-
ology used in determining these changes in EDD and hardware costs was to locate the
detailed estimate of the corresponding B-9U element (wing, thrust structure, etc. ) on a
logarithmic plot of cost versus weight and pass a parametric scaling line through the
point. The slope utilized for unit manufacturing cost scaling was 0. 667, which was con-
sistent with that used in the parametric cost model. Similar plots of component EDD
costs were made with 0.187 slopes. No complexity factor changes were made in these plots.
The cascaded cost differences are those program costs that are not attributable to any
specific subsystem or hardware component, but are a function of the complete booster
program task. Elements included in the cascaded costs were vehicle installation, as-
sembly, and checkout (IA&C/O); subsystem development testing (major ground test
program); system engineering and integration; and booster program management. In
our analysis the IA&C/O cost differences were assumed to be negligible because the
major effort in this program cost element is related to tasks involving vehicle sub-
systems rather than the major structural elements of concent in this study. The sub-
system development testing cost differences were generated as detailed estimates of
unique safe-life and fail-safe testing requirements and included estimates of specific
material, engineering labor, and shop labor requirements. For details of this
analysis, see Sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.3. System engineering and integration costs were
calculated as a percentage of the booster engineering design and development effort in
the baseline cost model. This same percentage (15.5 perce"t) was applied to the
summation of direct EDD delta costs calculated for each subsystem component (wing,
thrust structure, aft orbiter attach frame) to obtain the cascaded SE &I delta costs.
Booster program management is similar to SE&I in that a percentage of booster EDD
costs was taken. This percentage (3.5 percent) was similarly applied to the summation
of direct EDD delta costs
The vehicle growth cost differences are those program costs that occur because of the
spiraling effect of increased weight in a subsystem or group of subsystems. An
example of this spiraling phenomena occurs when some incremental weight introduced
into the wing causes greater load to be exerted in the thrust section, thus re-
quiring a beefed-up structure, which in turn requires more attitude control system
capability and more propellant tankage, etc., etc. The vehicle growth costs account
for this phenomenon and they are applied in the form of a program cost penalty per
pound of direct weight increase. For this study effort vehicle growth cost penalties
applicable to the nonrecurring, recurring production, and recurring operations pro-
gram phases were utilized. The values for these growth cost penalties were developed
from a series of cost model runs on a set of vehicle configurations that had been resized
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with varying amounts of contingency weight. The plotted results of these cost model
runs gave us the isolated program delta costs corresponding to the weight spiraling
effect of a one pound increase in structure weight. The resulting actual values that
were used to generate the vehicle growth cost differences reported in this study were:
a. Nonrecurring program (development phase)cost =
b. Recurring production (procurement phase*) cost =
c. Recurring operations program cost =
Structure Wt Increase
($/lb)
725
49
101
These cost penalties were applied to the totalstructural weight increase due to the
safe-lifedesign concept. In addition to the hardware-associated operations costs
(spares and repair parts), vehicle turnaround labor requirements were analyzed
independently by Convair Aerospace operations personnel. Based on the results of
this analysis, no cost penalties were applied to the safe-lifedesign concept. The
details of this analysis appear in Reference 16.
The following list of ground rules and assumptions apply to the cost developed in this
analysis:
a. All cost deltas represent increases from the baseline B-9U configuration program
costs of Reference 15.
b. The following weight penalties were used for costing:
B-9U B-16B
Safe-Life (Ib) Safe-Life (Ib)
Wing +1030 +1151
Thrust Structure +0 +0
Orbiter Support Frame +0 +0
*Represents only about 1.5 equivalent vehicles due to conversion of flighttest articles
to operational inventory.
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Co The following equations were used to evaluate theoretical first unit (TFU) and
engineering design and development (EDD) delta costs due to safe-life weight
increases :
Wing
Thrust Structure
Orbiter Support Frame (LH 2 Tank)
TFU
0.02036 (wt) 0"667
0. 02687 (wt) 0" 667
0. 00916 (wt) 0' 667
EDD
5. 06851 (wt) 0" 187
4. 52167 (wt) 0" 187
2. 79049 (wt) 0. 187
d. The following hardware quantities (equivalent units) were assumed for calculating
direct cost differences due to TFU changes:
Test
Test Production Article
Hardware Articles Conversion Spares
Wing 3.5
Thrust Structure 6.21
Orbiter Support Frame (LH 2 Tank) 6.01
2 0 0.2
1 0.3 0.01
1 0.3 0. 005
e,
f,
g.
h.
An inventory of four operational booster vehicles is assumed to perform 444
operational flight missions over 10 years. The first manned orbital flight is
assumed to be in the development program.
No main rocket engine costs are included.
No prime contractor's fee is included.
All costs assume constant 1970 dollars.
Table 4-5 shows the booster program cost penalties that were determined for the safe-
life design concepts of a delta wing (B-9U) booster and a swept wing (B-16B) booster.
Also shown are the delta costs attributable to direct, cascading, and vehicle growth
cost effects. In the case of the direct weight cost deltas, individual penalties trace-
able to the wing, thrust structure, and orbiter aft support structure are shown.
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Table 4-5. Booster Program Cost Penalties, Safe-Life Design
Direct Cascading Weight
Weight Program Spiraling Total
Vehicle Cost A Cost A Cost A Cost A
Configuration ($M) ($M) ($M) ($M)
B-9U Booster +I. 799 +0. 525 (1) +0. 901 +3. 225
Wing +I. 799 -- --
Thrust Structure 0 -- --
Orbiter Support Structure 0 -- --
B-16B Booster +I. 979 +0. 527 (1) +I. 006
Wing +i.979 -- --
Thrust Structure 0 -- --
Orbiter Support Structure 0 -- --
+3.512
(1) Unique safe-life development program testing effort represents $0. 505M of this
item. (Reference Section 4.3.1.)
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SECTION 5
DEVELOPMENT OF FAIL-SAFE BOOSTER
In Section 3.4, the fail-safe capabilities of the selected booster components were in-
vestigated, with a summary of the results of this analysis shown in Tables 5-1 and
5-2 (and in Section 6). The analysis indicates that only the LO2 and LH 2 tanks do not
lend themselves to a fail-safe design philosophy. One component, the vertical tail,
is inherently highly fail-safe in its baseline configuration by virtue of the extremely
large crack length that may be sustained before the stress intensity factor reaches
its critical value (reference Section 3.4.7). The five-spar B-16B swept wing is
shown to be fail-safe (Section 3.4.5) because of the multiplicity of bending, shear,
and torsional elements. The remaining components (the B-9U delta wing, thrust struc-
ture, and aft orbiter support frame) require various types and amounts of reinforce-
ment to achieve fail-safe capability. These changes arc described in subsequent para-
graphs. As a matter of intere st, the fall-safe characteristics of the three-spar B-16B
swept wing were investigated in Section 3.4.6. This configuration was, not unexpect-
edly, found deficient in the crack arrest capability of the integrally stiffened skin. No
remedial measures were determined, since the three-spar configuration was included
in the study primarily as a safe-life design, the five-spar arrangement being the fail-
safe configuration.
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES
The degree to which the baseline B-9U delta wing approaches a fall-safe design was
determined in Section 3.4.4, which also shows the increase in section size required
in certain members to achieve full fail-safe capability. Section 3.4.8 similarly shows
the required increases in members of the _hrust structure.
The baseline aft orbiter support frame does not possess fail-safe capability, because
of its monolithic construction. An alternative fall-safe design concept was developed,
and is presented in Figure 5-1(b). The alternative design consists of multi-element
caps and dual shear webs, and retains the welded attachment to the tank wall for seal-
ing against hydrogen leakage. With the failure of a single web or cap element, the
remaining elements are sized to carry limit design load. An advanced composite
(unidirectional graphite/epoxy) reinforcement is used at the inner flange of the frame.
When tension stresses design the flange elements, a 0.75 rivet factor is used to
account for the fasteners used to assemble the elements. Revised frame flange and
web sizes are presented in Table 5-3, which shows the weight increase for the fall-
safe frame design to be 720 pounds.
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(a) Baseline Design Concept (Monolithic/Safe-Life)
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L
,STRINGER
TANK WALL °/
(b) Alternate Fail-Safe Design Concept
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,,__,,, _. ..... _ STRINGER
TANK WALL J
Figure 5-1. Aft Orbiter Support Frame Design Concepts
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5.2 EFFECTS OF FAIL-SAFE APPROACH ON DEVELOPMENT PLANS
In the foregoing paragraphs, the structural changes necessary to accomplish a fall-
safe design in each of the studied components are described. The resulting modifica-
tions to the baseline structural test plans, quality control and maintenance plans, and
the overall effects on booster program costs due to application of the fall-safe philos-
ophy are outlined below.
5.2.1 STRUCTURAL TEST PLANS
5.2.2.1 Additional Wing Tests. The fatigue qualification wing test article will be
used after fatigue tests are completed. Tests will be conducted by the contractor.
Static limit load tests at room temperature will be performed 30 times, each with a
different pre-<lamaged location. Approximately 20 locations will be in spar caps,
5 in spar truss diagonals, and 5 in spar webs. Ten of these will be partial cuts with
sharpening by applying approximately 500 load cycles. The previously damaged areas
will be repaired, using a non-production type of repair, prior to proceeding with each
predamage and test. Data will be recorded at five load increments from 40 strain
gages in each test. It is assumed that 20 of these will be newly-installed gages.
Baseline loading and data acquisition equipment will be used.
5.2.1.2 Additional Thrust Structure Tests. The fatigue qualification thrust struc-
ture will be used after fatigue tests are completed. This structure will be installed
on the full body structure tested at NASA-MSFC. Static limit load tests at room tem-
perature will be performed ten times, each with a different pre-damaged location.
Approximately six locations will be in cap elements and four in diagonal elements.
Three of these will be partial cuts with sharpening by applying 500 load cycles. Pre-
viously damaged areas will be repaired prior to proceeding with each pre-<iamage and
test. Data will be recorded at five load increments from 20 strain gages on each test.
It is assumed ten of these are newly-installed gages. Baseline loading and data acqui-
sition equipment will be used.
5.2.1.3 Test Costs. Fail-safe test costs are given in Table 5-4.
5.2.2 QUALITY CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE PLANS. A fail-safe design requires
a maintenance approach that inspects for gross defects, and the inspection interval
must be much smaller than for the safe-life design, because of the pote**tial accelerat-
ed growth of defects in the structure adjacent to the gross failures.
Table 5-5 reflects the above differences for all structural components evaluated except
propellant tanks, which of necessity are considered safe-life structures.
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Table 5-4. Costs for Fall-Safe Tests
Engrg
M-H
Shop
M-H
Matl
$
AJ Wing Fatigue Article (Contractor)
Damage Preparation
30 Locations @ 8 hr = 240
4 engineering 960
4 shop
Repair Design 29 @ 40 hr 1,160
Repairs 29 @ 6 Shifts
Average = 1390 hr 5,560
Material: (300 lb) (29) (0.15/lb) steel
bolts (29) (50)
Pre-Cracking hr
(10) (500 cyc) (10-_-_vc) = 50 hr 200
Install 20 Strain Gages/Test
(30 tests) (20 gages) (10 hr/gage) 6,000
Material (30) (20) ($10/gage)
Test - Limit Load - 1 Condition
(30 tests) (8 hr/test) = 240 hr 960
Data Processing 4 hr/test @ 4 men 480
Computer ($350) (30)
Test Report 1 man, 2 mo; 30 photos @ 15 336
Design/Stress
Schedule 240 + 1390 + 50 + 240 = 1,920
1920
- lyror 6mo@2 shifts167
6 men, 6 months 6,000
Project Office, Supervision 10% 2,165
960
5,560
200
960
1,300
1,500
6,000
10,500
450
Totals 23,821 7,680 19,750
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Table 5-4. Costs for Fall-Safe Tests, Contd
Engrg
M-H
Shop
M-H
Matl
$
B! Thrust Structure Fatigue Article
(NASA MSFC)
Damage Preparation
10 Locations @ 8 hr = 80
6 engineering
10 shop
Repair Design 9 @ 40
Repairs 9 Locations @ 10 Shifts
Average = 720 hr 4,320
Material: (300 lb) (9) (0.15/lb) steel
Bolts (9) (50)
Pre-Cracking
hr
(3) (500 cyc) (100 cy_ ) = 15 hr 90
Install 10 Strain Gages/Test
(10 tests) (10 gages) ( 10 M-H) 1,000
Material: (10) (10) ($10)
Test (10 tests) (8 hr) = 80 hr 480
Data Processing 4 hr/test @ 4 men 160
Test Report 1 man, 5 weeks, 10 photos
@ 15 20O
Design/Stress
Schedule 80 + 720 + 15 + 80 = 895 hr
895
14---7-= 5.4 mo or 2.7 mo @ 2 shifts
6 men, 3 mo. 3,000
Project Office, Supervision 10% 1,000
480
360
8OO
7,200
150
8OO
4OO
45O
1,000
150
G.D. Totals 11,090 8,950 2,000
NASA: 6 engineering I10 shop 3 mo 3,000 5,000
Computer (MSFC) ($350) (10) 3,500
260
Table 5-4. Costs for Fail-Safe Tests, Contd
Co Sumnmry
Assume following rates for both General Dynamics and NASA:
Engineering: $20/hr
Shop: 15/hr
Wing
Thrust Structure (SD)
Contractor Total
NASA Total
En_neering Sho____p Materials
$ 476,420 $ 115,200 $ 19.750
221,800 134, 250 2,000
698,220 249,450 21, 750
60,000 75,000 3,500
Tot_
$ 611._70
35_,050
969.420
138,500
Table 5-5. Maintenance Manhours/Turnaround,
Fail-Safe Design
Scheduled
Routine Phased Unscheduled Total
LO 2 Tank 3 7 1/2 2 1/2 13
LH 2 Tank 3 7 1/2 2 1/2 13
Wing Box 2 4 1/2 3 1/2 10
Vertical Tail 1/2 4 1/2 3 8
Thrust Structure 2 1 2 5
Aft Orbiter
Support Frame 1/2 1 1 2
51
5.2.3 COSTS. The approach taken in the determination of the program cost differ -
ences between the baseline design and a design based on fail-saf9 criteria was similar
to that followed for the safe-life design and described in Section 4.2.3, except fox th,
direct cost delta for the aft orbiter attach frame, which required boron/epoxy com-
posite reinforcement. As this itemts Acost is calculated within the LH2 tank cost,
the effects of complexity differences were diluted in proportion to this ttemts
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fraction of the total tank weight. A complexity factor of 12 (as compared to aluminum
sheet stringer construction) was assumed for the composite portion of the frame.
This resulted in an equivalent complexity increase on the whole LH2 tank of about 10
percent in TFU cost. Using these cost versus weight plots and an appropriate com-
plexity factor, TFU manufacturing and EDD costs for the higher-weight safe-life and
fail-safe components were determined. The ATFU cost was then multiplied by appro-
priate hardware quantities for the test, test article conversion, production and spares
programs. When combined with the '._ EDD costs the total direct cost delta for the
respective subsystem element was obtained. The computation of these deltas is shown
below.
TFU* = 0. 009066 (88193) 0. 667= $18.031M
TFUFs B9U = 0.009157 (88193 + 720) 0.667 $18.310M
ATFU = 0. 279
EDDB9 U = $23.468M
EDDFsB9 U = 2. 79049 (88193 + 720) 0. 187 = 23. 504
AEDD = +0. 036
ATest Hardware = (No. Ground Test Units + No. Flight Test Units
+ Equivalent Flight Test Spares) ATFU
= {4 + 2 + 0.01) (+ 0.279) = 1.677
ATooling = No Change
Direct Nonrecurring Cost A = 1. 713
AProduction
= (No. Production Units)(ATFU)
= {1.0) (+0.279) = ÷ 0.279
Test Article Conversion = (Equiv. Units for TAC) (ATFU)
= (0.3 {+0.279) =+0.83
Direct Recurring Production Cost A = + 0. 362
ARecurring Operations Hardware = (Equivalent Operations Spares Units)(ATFU)
= 0.005 (+ 0.279) = + 0.001
Direct Recurring Operations Cost A --+ 0.001
Total Direct Cost Delta, B-gu Fail-Safe Orbiter Support Frame = $ + 2.076M
*Theoretical First (Production) Unit Cost
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Table 5-6 shows the booster program cost penalties that were determined for the fail-
safe design concepts of a delta wing (B-9U) booster and a swept wing (B-16B) booster.
Alr_ shown in the table are the delta costs attributable to direct, cascading, and
vehicle growth cost effects. In the case of the direct weight cost deltas, individual
penalties traceable to the wing, thrust structure, and orbiter aft support structure
are shown.
Table 5-6. Booster Program Cost Penalties,
Fail-Safe Design
Direct Cascading Weight
Weight Program Spiraling Total
Vehicle Cost A Cost A Cost A Costa
Configuration ($M) ($M) ($M) ($M)
B-9U Booster + 3. 729
Wing + 1. 188
Thrust Structure + 0. 465
Orbiter Support
Structure + 2. 076
+ 1.131(1) + 1.300
m
+ 6.160
B-16B Booster + 2. 541 + 1. 119 (1) + 0. 713 + 4.373
Wing 0 - -
Thrust Structure + 0.465 -
Orbiter Support
Structure + 2. 076 - -
(1) Unique fail-safe development program testing effort represents
$1. 108M of this item.
Significant uncertainty exists in the cost results shown both in safe-life and fail-safe
designs. Any extrapolation of these results to other subsystems would, of course,
be at least as uncertain as for the specific subsystems analyzed. The weights utilized
in developing the cost penalties are a significant source of uncertainty because the
booster design concept is still relatively immature and the indicated weight differences
1030
between the design concept represent only about_ - 0.16% for the B-9U safe-life
design. 626933
Another reason for uncertainty is that these cost differences between safe-life and
fail-safe are extremely small ($1 to $3 million) when compared to the total program
cost of ahnost $4 billion. Compounding this uncertainty is the fact that schedule
effects we re not analyzed. The peak year funding requirements as opposed to total
program cost or operations cost per flight has been of primary importance to NASA
in recent months.
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SECTION 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes the analytical results obtained for the baseline booster
vehicles and presents the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. Finally, recommended
space shuttle booster design approaches and changes to the preliminary structural
design criteria (Reference 2) are presented. These recommendations are based
primarily on the study results.
6.1 SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS
6.1.1 CAPABILITY OF BASELINE BOOSTERS. Table 6-1 presents in a highly
visible form the results of the fatigue, safe-life, and fail-safe analyses conducted on
the baseline booster structural components, and represents the capability of these
components when designed for static strength and the factor of safety criteria of
Section 2.5.
As can be seen, all structural components investigated _how adequate fatigue life for
the assumed stress concentration factor (i.e., KT = 3.0) and the scatter factor of four
on life. The majority of the components exhibit fatigue lives many times greater than
the required design service life of 100 missions. The component with the lowest
fatigue life is the delta wing lower spar caps which have a fatigue life of 175 missions.
The results of the safe-life analysis of structural components containing initial flaws
are similar to the fatigue analysis, with many components having a safe-life to
failure in excess of the 100 mission design service life with initial flaw sizes within
reasonable non-destructive inspection detection limits. The wing box structures
show very short safe-lives to failure (i.e., 3 flights for the B-gu delta wing and 12
flights for the B-16A swept wing) for the initial flaw types and sizes assumed. These
short safe-lives are caused by the severity of the wing load spectrum, the poor flaw
growth properties of titanium (Reference Section 3.3), and the high limit stress level
used in sizing the wing spar cap members. As discussed in Section 4, a lowering of
the wing spar cap limit stress level is required (l. e., causing a B-gu wing weight
increase of 1030 pounds) to show a wing safe-life equal to a selected 25 flight safe-
inspection interval.
The results of the fail-safe analysis show that the propellant tanks and orbiter support
bulkhead have no fail-safe capability (i. e., a residual strength representing a very
low percentage of limit design load) when obvious partial failures (i. e., gross flaws
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detectable by normal visual inspection) are assumed. Attempts to provide fracture
arrest capability at crack stoppers on the propellant tanks _similar to commercial
transport practices) showed prohibitive weight increases. The fail-safe analysis also
showed the wing, thrust, and vertical tail structures to have a high degree of fail-
safe capability, although not sufficient to provide for limit load residual strength in
the case of the B-9U delta wing and the thrust structure. This high fall-safe capa-
bility is due to the inherent features of the structural arrangement (i. e., multiplicity
of members and redundaucy) in the case of the wing and thrust structure, and due to
low tensile stresses resulting from compression critical design in the case of the
vertical tail. For the thrust structure and the B-9U delta wing, it was found that the
critical elements were generally in the area of the assumed partial failure, and that
the weight increases required to obtain limit load fail-safe capability were small
(e. g., 95 pounds for the thrust structure and 670 pounds for the B-9U delta wing)
when compared to the total component weight (Reference Table 2-3).
6.1.2 ADEQUACY OF BASELINE DEVELOPMENT PLANS. The structural test and
maintenance plans presented in Sections 2.8 and 2.9 for the baseline booster vehicles
have been examined to determine if they are adequate for their intended purpose
( i. e., that of qualifying the stl_ctural system and maintaining it free of defects) in
the light of the analysis that has been accomplished.
The structural test plans presented in Section 2.8 provide a "bare-bones" structural
test plan adequate to demonstrate that the booster structure is free of design
deficiencies which could lead to fatigue or static failures; however, additional tests are
required to demonstrate residual life or residual strength in the wing and thrust
structures when safe-life or fail-safe design approaches are adopted. These additional
tests and associated costs are described in detail in Sections 4 and 5 for the safe-life
and fail-safe boosters respectively.
The detail maintenance plan presented in Section 2.9 for the baseline boosters appears
to be generally adequate with the following exceptions. The phased non-destructive
evaluation (NDE) tasks on the safe-life LO 2 and LH 2 propellant tanks and safe-life
orbiter support bulkheads can be reduced to a minimum because of the large safe-
lives calculated and proof test approach used. Similarly the phased NDE tasks on the
fail-safe delta wing, swept wing, thrust structure, and orbiter support frame can be
reduced to a minimum because the fail-safe approach requires only a visual search
for gross defects and failures. The minimum NDE tasks mentioned above should
retain a phased NDE of points of severe stress concentration such as lugs and load
carrying doors. The phased NDE inspection interval of the safe-life delta wing, swept
wing, and thrust structure can be modified to be equal to or less than the selected
safe inspection intervals presented in Section 2.9. In the case of the safe-life
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wings where the selected safe inspection interval was 25 flights (requiring reduced
stresses from the baseline booster wings), the optimum approach would probably be
a phased NDE inspection every 5 flights of 20 percent portions of the wing spar caps,
such that after 25 flights all the spar caps would have been inspected. This procedure
would provide a more uniform spread of maintenance tasks with minimum impact on
turn-around time and efficient manpower utilization. The interiors of the fail-safe
delta and swept wings require a visual inspection for gross defects every flight be-
cause of the high stress in the members adjacent to a failed member and the
potential rapid growth of defects if present in these adjacent members. It is antici-
pated that visual inspections aided by spotlights from spaced access points would be
adequate.
6.1.3 IMPACT OF SAFE-LIFE/FAIL-SAFE DESIGN AI_PROACHES. Table 6-2
summarizes the weight impact of alternately emphasizing safe-life and fail-safe
design approaches to the maximum practical extent on the B-9U delta wign and B-16B
swept wing boosters. It can be seen that the weight impact is small (less than 1 per-
cent when compared to the total weight of the components investigated.
When considering the impact of safe-life on fail-safe approaches on performance, the
reduced performance is expressed in terms of pounds of payload delivered to orbit.
Phase B studies show that for every 1000 pounds of booster weight added, the payload
in orbit is reduced by 165 pounds. The total baseline booster payload is 40,000
pounds. Table 6-3 presents the performance penalties when the increases in the
booster structural weight are conservatively extended to the entire booster structure
(excluding TPS) on the percentage basis identified in Table 6-2. These losses are
less than one percent of the total payload weight.
Table 6-4 presents the impact of safe-life or fail-safe design approaches on total
space shuttle booster program costs. The cost increases are due primarily to the
component weight increases, and to some extent to increased component complexity
(e. g., fail-safe orbiter support bulkhead).
The delta costs due to the revised structural test plans discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and
5.2.1 were found to be highly significant (Reference Tables 4-2 and 5-3), while the
delta costs due to the revised maintenance plans duscussed in Sections 4.2.2 and 5.2.2
were of lesser significance, compared to the delta costs due to the structural weight
inc re ase.
6.1.4 EFFECTS OF ALTERNATE MATERIALS. Section 3.5 presents an analysis
of the effect of substituting 2219-T87 altuninum for titanltun-6A1-4V (annealed) in
the wing spar caps and thrust beam caps of the baseline B-9U delta wing booster.
These members are tension critical and susceptible to fatigue and brittle fracture
failures. The results of fatigue and safe-life analysis of these components and
materials are summarized in Table 6-5.
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Table 6-3. Performance Impact of Safe-Life/Fail-Safe Design
Approaches (Pounds of Payload Lost)
Design
Booster_ncept
Configuration
B-9U Delta Wing
B-16B Swept Wing
Safe -Life
0. 165(0.61x251, 023)/100
= 253 lb
O. 165(0.68x248, 181)/I00
= 278 Ib
Fail-Safe
O. 165(0.88X251,023)/100
= 364 It)
0. 165(0.49X248,181)/100
= 200 lb
Table 6-4. Cost Impact of Safe-Life/Fail-Safe Design
Approaches (/_ $ on Total Program)
B o os_--'o_-'_r -_... Design
Configuration
B-9U Delta Wing
B-16B Swept Wing
Safe-Life ($M)
+ 3.225
+3.512
Fail-safe ($M)
+ 6.160
+ 4.373
As can be seen, the aluminum shows lower fatigue life; however, most significantly,
a large increase in safe-life occurs when initial flaws are assumed. This increased
safe-life when 2219-T87 aluminum is substituted is attributed to the fact that aluminum
and titanium have similar flaw growth curves (i. e., da/dn versus 5 K) as shown in
Figure 3-45, and the fact that the AK's in aluminum are approximately 50 percent of
the A K's in titanium, due to lower working stresses based on strength design. However°
if the design stresses for the titanium were reduced to give the same structural weight
with aluminum the titanium safe-life design would more closely approach the life of the
aluminum design.
6.2 CONCLUSIONS
It is concluded from the fatigue and safe-life analyses that:
a. Except for the wing (reference Table 3-34) conventional fatigue is not a critical
design condition for the booster structure because of its short service life.
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Table 6-5. Summary of Fatigue Life and Safe-IMe of Titanium
:!_(I Aluminunl Components
Corn p_m cn t
Thrust B(,.anJ (.:_ps
Fatigue (1)
I,IMIT Life
(ksi) (missions)
92.9 887
'2'219-T87 45.7 824
Assumed Safe-Life (1)
Flaw Missions
0.10 in. 824
corner
c rae k 1arge
B-9U Delta XVin_
Spar Caps
(1) Includes S.F.
Ti-iiAI-4V 91.2 1 1 l
221 :)-T87 43.5 44
.... 4 for fatigue and S.F. : 1.5for safe-life
0.10 in. 31
corner
c rack large
b. The wing s_rviec load spectrum is severe because of many near-desigm limit
loads applied during ascent and entry, and conversely, the vertical tail and
orbiter suppor_ load spectrum is mild.
c. The fatigue analysis and fatigue test tasks on the booster structure can be re-
duced to a minimum; however, the full scale fatigue qualification tests should
be retained because their primary objective is to drive out design deficiencies
not apparent from the fatigue and strength analysis.
d. The stress analysi,'_ can :ffford the luxuray of assuming the booster structure to
contain initial flaws, and show adequate safe-life without serious weight penalties.
Ado_ttutte _afe-lile is a safe-life that exceeds the lesser of the selected insw, ction
interval or the des,_gn service life.
e. The weight imtxtct of safe-life or fail-safe design approaches is approximately
0.5 to t. 0 percent, trod probably less than the weight increase due to other
design considerations such as machining tolerances.
f. The choir,:,, of safe-lift., or fail-s,qXe design criteria and approach does not exert a
strong infh,,enee on the Slxace shuttle booster weight, performance, or cost.
g. The choice of safe-life or fail-safe design approach is not significantly sensitive
to booster configuration, provided design ingenuity is used to minimize tim
weight t_.nalty of selc.eted fail-safe approaches.
h. The :malytieal results regarding the fatigue life, safe-life, and fail-safe capability
of the booster eom!_nents, and the weight penalties associated with the selected
safe-life and fail-safe requi _'ements are highly dependent on the factor of safety
eriticra and life scantier factors selected.
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6.3 RECOMMENDED SPACE SHUTTLE BOOSTER STRUCTURAL DESIGN
APPROACtt
The optimum choice of criteria _nd ,_pproaches for the space shuttle booster structural
system is a mixture of safc-lifc m_d fail-safe approaches that:
a.
b.
e.
Are dependent on the vehicle and component size ,and shape.
Take advantage of the inherent features of the structural arrangement (e.g.,
multiplicity of members such as in thrust structures and low aspect ratio wing
boxes, and lack of severe st_'css concentration points because of sculptured or
welded construction).
Are influenced by mild service load spectra when compared to other design con-
ditions (i.e., compression or stiffness requirements, etc.).
The recommended booster structural design approach is a program that includes the
following elements •
a. Development of service load spectra concurrent with the design loads.
b. A program of fatigue, safe-life, and fail-s_ffe analysis concurrent with the
component design.
c. A program of component safe-life/fail-safe design trade studies which considers
the design criteria, desired safe-life or fail-safe characteristics, design stress
levels based on (a) above, variation of material flaw growth and fracture
characteristics, inspection plums, access provisions, NDT capability, manufac-
turing constraints, weight, and cost, as well as the usual static strength, stiffness,
and functional requirements.
d. Development of quality control, nondestructive testing (NDT), and maintenance
plans concurrent with the booster design.
e. Development of a comprehensive fracture control plan to integrate and coordinate
the above tasks, and to monitor the booster structural integrity during its service
life.
6.4 RECOMMENDED CIIANGES TO DESIGN CRITERIA
This section contains recommended revisions to Reference 2, NASA SP-8057, Struc-
tural Design Criteria Applicable to a Space Shuttle. This document, dlscusscd in
Section I.I, was developed by NASA and other governmental agency and industry
representatives. These revisions are based on the experience gained in performing
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the analysesof Section 3, midalso incorporate conclusionsarrived at in other portions
of the study. All paragraph and pagemarnbersreferred to herein are those of Refer-
ence2. The underlined paragraphs have the samemeaning as the bold-faced ones in
Reference2.
1.6 DEFINITIONS
Add the following definition:
"FATIGUE LIFE. The life of an unflawed structural componentto the
initiation of visible fatigue cracks."
Changethe definition of s_e-life to:
"SAFE LIFE. The life for initial defects in a component to grow to critical
size for catastrophic failure."
Reason: To give precise definitions to terms which will be used subsequently.
2. RELATED DOCUMENTS
On page 2-2, OTHER NASA PUBLICATIONS, add:
"Preliminary Criteria for the Fracture Control of SpaceShuttle Structures,
June 1971."
Reason:
4.7.3. I FATIGUE
Changetitle to "FATIGUE AND SAFE-LIFE,
Reason: To add a recent reference pertinent to sound structural design and construe-
tion.
Onpage 2-'3, OTHER PUBLICATIONS, add:
'_DMICMemorandum 252, Broek, David: Concepts in Fail-Safe Design of
Aircr,_ft Structures. DefenseMetals Information Center, March 1971."
To add a reference showing goodpractice.
" and rewrite the section as follows:
"The fatigue-life and safe-life characteristics of structural materials shall
be determined by experiment for appropriate cyclic loading and temperature
conditions.
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"Both crack initiation and crack-propagation characteristics should be eval-
uated with geometric parameters (i.e., gages and stress concentrations)
which simulate the design conditions. It should be assumed that the fab-
ricated structure contains flaws of the maximum size that cannot be
detected by ordinary ;_spection processes or by proof test. For the
selected material, the number of stress cycles required to initiate fatigue
flaws and the number of stress cycles required to grow the maximum
possible initial flaw to a size sufficient to initiate fracture shall exceed the
specified fatigue life and safe-life respectively which are based on multiples
or increments of the specified service life. If it is suspected or known that
the environment in which the structure operates will accelerate the flaw
initiation and growth, then this environment should be accounted for by the
analysis or test. If the m_alysis shows that a specific vehicle or component
with a specific material has more than adequate fatigue life and safe-life
with proper allowances for extension of the vehicle life, then some of the
requirements of this section can be waived. "
Reason: The criteria of this section lump discussion of fatigue (i.e., crack initation)
and safe-life (i. e., crack propagation) under the common title of fatigue, which is
not consistent with the definitions of section 1.6. In addition, the life of structures
which contain flaws cannot be expected to exceed the specified fatigue life or service
life of the vehicle. Also, it is not necessary to perform extensive fatigue and crack-
propagation tests if it can be sho_a by analysis with preliminary data that the structure
possesses more than adequate fatigue life and safe-life.
4.7.3.2 BRITTLE FRACTURE
Based on the comments noted for 4.7.3.1 above, it is recommended that the following
be added to Section 4.7.3.2:
'q.f analysis shows that a specific vehicle or component with a specific
material is not prone to brittle fracture or has adequate safe-life with
proper allowances for extension of the vehicle life, then some of the re-
quirements of this section can be waived. "
Reason: Same as for 4.7.3.1.
4.8 SERVICE LIFE
Add the following:
"All structures vital to the integrity of the vehicle or the safety of the
personnel shall be designed for adequate fati_ue life. The fatigue life
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shall be determined by analysis and fatigue test to be at least four times the
specified service life.
'_n addition, safe-life or fail-safe design concepts, analysis, and tests
shall be employed to determine the residual strength and residual life of
structures containing flaws or defects due to manufacturing or service
conditions, and to establish fracture control approaches and plans for all
structural components of the vehicle.
"The choice of safe-life or fail-safe design approaches should exploit the
inherent safe-life or fail-safe features of the vehicle configuration and
structural arrangement, and should be selected based on minimum impact
to the vehicle weight, performance, and costs. The basic objective of the
design approach and fracture control plan shall be to ensure that unaccept-
able structural failures due to crack-initiated fractures will not occur
during the service life of the vehicle. "
Reason: The confusion that exists regarding the precise definitions of fatigue life and
safe-life is apparent in this section. Section 4.8.1 (i.e., safe-life) dictates that safe-
life design concepts shall be applied to all structures vital to the integrity of the
vehicle or the safety of personnel. This is not necessary since fail-safe design con-
cepts with fatigue lives of at least four times the specified service life are equally as
acceptable as safe-life design concepts.
4.8.1 SAFE-LIFE
Delete the first paragraph of 4.8.1 and substitute the following:
"Safe-life design concepts shall be applied to all structure where a safe-
life approach has been selected as the optimum structural approach based
on weight, performance, and cost, or a fail-safe design approach is not
practical. The safe-life shall be determined by analysis and test to be at
least TBD times the specified service life or the selected inspection
interval. "
Reason: Same as for Section 4.8.
4.8.2 FAIL-SAFE
Delete the first two paragraphs of Section 4.8.2 and replace with the following:
'qhlhere practical, fail-safe design concepts shall be applied; however, the
concepts shall be compared to safe-life design concepts for impact on total
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program cost and performance. The impact of additionalor more severe
stress raiser on the fatigue lifeof the structure shall also be investigated.
'"Where inherent fail-safefeatures such as stringers, splices, or redundant
structural arrangements exist in the selected design, these features shall
be enhanced and exploited to the extent required to comply with the fail-safe
requirements.
"Fail-safe designs can be provided by multi-element or redundant structural
arrangements, and by fracture arrest by non-integral or integral crack
stoppers and stiffening elements. For all multi-element or redundant fail-
safe structures, the fail of a single principal structural element shall not
degrade the strength or stiffness of the structure below that necessary to
carry a specified percentage of limit load. For fall-safe structures relying
on fracture arrest capability, the propagating crack shall be arrested by the
crack stopper at the specified percentage of limit load and shall account for
the dynanaic effect of suddenly failing elements. "
Reason: Same as for Section 4.8.
4.8.3 MATERIAL PROPERTIES
Delete the first sentence in the second paragraph of Section 4.8.3 and replace with
the following:
"Analysis of flaw growth shall account for material properties, loading
conditions and associated stress levels, environmental conditions, the
scatter of flaw growth data, the effect of cyclic load rate, and the size and
source of flaws throughout the structure."
Reason: Flaw growth scatter must be accounted for in the prediction of safe-life.
4.8.7.1 METALLIC PRESSURE VESSELS
Delete the first paragraph of Section 4.8.7.1 and replace with the following:
"Flaw growth shall not exceed the growth required to increase the maximum
undetectable initial flaw to a size where the stress intensity under limit-
stress levels exceeds the criticalstress intensityvalues for the design
geometry. The effectof load excursions which result in stress intensities
above the threshold (KTH) shall account for both cyclic and sustained load
flaw growth in the predictions. Where the design geometry is thinner than
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that required to produce plane strain conditions, the fracture toughness
determined by specific tests which duplicate the design conditions may be
used to establish the critical stress intensity values. "
Reason: The applied stress intensity under maximum service load conditions may
exceed the threshold stress intensity values, provided that sustained load flaw growth
is accounted for in the flaw growth safe-life prediction. To restrict the applied stress
intensity values to values lower than the threshold stress intensity values would result
in prohibitive weight increases for space shuttle pressure vessels.
7.2 ANALYSES
Add the following sentence after the second sentence of Item 3 of Section 7.2:
"The stress analysis shall include fatigue, safe-life, and fail-safe analyses
to establish the tolerance of the structure to the initiation and propagation
of crack-like defects during the testing and service life of the vehicle. "
Reason: Stress analysis is the primary method to verify structural adequacy. The
stress analysis should encompass fatigue, safe-life, and fail-safe analyses as well as
conventional static strength and deformation analyses.
7.4.1 PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
Delete MIL-A-8860 (ASG) and MIL-STD-143A, and replace with MIL-A-008860 (USAF)
and MIL-STD-143B.
Reason: To add current references and correct typographical error.
7.4.3 FAILURE MECHANISMS
Delete entire section on "Brittle Fracture" and rewrite as follows:
'_Brittle Fracture. The brittle-fracture properties of thick-wall and heavy-
forged sections will be required for the vehicle structural design. The
tentative standard testing procedures developed by ASTM Committee E-24
should be applied.
'qn conjunction with evaluation of brittle fracture, fracture toughness should
be determined by experiment. For materials selected for _ truetural com-
ponents designed using a safe-life approach, flaw-growth characteristics and
threshold stress intensity should be experimentally determined.
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"qVhenexperimentally determining the fracture toughnessof materials, the
test specimens shouldbe sufficiently wide to prevent in-plane bendingand
shouldbe of the samematerial _mdthickness as the component, andpro-
cessed in the samemanner. A sufficient number of specimenshaving flaws
of various sizes and simulating the parent metal, weldments, andheat-
affected zones of welded components, shouldbe tested to allow meaningful
statistical values of fracture toughnessto be established."
'"Whenexperimentally determining the flaw growth characteristics of
materials, the test specimensshall be designedto eliminate detrimental
effects such as in-plane bendingandbackfaeecorrections. Sufficient tests
should )e conductedin the simulated service environments and at the service
load frequencies to allow meaningful statistical values of flaw-growth char-
acteristics to be established. In addition, flaw growth tests of test speci-
mens simulating the actual structural thicknesses, expectedservice loading
and environment, andanticipated flaw geometries shall be conductedon
critical structural componentssuch as pressure vessels to experimentally
verify the calculated flaw growth predictions.
'"Whenexperimentally determining the threshold stress-intensity character-
istics and sustained stress flaw growth rates of materials selected for
components subjected to sustained loads, the specimens should be tested in
environments simulating the actual service environments as nearly as
practicable. A sufficient number of specimens should be tested to allow
meaningful statistical values of the material's threshold stress intensities
to be established.
'Tor recommended practices for pressure vessels, refer to NASA SP-8040."
Reason: The section entitled '_Brittle Fracture" is written specifically for metallic
pressure vessels. The entire section should be rewritten making it applicable to all
structural components selected for fracture control.
7.6.1.2 ULTIMATE CONDITIONS
Delete MIL-A-8867 (ASG) and replace with MIL-A-008867 (USAF).
Reason: To update the reference.
7.6.1.3 COMBINED LOADS AND INTERNAL PRESSURE
Change and reason same as for 7.6.1.2.
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7.6.1.4 COMBINED LOADSAND THERMAL EFFECTS
Changeand reason sameas for 7.6.1.2.
7.6.2.3 BUCKLING AND CRIPPLING
Changeand reason sameas for 7.6.1.2.
7.6.7 LIFE TESTS
Add section 7.6.7.1 as follows:
"7.6.7.1 Fatigue Life
Fatigue tests shall be conducted for all structural components and as-
semblies that are vital to the integrity of the vehicle and the safety of
personnel, unless fatigue analysis and meaningful element tests show that
fatigue is not a critical failure mode and approval is obtained from the
contracting agency. The fatigue test lives with appropriate reduction
factors for inherent scatter in fatigue test results may be used to establish
the fatigue life of components. "
Reason: The confusion that exists regarding the precise definitions of fatigue-life
and safe-life is also apparent ill this section.
7.6.7. ] SAFE-LIFE
Renumber this section to 7.6.7.2, and rewrite as follows:
"Safe-life tests shall be conducted for structural components and assemblies
that have little or no tolerance for damage during operation in accordance
with the criteria of Section 4.8 and designed using safe-life approaches.
For safe-life designs concepts that depend on nondestructive inspection
{NDI) and flaw growth predictions for structural life assurance, safe-life
tests of the structure with artificial flaws shall be conducted to verify the
safe crack growth predictions and to demonstrate that NDI techniques are
adequate. The induced initial artificial flaws shall simulate flaws created
by manufacturing or service conditions and shall not exceed the maximum
permissible flaw sizes established as NDI standards for design of the
component.
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"The safe-life tests with appropriate reduction factors for scatter may be
used to establish the safe-life and safe inspection intervals of components.
"For safe-life design concepts utilizing the proof test as the final inspection,
the amount and type of preproof nondestructive inspection (NDI) required
should be determined considering the impact of a proof-test failure on
vehicle and program costs and schedules.
"For safe-life design concepts which depend on NDI for structural life
assurance, it should be demonstrated that the techniques are adequate to
ensure detection of significant defects."
Reason: Separate and specific fatigue, safe-life and fail-safe tests are required
depending on the service load conditions and design approaches.
7.6.7.2 FAIL-SAFE
Renumber this section to 7.6.7.3 and rewrite the first paragraph as follows:
"Fail-safe tests shall be conducted on structures depending on fail-safe
design approaches for damage containment and fracture control. Fail-
safe tests shall be conducted in accordance with the criteria of Sections
4.8.2 through 4.8.7 to demonstrate structural tolerance to damage,
fracture arrest capability, and the residual load-carrying ability at the
specified percentage of limit loads.
"Fail-safe tests may be conducted either on structure containing cracks in
a single component developed during fatigue testing or on structure which
has been purposely cut to simulate accidental severance of members.
'_During these tests, the load applied to the structure should not be greater
than the specified fail-safe load. "
Reason: Same as for Section 7.6.7.1.
7.6.7.3 MATERIAL PROPERTIES
Renumber this section to 7.6.7.4.
7.6.7.4 CYCLIC LOADS
Change and reason same as for 7.6.1.2.
Renumber this section to 7.6.7.5.
7.6.7.5 SUSTAINED LOADS
Renumber this section to 7.6.7.6.
7.6.8 INTERFACE-COMPATIBILITY TESTS
Change and reason same as for 7.6.1.2.
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